

Peter Pericles Trifonas
Bryan Wright *Editors*

Critical Peace Education

Difficult Dialogues

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ISBN 978-90-481-3944-6

ISBN 978-90-481-3945-3 (eBook)

DOI 10.1007/978-90-481-3945-3

Springer Dordrecht Heidelberg New York London

Library of Congress Control Number: 2012950362

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Printed on acid-free paper

Springer is part of Springer Science+Business Media (www.springer.com)

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Marie-Jolie Rwigema brings over 10 years of experience working in community-based organizations in the mental health, immigrant-serving, youth-serving, and community-based education sectors. She has worked as a community development worker, project coordinator, group facilitator, community- and arts-based educator, researcher, mental health counselor, and documentary filmmaker. She has a Masters in Social Work from the University of Toronto and an honours B.A. in African Studies and International Development Studies from York University. As a research assistant, she has been involved in several research projects documenting the experiences of immigrant youth, as well as a community-based participatory project documenting the experiences of homeless individuals. Within the Rwandan community, Rwigema has been involved in organizing efforts in Vancouver and Toronto, Canada. These have included coordinating the production of a film documenting Rwandan perspectives on the 1994 genocide against Tutsi in Rwanda; traveling to Rwanda as a member of Hope for Rwanda's Children Fund "journey to Rwanda," a team of professionals who worked with Rwandan youth to document their perspectives on Rwanda's reconstruction; and conducting a community needs assessment that led to the redevelopment of the Rwandan Association of British Columbia. Rwigema has most recently been employed as a mental health counselor with youth and their families in the Jane and Finch community and as a group facilitator for racialized queer youth. She also works on an ongoing basis as an independent consultant facilitating workshops and trainings on antiviolenence, anti-oppression, antiracism, and youth engagement.

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Sollange Sauter Umwali is a popular educator, community-based researcher, and community activist. She has over 10 years experience in the nonprofit sector working with diverse communities. She is currently an active representative on several community organizations including Policy Committee member at Youth Assisting Youth, Community Activist in the Rwandan-Canadian Community, and the Chair of Board of Directors at Springtide Resources. Umwali has Masters in Public Policy, Administration, and Law, and a Master's diploma in Democratic Administration from York University. Umwali has worked as Backup Supervisor and Mental Health Counselor at Women's Counselling Referral and Education Centre, providing mental health supports and counseling to individuals who have varying mental health issues. Umwali was involved in the creation of a video project documenting the experiences of Rwandan genocide survivors. For the past 12 years, she has organized and hosted annual genocide commemoration events, developed programs to maintain Rwandan culture, and mentored Rwandan-Canadians and advocates for context-specific programs to serve the unique needs of the Rwandan-Canadian community in Toronto. She was part of an advocacy team that succeeded in gaining official recognition from Mayor David Miller and the City of Toronto of April 7 as a "Day of Reflection on the Genocide in Rwanda." Umwali's current position is Manager of Community Programs and Services at Central Neighbourhood House.

Michael G. Wessells is Professor at Columbia University in the Program on Forced Migration and Health and Professor Emeritus at Randolph-Macon College. He has served as President of the Division of Peace Psychology of the American Psychological Association and of Psychologists for Social Responsibility and as Co-Chair of the InterAction Protection Working Group. He is former Co-Chair of the IASC (UN-NGO) Task Force on Mental Health and Psychosocial Support in Emergency Settings which developed the first interagency, consensus guidelines for the field of mental health and psychosocial support in humanitarian crises. Currently, he is co-focal point on mental health and psychosocial support for the revision of the Sphere humanitarian standards. He has conducted extensive research

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Bryan L. Wright is a Ph.D. candidate in Curriculum, Teaching, and Learning with a specialization in the Philosophy of Peace Education at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education/University of Toronto. He coedited *Critical Issues in Peace and Education* (2010) with Peter Trifonas. His masters thesis *Educating for Cultures of Peace within the Academy* was published by VDM Verlag Dr. Müller, Saarbrücken, Germany. Additionally, he is an Adjunct Professor in the Conflict Resolution Graduate Program at Portland State University, Portland, Oregon. His research interests center on the development of grounded philosophies for peace and education within the Western academy. Some of his other research and teaching interests include social justice education, collaborative pedagogy, engaged critical pedagogy, transformative education, and education/curricular research on peace and social justice.

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Critical Peace Education: Difficult Dialogues

The idea of difference poses critical questions for peace and education in institutions of higher learning in the new millennium (Derrida 2004; Trifonas 2005). These onto-epistemological questions on peace and peace education challenge the fundamental construction of knowledge and learning as it is represented, understood, and propounded in and through Western academe. The questions of peace, its conceptualization, interpretation, and co-optation within institutions of higher education remain contested across humanity and over time. Many of these epistemological questions on peace education are rooted in and emanate from the same conceptual battles educational theorists have engaged over the years in ethical pursuit of equitable curricular contexts for teaching and learning that are responsive to individuals and groups within a society or culture regardless of race and ethnicity, class, gender, or sexuality (Apple 1990; Giroux 1992; Hooks 1994; Lather 1991; McLaren 1997; Pinar et al. 1995; Spivak 1993; Todd 2009; Trifonas 2000, 2003). Yet this altruistic desire for securing equitable educational environments and opportunities compounds the struggle for peace within educational environments given progressively instantiated concepts of difference that inform and structure many disciplines across the social sciences (Wright 2010). Articulating such “communities of difference” and building upon them are critically important for the conceptual groundwork of peace education pursued through a trans-disciplinary or even supra-disciplinary approach, and therefore it becomes an intrinsic point of theoretical validation for asserting the legitimacy of such pedagogical discourses in practice by justifying the ethics of the methods each puts forward for the creation of equitable educational environments that seek to engage questions of peace and social justice while altering the ideological preconditions of prejudice and discrimination within, between, and among cultures, societies, and nations. Deconstructing the silos of the often-isolated critical pedagogies requires the development of a kaleidoscopic lens capable of producing multiple focal points that collectively reveal the image(ry) of peace. This reconstruction of the imagery of peace would then be more reflective of non-consuming, cosmopolitical interpretations and understandings of our world.

Conceptualizing peace within educational arenas is a task fraught with the challenges of bridging historical narratives, sociopolitical ideologies, and multiple

epistemological foundations and instituted pedagogical praxis (Wisler 2010). The imperative of engaging this challenge within tertiary education is manifest in the lives of the edu-learner as autotelic global citizen negotiating the basis of one's normative subjectivity within and among communities of difference. Our pedagogical task then as learners requires reflexive understanding and interpretation, which put into question the very foundation and founding of one's onto-epistemological being while exploring the infinite other. Critical pedagogues and some peace researchers alike have taken up this task within their respective fields of study with limited scope in recent decades in pursuit of equitable curricular purpose that would deconstruct the provenance and boundaries of knowledge, relationality, and meaning. Reconceptualizing the borders and boundaries of epistemology affords the opening to peace across, within, and through difficult dialogues. Reconceptualizing peace is at once an ontic onto-epistemological endeavor and the quintessential challenge within academe for a new age, which dissolves isolated and isolating subjectival discontinuities that serve to totalize otherness while it reconstructs epistemological subjectivity. While some of the necessary foundational blocks of a critical peace education have been finely hewn through the labor of leading critical pedagogues and educational philosophers in recent decades, the task ahead remains one of negotiating the limits of our constructed human body of knowledge toward an ethical future where peace and social justice are built on a foundation of equanimity. Disturbing or even deconstructing the foundations of particular bodies of knowledge affords the opportunity to witness, see, and express found connections in intersubjectivity that may eventually support the structures of human futures. Such futures manifest through these difficult dialogues would be the manifestation of peace that may be understood as the way of, the space for, and the place where the human communities of difference responsibly exist in sustainable equanimity.

Engaging difficult discourses in the current age repositions human subjectivity and ontology as the arena of inquiry that would cross the constructed borders of our world, genuinely listen to the voice of the other, challenge the innumerable historical narratives of power, and embody knowledge in being. Critical Peace Education asks theorists and educational practitioners across the world to reflect on these fundamental questions toward articulating a "curriculum of difference" that critically examines these questions and their import for peace and education in the global educational arena today.

"Meditating on the Barricades: Concerns, Cautions and Possibilities for Peace Education for Political Efficacy," Chap. 1 of this volume opens an examination of the normalized pedagogical discourse in the field of peace education and its limiting apperception and perspective. Betty Reardon's essay is written from the perspective of a practitioner-observer of peace education concerned with the effects of various fundamentalisms on current political discourse. Asserting that this situation presents a challenge to "critical peace education," her chapter introduces some cautions regarding methodologies and political frames of current practices in the field. It assumes that one of the main purposes of "comprehensive critical peace education" is to guide learners in the development of the reasoned judgment skills integral to political efficacy in citizen action toward peace and justice and to engagement in

participation in the difficult political dialogues such action entails. Reardon advocates reflective inquiry as an approach less likely to manifest the ideological bias infecting some practice of critical pedagogy. In arguing that the need for conceptual clarity as a means to work toward more constructive dialogues of difference, she discusses the blurring of two particular sets of concepts, the conflation of one with the other in each set is deemed to be especially problematic in conducting public discourse on peace and in the practice of critical peace education. The conflation of “critical” with “ideological” and “moral” with “ethical” aborts some of the constructive possibilities that might be derived from “difficult dialogues.”

She argues in the second half of the chapter that three forms of reflective inquiry are particularly suited to inquiries into the range of issues and aspects relevant to planning and carrying out the transformative politics necessary to achieve and sustain peace. These forms include critical/analytic inquiry through which learners explore the issues of power and the structures through which power is mediated, moral/ethical inquiry for the assessment and formation of the social values and political ethics with which to make essential political judgments, and contemplative/ruminative, essential to the creative thinking and deeper awareness of the personal capacities and social responsibilities essential to progress toward political transformation. All three are related one to the other, forming a general framework of inquiry that might comprise a core methodology for comprehensive critical peace education. In conclusion, Reardon asserts the essential normative nature of reflective inquiry as outlined, make it a pedagogy particularly well suited to learning toward the pursuit of moral inclusion, a core principle of the cosmopolitanism that is espoused as a foundational philosophy of education for peace and justice, a purpose impeded by lack of clarity about some of the fundamental concepts of the field.

In Chap. 2, “The Cold Peace,” Michael A. Peters and James Thayer critique prevailing notions of “peace” and its application to issues of social justice and citizenship as it underlies peace education and peace studies emphasizing how issues of conflict and security for the twenty-first century are embedded within a post-national and post-liberal framework that shifts our understanding of peace, security, and risk toward a post-Cold War and post-Cold Peace context. This displacement of the liberal nation-state and citizen is more accurately articulated by the neoliberal state and mobilized through a disciplined citizen subject. In this setting, transnational activity, corporations, and governance have reinstated a new highly centralized global form of governance and governmentality that has positioned the nation-state as one of multiple governing actors. Moreover, this has placed issues of peace and security as issues of what can and cannot be governed. As such, our critical understanding of peace and conflict must be remade and reinstated. Peters and Thayer begin by entertaining a notion of the philosophy of peace traced back to Kant’s minor essay as a basis for understanding liberal peace and liberal democratic theory and continue this investigation by briefly discussing the “peace industry” as part of a changed strategic context following the end of the Cold War in order to highlight the UN’s role in a post-9/11 world. Following this line of inquiry, the authors reexamine the US Peace Corps as an arm of foreign policy as a means of maintaining spheres of influence with newly independent countries in the process of

decolonization. Finally, Peters and Thayer examine the concept of “Crimes against Peace” and the way it was formulated after Nuremberg before discussing neoconservatism and the “New American Century,” the globalization of violence and the postmodernization of peace and the neoliberalization of security. These features constitute the new liberal montage that is recalibrating the concept of peace and peace education in the era of globalization.

Chapter 3, “Re-imag(e)ining the Cosmopolitical: Deconstructing the Other,” proffers another view of normativity within contemporary higher education and the specific field of peace education. Bryan L. Wright explores the problematic of subjectivity through Levinasian theory to deconstruct commonly received notions of self and other in the Western paradigm, which critically structure issues of peace and peace education within educational contexts. Through a destabilizing inversion of subjectivity, the self and the other as conceptual foundations arising from the metaphysical ground of deconstructed modern ideologies open to questions of human relationship, responsibility, and cosmopolitanism. Relocating the other and self through *différance* disrupts the fundamental conceptions we hold about human nature and our simultaneous a/di- synchronous (non-) relation. With an overview of many of the evolving discourses on cosmopolitanism and the cosmopolitical arising within philosophy, sociology, and educational philosophy, as well as peace education theory, the question of the *kosmopolitês* and the antinomies of cosmopolitanism reveals the onto-teleology of contemporary higher education and its import for peace and peace education. In this examination, the veil of syncretism that masks understanding of the disconnections between *demos*, *ethnos*, and *episteme* within an evolving (post-)critical peace education for the present age is rent exposing our understanding(s). In the third part of the chapter, Wright looks at performativity and the role of educators for peace within the university. Challenging epistemological boundaries in the interest of peace education toward the noble end to promote cultures of peace in our increasingly globalized existence is a twofold process that requires simultaneous deontological analyses of form and process along with historicized contextualization of social relationality. A paradigmatic shift in academic perspectivity, pedagogy, and praxis particularly in relation to peace and education within academe is proposed.

In Chap. 4, “The Transformative Power of Engaged Thinking for Peace Education” offers an engaging critique in thinking about critical thinking and education. Robert Gould suggests an expanded notion of critical thinking that includes thinking together, not just thinking alone or thinking from nowhere for everywhere wherein he states; it seems that thinking together is at the heart of cosmopolitanism, where we first respectfully welcome the other, then proceed to think across the differences of culture, history, and psychology. If the challenge of peace education is to help us learn to think and connect across difference, then we must look at a central difficulty in the way we teach critical thinking (both formal and informal logic). If critical thinking means careful thinking, then we are not careful enough when we solely focus on how to develop a position on a subject or argument. Unfortunately, according to Gould, the way we conventionally teach critical thinking amounts to argument construction—not connection across difference.

Panayota Gounari examines some of the limits of peace (as) discourse in Chap. 5. By critiquing the dominant discourse on peace and human rights, she exposes some of the fundamental elements of hegemonic Western teleology. In “Critiquing the discourse of peace as agency,” she proffers a critical review of what has taken place internationally during the past 10 years reveals how violent and bloody this decade has been despite a designation in 2000 by the United Nations for an International Decade for a Culture of Peace and Non-violence for the Children of the World. Despite the hard work, strides, and achievements made by peace organizations and movements worldwide, despite the positive interventions and the increasing awareness on issues pertaining to nonviolence and peace, the history of humanity remains one of atrocities, pain, and devastation. Since 2000 until today, Gounari claims we have witnessed not only the proliferation of existing major conflicts that have loomed for years but also the genesis of more fierce conflicts worldwide. Calling for a deeper reflection and understanding of the multiple forms of economic, political, symbolic, and discursive violence, and their very real human consequences, as well as an intensified move toward militarization worldwide, she wonders how do we reconcile a decade dedicated in the “culture of peace” with the ongoing wars and aggression? Furthermore, she acknowledges a tension that exists at the discursive level, as well: through the designation of an International Decade for a Culture of Peace and Nonviolence for the Children of the World, institutions like UNESCO, which are legitimized to define, process, and work on peace, produce their own discourse in reports, news briefs, and other antiviolence and pro-peace material and provide specific recommendations and directives. This discourse is integrated by and large in the discussion on Peace Education. On the other hand, violence is produced and reproduced materially and symbolically in multiple sites worldwide, and it produces its own discourses of aggression. In this context, there is a pressing need to rethink the ways in which we understand both violence/war and peace, discursively and materially, redefine them, and reconceptualize a curriculum that would address the aforementioned contradiction. This is an important task for educators and others who strive to reveal the inherent contradictions in the war-peace, violence-nonviolence, human rights-injustice binarisms; link them to larger sociopolitical, economic, and cultural questions; and make them part of the curriculum.

Gounari then analyzes the dominant discourse and “universal” character of peace and human rights and the way they have been used to neutralize or even promote aggression. This has been done in the context of a liberal ideology of missionary politics that promotes tolerance. She interrogates this missionary politics of tolerance and provides some thoughts on violence drawing on the seminal work of Slavoj Žižek, Herbert Marcuse, Walter Benjamin, and Hannah Arendt in an attempt to provide a theoretical framework of understanding the ongoing aggression worldwide. Finally, Gounari looks at Peace Education through the lens of Critical Pedagogy as a radical educational discourse and pedagogy, to suggest ways to integrate pressing questions about violence in the curriculum.

In Chap. 6, “Cosmology, Context, and Peace Education: A View From War Zones,” Michael G. Wessells emphatically calls for a pedagogy of peace and peace education that unreservedly acknowledges and honors difference. Wessells suggests

contextually appropriate peace education programs are much needed yet are relatively rare in many war zones. In rural Angola, for example, people have a spiritualistic, animistic cosmology that views events in the visible world as caused by the invisible events in the ancestors' world. Here, peace has as much to do with harmony between the living and the ancestors as it does with relations between groups and people who are living. Unfortunately, power dynamics in the humanitarian system frequently lead international NGOs to impose their predominantly Western ideas of peace. This imposition makes peace education a neocolonial enterprise, and it undermines the equity, respect for diversity, and spirit of mutual learning that are central to peace education. Imposition can be avoided by taking a grounded approach that builds on local beliefs and practices, empowers local people, and works in a bottom-up rather than a top-down modality.

Problems also arise from isolated programs that make little contact with the lived realities of children. In northern Uganda, for example, a program taught children about peace between Acholi people and the government, yet it did little to address the main problem of violence for the girls, whose teachers forced them to trade sex for grades. Similarly, sociopolitical disconnects occur when compartmentalized peace education projects do not develop effective linkages with wider social, political, economic, and cultural systems. For example, cross-conflict dialogues or exchanges may, in very hostile environments, lead to backlash and protection threats against participants. Also, peace education programs in war zones tend to be adult centric and marginalize youth, whose disempowerment is a risk factor for violence. Wessells finds these challenges can be addressed through a youth empowerment, multilevel approach that connects and harmonizes efforts at one level to the situation and change efforts at other levels of the social system.

In Chap. 7, Michalinos Zembylas examines how psychoanalytic and sociopolitical perspectives of trauma and emotion can work as a pedagogic resource for developing critical insights into teaching and learning about trauma and reconciliation in schools. A major challenge for critical educators in traumatized societies which struggle for reconciliation is that emotions of trauma are often appropriated by social and political institutions, including schools, to justify particular collective narratives and ideologies. For this purpose, I analyze a detailed example of the political appropriation of one emotion—fear—as it stems from a particular context and shows how reconciliation possibilities are essentially “undone” by the restrictive engagement with trauma narratives. To this end, I propose critical emotional praxis as a pedagogical tool that could potentially invent new interpretive approaches and practices of relating with “others”—pedagogies that do not fossilize emotional injury but move forward.

Chapter 8, “What you see depends where you stand: Critical anticolonial perspectives on Genocide Education addressing the 1994 Rwandan Genocide,” traces some of the key tensions and questions at stake in critical, anticolonial research into contemporary practices of Genocide Education regarding the 1994 Rwandan Genocide against the Tutsis (shortened here to Rwandan Genocide Education or RGE) in Canadian schools. The discussion emerges from a long series of conversations among and between Rwandan-Canadian community activists/educators, NGO- and local school-based educators, and university-based researchers concerning the politics of knowledge production and representation within

institutional initiatives to commemorate and learn from the 1994 Rwandan genocide. In sketching out the central concerns of our collaborative inquiry, this chapter traces a conversation in three voices among Marie-Jolie Rwigema and Sollange Sauter Umwali—two community-based researchers and educators—and Lisa Taylor—a university-based researcher and teacher educator.

In Chap. 9, “Forging a Constellation, Re-covering A Space of Memory Beyond Reconciliation and Consternation,” Mario Di Paolantonio examines how psycho-analytic and sociopolitical perspectives of trauma and emotion can work as a pedagogic resource for developing critical insights into teaching and learning about trauma and reconciliation in schools. A major challenge for critical educators in traumatized societies which struggle for reconciliation is that emotions of trauma are often appropriated by social and political institutions, including schools, to justify particular collective narratives and ideologies. For this purpose, Di Paolantonio analyzes a detailed example of the political appropriation of one emotion—fear—as it stems from a particular context and shows how reconciliation possibilities are essentially “undone” by the restrictive engagement with trauma narratives. To this end, Di Paolantonio proposes critical emotional praxis as a pedagogical tool that could potentially invent new interpretive approaches and practices of relating with “others”—pedagogies that do not fossilize emotional injury but move forward.

In Chap. 10, “Dialogical Hospitality as a Habitat for Peace,” François Mifsud traces the notion of peace as a quality of a relationship between human beings has been the object of many conflicts and wars. A historical archetypical situation that explains this contradictory reality is the *Pax Romana* (Roman Peace) where the Roman wars and violent colonizations were animated by the objective of peace. Thus, the same instance in which an individual or a community attempts to express a definition of peace becomes the same instance that estranges (othering) others, creating conflicts and in extreme situations wars. This contradictory situation, where the communication of peace becomes the announcement of conflicts and wars, reveals the necessity for a habitat that presides and creates the possibility for people to dialogue and exchange their different notions of peace. In this chapter, Mifsud identifies this habitat for peace with the notion of dialogical hospitality; this becomes the space for strangers to relate and to exchange their notion of peace in peace.

In Chap. 11, “Participatory Action Research (PAR) and Homeless Youth,” David Alan Goldberg provides an overview of Participatory Action Research (PAR) and explores the advantages of utilizing this methodology with homeless youth as a way for approaching questions of community and social justice. By incorporating the voice and viewpoint of homeless youth in the framework and substance of the research, PAR differs from traditional academic studies in terms of participation, ownership, and whose voices shape the research. Through youth’s involvement and self-inquiry through PAR and the subsequent sharing of their experiences and perspectives, new and beneficial understandings of their lives and situations can emerge toward the possibility of actualizing social justice and inclusion.

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Chapter 1

Meditating on the Barricades: Concerns, Cautions, and Possibilities for Peace Education for Political Efficacy

Betty A. Reardon

Reflective and Conceptual Dimensions of Comprehensive/ Critical Peace Education

Some years ago, the late, revered peace researcher and distinguished economist, Kenneth Boulding, turned the maxim frequently used as a call to action on its head. “Don’t do something, just stand there!” I took this to mean that, even in times of crisis, reflection is a fundamental necessity to intelligent human action. Reflection in all its forms is a capacity at once essential and severely lacking in American education and politics; I have argued this position, a legacy from my work with Lawrence Metcalf, in previous publications. It is central to several of the essays in *Comprehensive Peace Education* particularly to the one identifying reflection as one of seven peacemaking capacities to be developed through peace education (Reardon, Chapter 5, 1988). Subsequent learning leads me toward further specifying and clarifying some of the pedagogical dimensions of comprehensive peace education as outlined in that work. It is the first on several more sets of reflections on what I perceive to be some political and pedagogical problems in present practices of “critical peace education.” (I see critical peace education as one of various more recent approaches to comprehensive peace education.)

I worry that these perceived problems may be detrimental to the role of dialogue as an approach to the politics of peace. Not the least of these preoccupations is that my own work and the way in which it and the work of others whose ideas have influenced me – or the ways in which these ideas have been interpreted – may well be in part responsible for what now concerns me. I also note that I refer to “perceived problems.” Not everyone will see the conditions that concern me as problematic.

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But more to some of the points to be made here, I have come to find it ever more important to the values I seek to serve, to remind myself that I may be wrong, an attitude necessary to the capacity not just to listen but to fully hear the views of others, always harder to do when “we know we are right.” I share these worries because they have for me urgency, undiminished by my own and other’s continuing challenge to these and all arguments and assertions about peace education.

Since what follows is intended as an extension and clarification of my own previous work, the judgments are admittedly subjective. Some may read the conceptual distinctions proffered in this essay as a argument about angels on the head of pin, irrelevant distinctions between concepts widely understood – even sufficiently clear – in common peace education discourse. However, because the pedagogy I advocate involves organizing substance in conceptual frameworks, to me, these distinctions are both relevant and essential to the clarity of peace education subject matter and to the pedagogy that is my main concern. I offer them as examples of a process of the continued learning that I understand as constitutive to critical peace education, making it a dynamic, often exciting field of study.

I write not as a scholar or researcher, but as a teacher, an observer/practitioner, and a peace learner, what I have termed an “edu-learner” (1988). My interest is in continued learning for more relevant and effective teaching practice – the behaviors, interactions, and queries that comprise what we *actually do* in the classroom. The main sources of my learning have been the classroom and the students with whom I have pursued critical inquiries into the issues and substance of peace education, and “shop talk” with other peace educators. I am not a philosopher or ethicist, nor a political or critical theorist, and neither am I a lawyer nor a scholar of international relations. Those with expertise in these fields may rightfully challenge what my experience leads me to argue here, as I try to learn how to think and how to help other ordinary citizens learn how to think about the humanly untenable state of a violent world – and how we might become enabled to change it. I hope that I do not do them a disservice in the following reflections. In these pedagogical reflections, I hope that I have not too seriously misinterpreted the invaluable scholarship of these various fields from which much peace knowledge is derived.

One further admission of limitation is that most of my work has been done within an international network of peace educators with whom I have collaborated and share political views on peace, justice, and pedagogic preferences for inquiry and participatory approaches to peace learning. Herein, however, most of my observations stem from the contemporary American political culture and the pedagogical problems faced by American peace educators in responding to it.

Political Concerns: Efficacy in Establishing Cosmopolitan Norms

The political concerns which inform this essay and its pedagogical arguments arise from the present debased political culture in which civility and dignity have been deeply corroded by an acidic climate of contempt and absolutism, the antithesis

of that to which we aspire in the cosmopolitan vision. In this climate of contempt, authentic dialogue is impossible as public discourse is debased by distortions of politics and religion and the erosion of the constitutional separation of church and state, which is fundamental to the freedom of conscience and religious belief that is the bedrock of secular democracy. Nothing short of a profound change in political ethics will enable us to heal the diseased moral state of the society. Peace education should contribute toward this healing.

Starting from the long-held premise that peace education is education for responsible global citizenship, our task in general terms is educating toward political efficacy in the formation and pursuit of citizen action and public policy intended to move the world toward the achievement of a more just and less violent global order. Such citizen action calls for intention born of reflection, a considered decision, as stated in the Earth Charter, "...we must decide to live with a universal sense of responsibility....We are at once citizens of different nations and of one world..." (Earth Charter Commission 2002). In terms of current trends in the philosophic foundations of peace education, these goals might be summarized as cosmopolitanism, a worldview that emanates from thinking, acting as, and feeling ourselves to be global citizens. Cosmopolitanism is compatible with the premises of comprehensive peace education and the concept of a culture of peace that accommodates the political and pedagogic complexities inherent in so broad a concept as a culture of peace. The contribution of cosmopolitanism most relevant to peace education as an agent of healing is, in my view, that it best articulates the normative goals of our evolving field. "Cosmopolitans posit the existence of ethical values and principles that are universally applicable to all human beings, regardless of culture, ethnicity, religion or nationality. They maintain that our shared humanity carries with it a moral imperative to respect and care for the dignity of *every* human being..." (Snauwaert 2009, p. 1, original emphasis). I would summarize this as the vision of universal moral inclusion that inspires the normative goals of peace education, a vision in which all human beings are accorded respect of their fundamental human dignity.

These goals call for transformation of world views and identities as well as of the institutions and structures that manage our lives within which our world views and our identities are formed and manifest. A comprehensive goal of critical peace education would incorporate this purpose and could be designated as transformative political efficacy. Political efficacy of all types and at all levels of human social organization depends upon sound political thinking and political education that imparts to learners in a paraphrase of the Final Document of UNESCO'S World Congress on Disarmament Education (1980) "not *what* to think about [the politics of peace and justice] but *how* to think about [the politics of peace and justice]." Toward that goal, inquiry into obstacles and possibilities for transformation should form the core of peace pedagogy, so as to provide learning in how to think and to act for political efficacy in peace politics, a complex learning that requires pedagogies of multiple forms of reflective inquiry. It seems to me that the purpose of what is termed "critical peace education" is most effectively pursued through reflective inquiry.

I am convinced that lack of the reflective element in all public policy discussion – especially that which surrounds issues of peace, security, human rights, social justice, environmental sustainability, and the range of such hotly contested

issues – impedes constructive discourse, contributing to the problematic that I understand to underlie the organizing theme concept of this volume, difficult dialogues. The lack of reflection is especially evident in the failure to perceive and articulate some essential conceptual/normative distinctions, a failure that has become the basis of specious political controversies, producing even more intense conflicts and posing more obstacles to constructive social and political change. In the proposed clarifications of the blurring of two sets of key concepts addressed in this essay, moral/ethical and critical/ideological, I hope to deepen and to some degree challenge my own political thinking and pedagogical practice, as well as encourage colleagues to examine theirs. I perceive new facets and dimensions of politics and pedagogy not previously comprehended even in the concept of comprehensive peace education (Reardon 1988). I hope that focus on these facets and dimensions may help to form a basis for a critical inquiry into the present phase of the development of pedagogies of peace learning, notably the refinement and augmentation of more particular forms of reflection and processes of conceptual clarification to make our practice more politically effective.

Second only to reflective inquiry among the capacities for transformative political efficacy is conceptual clarity, essential to reflective thinking about any problematic and to conducting any public discourse, the effectiveness of which will depend upon common understanding of the terms employed to describe issues and proposals for their resolution. So, consideration is given to two particular instances of conceptual blurring (among a larger number thereof) that I believe impede peace learning, constructive public peace discourses, and the achievement of wider realms of moral inclusion. The two sets of concepts discussed later in this essay are especially relevant to the critical and ethical reflection essential to moral healing and political transformation.

Pedagogic Concerns: Maintaining Authentic Open Inquiry

Three particularly focused forms of reflection are proposed here as pedagogical devices to accommodate the complexity of the issues involved in these conceptual areas and other instances of difficult dialogues. I hope to articulate, as clearly as I can, some growing concerns with a few of the characteristics of current practice in critical peace education that I see as owing somewhat to the blurring or conflation of concepts central to peace discourse and peace learning. Peace pedagogy is constantly evolving to meet ever changing needs of education for political efficacy in democratic societies, societies growing ever more contentious, torn by multiple competing, morally exclusive religious and political forms of fundamentalism. In my present view, there are some aspects of peace pedagogy that may themselves present obstacles to our goals, and their underlying social purposes of contributing to a political movement directed toward the necessary and desired transformative changes. There are several current practices that I perceive to limit the possibilities for educating toward a cosmopolitan ethic. These perceptions are significantly influenced by what I consider to be politically responsible and pedagogically ethical

peace education. In its comprehensive form, peace education accommodates – even demands – multiple approaches and perspectives.

The title of this essay – intended to capture the core of the reflection/action cycle at the core of peace learning – comes from a recent conversation with an educator activist who has often taken to the “barricades,” the forefront of nonviolent peace action, who takes as her professional responsibility the practice of critical peace education for political efficacy. Her teaching partner approaches the pedagogical task in a contemplative manner intended to cultivate qualities and practices of inner peace that she sees as the font of peaceful political behaviors, including organized nonviolent strategic action. Elements of both approaches are essential to transformative learning. However, there are few situations in which such teaching partnerships assure that peace education students are educated through a positive balance of these distinct but complementary approaches, each of which could be facilitated by one of the forms of reflection outlined – intended as complementary one to the other – and proposed in this essay.

In some cases, neither education for action nor education for reflective contemplation characterizes courses in peace studies or peace education. Rather, the learning objectives are still too often built upon traditional educational goals of subject matter mastery of the research and theories of the more widely published peace scholars – or the instructors’ interpretation thereof. Although the learning modes are likely to include instruction in methods of research and analysis, still we might recognize that when we focus primarily on predigested interpretations or catechetical study of the primary theorists, we may limit autonomous thinking. Certainly, students of peace should be guided toward the achievement of the substantive and skilling goals undertaken in the study of research conclusions and explanatory theories. However, even when the substance is the fruit of “critical peace research,” should we not also facilitate independent analysis and autonomous theory building among the learners? Most students, even at the beginning stages of political awareness, could benefit from such learning opportunities. Public political discourse would surely benefit if most citizens – not just those enjoying the advantage of academically oriented secondary or higher education – had such opportunities as are integral to the teaching of those who practice the educational philosophies of John Dewey and/or Lawrence Metcalf or Paulo Freire and more current critical educators including, Henri Giroux and all their respective disciples. The pedagogies suggested here are intended for the general citizenship, applied to the social education offered in secondary schools and to the preparation of those who teach in them. There are elements of these suggestions, however, that are adaptable to all levels and other subject areas.

One particularly discouraging consequence of the lack of such opportunities is an unfortunate tendency of too many peace education students to accept the political conclusions of the scholars they study to be the last word on the issues being addressed. While “the classics” of peace research may provide a critical view of politics, they will not, of themselves, offer experience in the practice of the independent critical thinking essential to responsible, effective political action. Only at the doctoral level is there much encouragement of student pursuit of new knowledge, alternative critiques or forms of analysis, all of which comprise fundamental

elements of education for political efficacy but should be included in general citizenship education in all venues and all forms. Little of the prepackaged peace knowledge we have has yet to prove adequate to movements for political change. All that we know and all that we think we know about peace should be open to continual critical review and assessment as a standard practice of our pedagogy – at all levels and in all spheres of peace education. So, we too should be preparing students to make their own contributions to our store of peace knowledge, so as to deepen understanding of the problems and possibilities for change, and to strengthen the commitment to action that comes from direct, critically reflective involvement with the issues being addressed.

There is still another factor of concern regarding the lack of reflective teaching in our schools. Not only does it prevent the development of thoughtful decision making among the general electorate; it also serves as an additional division that is rending the political fabric of this and other societies by generating mutual contempt between the “ordinary folk” and the “intellectuals.” The moral chasms dividing society rent by lack of reflection are deepened by lack of respect that pervades the political culture.

Most of all, we need to be keenly cautious of letting the strength of our own convictions and adherence to particular political interpretations creep into what and how we teach. We need to avoid privileging views congenial to our own over the multiple alternatives that authentic, open inquiry requires us to present as objectively – note I do not say neutrally – as we can. Even the slightest appearance of bias or lack of objectivity is used by those who oppose our field, claiming that we are teaching *what* to think, while we believe we are teaching *how* to think about the issues at hand. This, sometimes seemingly unconscious, privileging of our own views contributes to *politicization* of peace education, by which I mean placing the positions presented to students on the continuum of contemporary partisan politics, ideologies, and political theories without the broader context of a wider range of alternatives which may lay outside the continuum. Absent fully open inquiry, evaluative assertions can function as bias. Exclusion of multiple alternatives lays us open to opposition from those who themselves have little understanding of the distinctions between education and indoctrination. So, we and our students fall into the very politics that makes the dialogues we want to encourage so difficult. Objectivity calls for the widest possible inclusion and a broad range of practices in critical inquiry and multiple forms of reflective thinking. It does not require neutrality, but it does require that the values proposed as criteria for making judgments be openly presented and thoroughly examined.

Reflecting Our Way to the Barricades: Multiple Modes of Reflective Inquiry Relevant to the Political Efficacy of Peace Learning

The point of fully open inquiry is not to avoid these difficult dialogues, for such would delay action for change. Rather, it is to become more intentional in assuring that both the debates and the actions and policies they may determine are thoroughly

explored, soundly reasoned, ethically assessed, and thereby more likely to be socially constructive. Here, I find the practical wisdom of Kenneth Boulding's precept – interpreted as an injunction to reflect before action – enjoining peace educators to be more focused on the pedagogical responsibilities to instruct learners in the habits and skills of reflection, a learning objective that involves learning by doing. The practice of reflection should be integral to all approaches to citizenship education and to all forms of critical and comprehensive peace education. Reflection is the realm of thinking most appropriate to critical inquiry. It is the intellectual space in which the “critical” comes to bear. It is also that space where the practical, the normative, and the human may be illuminated.

A reflective pedagogic process is initiated by the questions and queries provoked by the problematic of the topic or issue being addressed. The questions are formulated so as to encourage deeper modes of thought than the kind of recall that is characteristic of a curriculum designed primarily for mastery of content rather than a critical analysis of it. Reflection is well suited to peace learning as its subjective element is conducive to the ongoing developmental nature of comprehensive peace education. All peace learning at whatever academic level in whatever learning setting should be directed toward developing a range of reflective capacities relevant to political efficacy. Development of such capacities requires independent individual and group practice of reflection. Through years of practice, I have come to conceptualize three – I assume there are more practiced by others – forms of reflective thinking in which to frame an inquiry focused on the particular nature of the peace problematic in question. All three are informed by the foundational capacities of clear conceptualization and the sound reasoning which of itself can be developed through posing questions suitable to the developmental level of the learners so as to encourage its becoming a habitually used skill. Reasoning capacities, like other skills, can be honed through continued practice that serves to reinforce the habit of reflective thinking. Through years of posing questions of inquiry, I have employed several kinds of queries to enable students to achieve a better comprehension of subject matter by processing it through reflective thought. The queries are also designed to develop autonomous critical thinking. Particular types of queries have been used to introduce the primary forms of reflection I have used – without necessarily designating them as such: critical/analytic, moral/ethical, and contemplative/ruminative. The three are, of course, not necessarily distinct one from the other and may operate separately, simultaneously, or in sequence. However, each may be more suited than the other two to inquiries into particular issues or problems, and the greater the clarity and intentionality with which we facilitate the practice of these forms, the more likely we are to educate for the reflective thinking most conducive to political efficacy. Here, too, conceptual clarity is needed. What follows in descriptions of the three forms attempts to provide peace educators with somewhat more refined notions of reflection than I may have presented in previous work.

Reflective thinking, as I understand it, is as defined and advocated by Lawrence Metcalf in his book with Maurice Hunt (Hunt and Metcalf 1958) as influenced by Dewey's thinking on education for democracy (1933). “Reflective thought... grounded in tested belief... [While it is not inconsistent with scientific method, it also]... uses criteria other than scientific ones...” (p. 67). Hunt and Metcalf also

presage the holistic forms of thought currently advocated by peace education. “Reflective thought ... includes every relevant aspect of the mental and physical environment in which ... thought occurs ... General ideas or principles are prominent among the resources applied to any act of reflection...” (p. 280).

The concept as I present it here refers to thinking that brings to bear – as fully and objectively as possible – all substance available and relevant to the consideration of an issue or problem. As noted earlier, by “objective,” I do not mean “neutral” or without normative and/or value considerations. Reflection in itself is a value, and reasoned reflection in regard to public issues is directed toward taking a position on an issue or advocating a strategy or policy for addressing the problem upon which the reflection is focused. The values and norms themselves, the “tested beliefs” integral to the process of reflection, are subject to assessment and values testing that makes us conscious of the values at play so that they are less likely to function as an unacknowledged screen by which evidence that may appear to contradict the validity of the assessor’s values might be excluded from consideration. Such is the case when assessments are made from an ideological base or a fixed belief system (a point I will deal with below in discussion of the conceptual blurring of critical and ideological morality and ethics). Reasoned reflection, observing and assessing evidence in light of pragmatic as well as normative criteria, is the starting point of reflective inquiry and the minimal essential of critical inquiry, the first and more widely used of the three forms of reflective inquiry.

Critical/analytic reflection is the core reflective process of critical peace education. It is also this form that peace educators associate with Paulo Freire and his theoretical heirs (Darter et al. 2003), as examination, analysis, and reasoned assessment of evidence in whatever form or through whatever process it has been gathered, that is, research, observation, experience, etc. As a sphere of peace learning, it is practiced within a framework of fully open inquiry that seeks to explore all possibilities and propositions involved in the focus subject of the inquiry.

Critical/analytic reflection is more directly political than the other two as its primary inquiry is most often into the nature, functions, and distribution of power, the political institutions and social structures through which it is mediated and the consequences of these circumstances to human lives and relationships. In my own work, this form of reflection has centered mainly on the problematic of gender and alternative security systems, inquiries in which issues of institutionalized power are the core problematic. In all such inquiries, the question of whose interests are served have to be confronted as the relevant institutions are subject to analysis of the locus and function of power and assessment of the human consequences of their uses of power. Reflections focus on both the diagnosis of the dysfunctional in existing institutions and prescriptions for changes in social and political structures, intentionally designed to fulfill core peace values. Raising the institutional questions should, in my opinion, form one of the main tasks of critical/analytic inquiry in all forms of peace education.

In assessing positions and proposals in both the politics of security policy and the power relations between men and women, in any vigorously contested political/social issues, the subjective values, norms, and ethical principles espoused by the

assessor play a key role in the process, as is the case in nearly all political analysis. This role requires that the individuals and the groups involved in any process of critical/analytic reflection be clear about the themes, values, and processes involved – clear in the conceptual sense and in the sense of transparency – for the sake of political efficacy and ethical integrity. Both well-documented substantive knowledge and values awareness are essential.¹ If the conclusions of critical analysis are to be ethically defended and politically efficacious, the values applied must be acknowledged and publicly stated. The efficacy of critical conclusions is largely determined by public understanding and acceptance of the analysis, the evident validity of the data upon which it is based, and the value frame in which they are articulated. Conclusions of any transformative reflection process should also involve consideration of potential political consequences – both short- and long-range consequences – of acting on the conclusions to contribute to constructive change. As noted, the process of critical reflection focuses the diagnosis of the problems being explored by the inquiry. Why is this condition a problem? What differences in perspective or values may be at issue? What are the manifestations of the problem? What political, economic and/or social norms or cultural values are ignored or violated, and what causes can we discern? How conducive to peaceful and just outcomes are these norms and values? Is there need for normative and or value change? What remedial political and economic efforts and/or social actions might be taken? Transformative reflective inquiry should address possibilities for practically achievable and normatively acceptable solutions. Among the queries to be addressed in critical analytic reflection on each proposed solution are the following: Is it necessary? Is it fair? Is it feasible? Will it work? Is it sustainable? Is it desirable in light of the values brought to the critical assessment? Pursuing the values questions in many cases will open a moral/ethical inquiry.

Moral/ethical reflection addresses questions of fairness and moral inclusion with queries focused on issues of the goodness, distribution of advantage and harm, questions of justice, as well as potential detriments and benefits of political, social, and economic relationships and their effects upon the quality of human life and the health of the biosphere. Transformative moral/ethical reflection – directed toward reducing violence and enhancing justice – is guided by normative principles consistent with the values designated as the indicators of what is considered to be socially good and humanly enhancing. These norms arise from the deepest cultural values of a society and its dominant philosophic and religious beliefs, and the not always “self-evident truths” that form the foundation of the social contract that informs the laws that govern the society and the relationships among its peoples. The normative order of even secular societies can trace some of its roots to the religious beliefs and institutions formative to most world cultures. Theologically, the moral codes of the world’s great religions may have been intended to apply to all, but in

¹ A common critique of peace education asserts that it is lacking in substance and inculcates predetermined positions rather than cultivating autonomously derived values, the latter which is in fact a primary purpose of peace learning.

practice – especially in these times – these codes have come to serve the cause of moral exclusion and considerable violence. These moral contentions as a focus of transformative moral/ethical reflection present a challenge to peace learning that may best be met through a secular cosmopolitan social contract.

As the *Declaration of Independence* articulates the “self-evident truths” of the American social contract, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights has come to be considered the self-evident truths of global society. The Declaration serves as the first phase in the evolution of cosmopolitan ethical and legal norms. In just societies, the laws assure that all in the society have access to the goods that manifest the self-evident truths. The global human rights movement and much of what informs peace education – consistent with the cosmopolitan ethic – is directed toward learning that will enable and motivate societies to provide access to as much of the goods of the Earth to as many of the world’s people as possible. The principles of the Declaration, along with other such secular ethics, might well serve as reasoning guides and assessment criteria for exercises in ethical reflection that should be undertaken in peace learning. The very title of the Declaration suggests the recognition of some fundamental universal values as basic norms of human and social relations.²

Just as I hold that the primary inquiry of critical/analytic reflection should be directed toward transforming the international political system from militarized patriarchy to a nonviolent order dedicated to the achievement universal moral inclusion, I believe that the core focus of ethical reflection should be to transform the divisiveness of moral exclusion toward universal moral inclusion. The core of this inquiry should focus on transcending the objectification of persons that now operates at every level of human relationships from child abuse, to sexual exploitation, to domestic violence, to strategic torture, to the demeaning of human dignity throughout popular entertainment, and to racism and genocide. With the concept of universal moral inclusion in mind, inquiry into ethical dimensions and consequences would raise such questions as the following: What ethical principles should we bring to consideration of this problem or proposal? What ethical issues might be raised by the problem or in the enactment of this proposal? Are the potential outcomes of the proposals likely to be just? Who will benefit and how? Who might be harmed and how? Are the potential distribution of benefits and harms fair and just to all human identities and respectful of universal human dignity? How might the harms be avoided and benefits more widely distributed? Are there existing norms and standards that might help in finding constructive responses to the ethical queries raised by this problem, issue, or proposal? As in other inquiries, the responses to

²The “universalism” of the Declaration is asserted by some to be a Western masculinist construct that is not applicable to all world cultures. This assertion is contested by the global human rights movement, representing all world cultures, who claim that the standards are adaptable to various cultures. What is universal is not the mode of application, but rather the fundamental principles. Perhaps most contended are the standards that uphold gender equality and the human rights of children, both of which are seen as challenges to widely accepted patriarchal norms.

such queries as these are likely to lead to further and more specific inquiry that could extend the reflection to the critical/analytic and – as the inquiry deepens – to contemplative/ruminative reflection.

Contemplative/ruminative reflection is a process consistent with the breadth of thought inspired by a cosmopolitan view. It is a wider sphere of reflection, which facilitates perception of the full scope of the complex systemic, dynamic interrelationships comprising our natural and humanly constructed environments. It makes space for affect and intuition, as ways of apprehending aspects of a problematic that require sensitivity to the seldom considered psychological and emotional elements of a problematic. It is through deeper thought that persons gain levels of self-awareness which further develop capacities to lead not only humanly fulfilling lives, but even more to the point, to live personally, socially, and politically so as to be agents of social and political transformation, and to commit to an active struggle or movement for transformative change. Agency manifest by participation in some of the multiple movements striving toward global transformation is for many aspiring global citizens, a significant dimension of a meaningful life.

Taking up such participation is one point of this form of reflection which I refer to also as *ruminative* to connote the aspect of “mulling over” that is the essential process of contemplative/ruminative reflection, a process suited to considering where and how one applies political and social agency, and where one stands on crucial public issues. Rumination is thinking things through more deeply and fully than the habitual superficial thinking that produces too much of our public discourse that has become little more than vituperative exchanges of sound bites, reducing political arguments to ethically stunted superficiality and politically dysfunctional simplicity. Such discourse has turned American politics into a zero sum game in which the contender seeks only to win, to gain power for their respective groups’ having power, not to use it for the common good. Here is another challenge to critical peace education.

Contemplative/ruminative reflection may be at some distance from what Metcalf advocated. It is a process in which reason and tested truths are complemented by the exercise of what Lawrence Kohlberg (1984) had come to designate as the sixth stage of the development of moral reasoning, involving concepts of universal justice, a stage few of us have reached. I would attribute this paucity of achievers of higher levels of moral reasoning in no small part to lack of opportunity or encouragement to engage in the processes of deeply reflective thinking essential to the ethical quality of practical political action toward widening realms of moral inclusion in a diverse and complicated world.

The pedagogic uses of contemplative/ruminative reflection are well suited to education for cosmopolitanism. I have previously argued that we need to make more room for silence in our classes. Not only for those times when students may be at work on individual learning tasks, or some of those points in the consideration of various very painful realities comprised by the problematic central to peace learning where speech is halted, or more personal reflection is called for, but also for times when silent thought is the richest realm for internalizing learning and integrating it into the individual and social self. Perhaps daydreaming might be encouraged from time to time rather than denounced as failure to pay attention. The introduction of

something as simple as “quiet time” to allow for the silence necessary to contemplative reflection, that silence in which it is legitimate to suggest that students reflect on how they “feel” about the topic of reflection as distinct from – but a complement to – what they “think” about it, to intentionally call forth affective responses to material that has been cognitively considered. Learners might explore some of the unexamined notions that produce those feelings as a step toward analyzing their own values and achieving the kind of self-awareness referred to above.

Contemplation provides the opportunity to develop a capacity for empathy without which the development of concern for justice is very likely. I would define empathy as a capacity to understand/appreciate the feelings and circumstances of others, even in the absence of similar experiences. It is that which enables those free and not in need to feel solidarity with and responsibility to act on behalf of the deprived and oppressed. Critical/analytic reflection calls for inquiry into political, economic, and social effects on all who would fall within the realm of a policy proposal. Moral/ethical reflection calls for assessment of the elements of justice and moral inclusion at play in a problem under study. Contemplative/ruminative reflection might inquire into how others may feel and the human experiences they might endure as consequence of the personal or political action being contemplated, inviting those in reflection to consider more deeply the experiences and suffering of those who are affected by what they themselves do and how they live and by the policies of their country.

Powers of the imagination are given play in contemplative reflections which is the most fertile ground for the cultivation of human creative thought, the source of the sorely needed alternatives to present political and social orders. Without acts of creative imagination, the alternative structures and institutions manifesting transformative change cannot be conceived. Contemplation encourages speculation on “what might be” and the envisioning of a transformed global society that inspires and motivates transformative action (Lederach 2005).

Contemplative/ruminative reflection is a realm of thought that manifests the holism that many peace educators advocate as the learning framework for the subject matter of the peace problematic. It certainly should be considered within the pedagogic practice of holists. Holism, a comprehensive and integrated approach to an inquiry, is advocated as an antidote to the reductionism and fragmentation that obscures the essential interrelationships among the multiple components of the problematic. In a similar vein, it offers the thinking space for the integration of learning from different times and different sources. Integration is a significant aspect of all learning, but it is an essential aspect of cosmopolitan peace learning. A cosmopolitan view requires not only seeing the world as a whole, but fully perceiving its complexity and diversity. Integration is a kind of intellectual management skill that enables learners to become ecological/cosmopolitan thinkers.

No form of reflection can more deeply enrich the common learning and nurture the human spirit more than contemplation; not ignoring the difficulties and dilemmas of pedagogical practice of contemplative/ruminative reflection, but rather attending to the caution to distinguish this reasoning of the heart from the profession and practice of religion and spirituality, contemplative reflection can provide learning experiences

that could serve in all classrooms to inspire and strengthen the capacities of learners to live, act, and view the world as global citizens. Among the types of queries³ which might provoke the creative and empathetic thinking to be developed through contemplative/ruminative reflection are: How might you/I/we describe a global society in which moral inclusion is the norm? What new or significantly changed institutions would make such a society possible? What are the major obstacles to universal moral inclusion in the present world system? (In this inquiry, moral inclusion includes the Earth.) How do the people of our society and other societies experience these obstacles? Who suffers and how do they suffer from the consequences of these obstacles? What are our personal and political relationships to those obstacles? In what ways might we change our own behaviors, relationships, and lifestyles to overcome our complicity in any form of moral exclusion? What alternative institutions might assure wider realms of moral inclusion? How might we make a particular and personal contribution to changing the structures and institutions that manifest moral inclusion? What kinds of political action might we imagine to bring about the establishment of the necessary institutions? What would we need to learn to be capable of such change and such action? Can you envision a history of how the transformation might have come about? Learning queries should be central to all forms of reflective inquiry, as it is from the responses to these questions that a common learning agenda for peace education might be derived.

Caution with Regard to Religious and Spiritual Practice

As the other two forms of reflective inquiry call for objective outward-looking thinking, contemplation/rumination invites learners to think inwardly and subjectively, propelled not only by reasoning, but also by an inward looking gaze on the self, the individual self, and the self in relation to others and to the larger living system, the biosphere that is the source of our individual lives. It is a deepening of what I previously termed *ecological consciousness*, that is, thinking broadly and deeply in living systems terms (Reardon in Nordland, 1994, p. 21). Contemplation as reflective inquiry is akin to – but not synonymous with – the spiritual practice of meditation and the religious practice of meditative or contemplative prayer. While these practices are significant and to be encouraged in the personal and spiritual development of peacemakers, I do not believe them to be appropriate to secular public education about public issues. Educators in the public realm should respect the spiritual natures of students, but not involve themselves directly in their spiritual/religious development. The principle of the separation of church and state obliges us to leave the guid-

³In the practice of inquiry, I make a functional distinction between questions and queries. *Questions* are interrogations for which there are definite – usually discrete – *answers*. *Queries* are those that can provoke multiple *responses*, making possible the exploration of different perspectives and various possibilities, a pedagogic process consistent with moral inclusion.

ance of that development to the constitutionally appropriate agents. Although respecting very much the work of Arthur Zajonc on contemplative inquiry (2008) and the Waldorf/Steiner spiritual approach to education, I do not seek to adapt them directly to reflective inquiry. I do, however, hold that contemplative reflection is an important form of the deep thinking without which neither personal nor social transformation is possible. It does provide an introduction to a mode of reflective thinking out of which spiritual and religious development might grow in experiences outside public citizenship education that – given the materialistic, antagonistic nature of contemporary culture and politics – should respond more directly to the need for transformational learning for the public and political realms.

While there is growing common understanding of what might comprise social and political transformation, self-transformation in the secular sense of critical and ethical agency – as I refer to it here – has not been widely considered in the discourse of peace education. Such transformation involves coming to a realization of how we are formed by the institutions and relationships in which we live our personal and social lives. It leads to understanding that through a process of intentional learning we can become capable of changing personal relationships and gain awareness of our own possibilities for agency directed toward changing institutions. Thus, I deem it very important not to jeopardize the possibility of all learners experiencing opportunities to engage in contemplative/ruminative reflection in their general education by not clearly separating it from religious and spiritual education and practice.

Nonetheless, while the contemplative/ruminative reflection I advocate here is not a spiritual practice, I do believe that teaching *about* particular religious and spiritual beliefs and practices – not teaching adherence to the beliefs and practices – has a place in peace education subject matter as a dimension of multicultural education. Multicultural education is an essential substantive component of a curriculum to educate toward understanding of the world, comprehending as much of its diversity as can be communicated in formal public education. Consistent with my position on the limits of spiritual practices in the application of contemplative reflection in secular education, I am opposed to introducing religious practice as such and certainly to the advancing or imposing of religious beliefs and perspectives within the public schools, as has been the cause of curricular controversies in several states of the USA recently. These controversies are cases in point to illustrate the problems of lack of conceptual clarity in political and pedagogical thinking and practice. Their consequences also strengthen the arguments for pedagogies of reflective inquiry and have led to my critical stance on the blurring of morals and ethics as discussed below.

Significant Distinctions: Reflective Inquiry into Conceptual Clarifications

Difficulties and dilemmas abound throughout all practices of critical thinking and reflective inquiry. Not the least of these is the pedagogic challenge of formulating cogent queries as the foundation of the structure of an inquiry and within which to

frame difficult dialogues toward wider and more open discussions. It is in difficult dialogues – involving not only those who hold different world views, values, and philosophical premises but also those with whom we share similar political inclinations yet differ profoundly over political instruments and methods – that the assumptions and purposes of critical reflective inquiry are tested. Educators applying any of the queries posed above in relation to each of the three forms of reflective inquiry are likely – or at least it is hoped so – to elicit a variety of responses. Absent a commonly accepted inquiry agenda, differences may even become so difficult as to prevent any dialogue. In these cases, questions of clarifications of concerns and meanings are essential to opening the communication process. Words may be understood to connote different concepts and carry different value valences, trapping us in what can become seemingly intractable conflicts. Dialogue – the avowed preferred mode of peace seekers – is often thwarted by the very language with which dialogue is to be conducted. The terminology itself sometimes encourages rather than dissipates conflict and difference.

In spite of several decades of the advocacy and practice of holism by peace educators, there is still – even in peace education practice – a tendency to think in terms of dualisms when conceptualizing positions in a controversy. Oppositional and adversarial positions are not infrequently taken to “defend” peace. Winning – not resolution – becomes the objective of academic as well as political discussions. Clarification of issues is jettisoned in favor of disproving others’ arguments. Debate to assert truth from one perspective prevails over dialogue in search of a common truth, accommodating multiple perspectives. Although academic debate as such has sometimes proven a useful tool in the advancement of scholarship, it is not the most useful style of discourse toward the transformation of the adversarial nature of communication that characterizes the mainstream politics of the cultures of violence. Adversarial discourse is integral to the deeply fragmented, competitive world as seen from the dominant realist view that stands in opposition to cosmopolitanism. Separating oneself from the positions of adversaries is more important than communicating with them. In spite of an insistence on the need for civility in professional and public discourse, peace educators (and even some human rights educators) are not totally free of the fault of denigration rather than reasoned refutation – part of the process I have referred to as civil disputation (Reardon 2001) – of ideas and positions in contention with our own, and of the persons who hold them. Contentious dialogues, while necessary to political change, are the most difficult and most in need of conceptual clarity and civility in the search for common truth and efforts to liberate the common humanity within which lies our greatest hope for peace. Sadly, the possibility of deriving a common truth and a socially constructive resolution of publicly debated issues is often lost in relentless striving to win, to “come out ahead” of our interlocutors rather than “come together” with them. Peace education should attend to this serious obstacle to a civil and just peace.

Toward this end, I have given thought to various conceptual blurrings, the clarification of which is essential to the conduct of difficult dialogues and the pedagogic practice of reflective inquiry. It is important in reflective inquiry to make distinctions without setting up dualisms and privileging one concept over another. In the discussion below, I do not intend to contrast the concepts in each set, or to

suggest one to be intrinsically better than the concept with which it is paired here. My purpose is to make distinctions toward greater clarity and integrity of reflective inquiry as peace education. Two blurred pairs, critical/ideological and morality/ethics, seem to me to be particularly relevant to the pedagogical practice of reflective inquiry argued here to be an appropriate and effective pedagogy of peace learning for political efficacy. Both pairs affect public discourse on many “hot button issues” related to peace among them: international and global security, climate change and the environmental crisis, human rights and social justice, gender and human diversity, and violence and nonviolence. Preparing citizens to push these buttons without burning their political thinking fingers is a task of education for political efficacy. Preparing them to do so in a manner consistent with the values of a culture of peace and/or cosmopolitanism is a particular task of peace education. The heat of these buttons is in no small measure due to the blurred conceptual distinctions between some of the core notions that are fundamental to peace theories and to the cultural characteristics of common political discourse outlined above. The exigencies of peace education call us to address a seriously unattended need to clarify conceptual contradictions and complementarities, as well as strategic and political differences. Two that I identify as most relevant to a pedagogy of reflective inquiry are addressed here.

Critical and Ideological: Toward Truly Open Inquiry

Over the past decade, various forms of “critical pedagogy” have become the preferred methodology of growing numbers of peace educators in various countries. On its face, critical pedagogy is a highly appropriate – some argue the most appropriate, or even the only suitable – methodology for peace education. I have rather recently argued something that might be so construed (Reardon 2010). Critical pedagogy is rooted in the essential political nature of peace education, taking its inspiration from the “Frankfurt School” of critical philosophy, the gospel according to Habermas and his followers (Darter et al. 2003). Intended to inspire a politics of emancipation, this philosophy has been adapted to devising an emancipatory education, framed somewhat more in the actual politics of inequality than is the awareness process of *conscientization* advocated by Freire. My concern is not with the fundamental philosophy, but with some of the educational practice that carries its banner that seems to conflate “critical” with “oppositional,” not infrequently on ideological grounds. The practice of concern seems sometimes to ignore the mission of a critical theory of education as described by Henry Giroux who refers to “...self conscious critiques and to the need to develop a discourse of social transformation and emancipation that does not cling dogmatically to its own doctrinal assumptions” (Giroux, in Darter, 2003, p. 27).

While I am of the opinion that effective peace education is political education, that is, education for responsible and effective political participation, I also hold that peace education should not be “politicized” by privileging any particular political bias or ideology, even the emancipatory gospel of the prophets of Frankfurt or any

number of equally revered peace theorists. Such political privileging compromises the integrity of the critical inquiry, which is the essence of responsible peace education. Likewise, shaping public school curriculum to conform to particular religious beliefs compromises such inquiry. I fully accept the validity of Freire's claim that no education is neutral. All education carries and communicates values that in public education must be as openly acknowledged as religious values are reverently avowed in religion-based education. The acknowledged values that infuse the goals and objectives of peace education are best pursued in a truly open inquiry, one not bound to a particular place on the left-right continuum of the organized politics of the present system and one that does not privilege any of the political philosophies that underlie the continuum. Such philosophies might well be the subject matter of peace education if subject to the challenge of authentic inquiry, but not presented as the ultimate explanation for the problematic of peace. The conflation of critical pedagogy with education from the perspective of the left contradicts what I would take to be the purpose of critical pedagogy, discerning as clearly and objectively as possible how the present social order obstructs the achievement of a just peace, analyzing the obstructive social and political institutions and raising awareness about the modes of thinking that maintain them. Various philosophies and peace theories might be explored for their possibilities to shed light on causality and to point toward a way out of the problematic. The inquiry into each would entertain the question, "What light does this theory shed on our quest for a politically effective response to this particular peace problem?" rather than, "Is this theory the answer?" All must be fully open to challenge by students as well as their instructors. (I need to continuously remind myself of this imperative in explicating some of my own interpretation of the pivotal role of gender in the peace problematic.) All involved in the inquiry should be encouraged to form their own theories to be subject to the same assessment.

Challenging the notion of a "pedagogy of the left" as antithetical to open inquiry is in no way intended to deny the fundamental structural injustices and institutions of violence the left rightly opposes. Rather it is intended to open, broaden, and deepen the peace inquiry so that it might produce a wider range of thinking about more effective strategies for change. Such strategies, I believe, cannot be derived from an inquiry that begins with the assumption of the validity of the perspectives and analyses of the left any more than it can from the assumptions of the right or the "establishment" that colors much public education. If inquiry reveals either of the latter two to bear significant responsibility for the problems, it can be challenged more effectively within a framework that has taken its own assumptions and assertion fully into account, as is suggested by the Giroux quotation above. The inquiries undertaken by peace education should extend beyond and beneath contemporary, specific issues of war and peace, the strategies for achieving one policy change or eliminating one weapons system or implementing one political philosophy. It is not that these issues are irrelevant, but that they are insufficient. In the pursuit of the learning necessary for progress toward authentic global security and universal human dignity, peace education must favor no particular position in the contemporary range of the main political camps and must challenge the very systems and structures

that produce both the problems of study and the political camps. This is not just because virtually all political positions and structures are morally, ethically, and even politically bankrupt, as well as blind to the deeper roots of the problematic (such as, I would argue, patriarchy), but because virtually none of these positions or structures shows reasonable possibility of providing a basis or framework for deep and fundamental change. To be truly radical is getting to the deepest roots of the core political problem, the worldviews and fundamental belief systems that are yet to be fully examined in most educational practice much less challenged by our political actions, largely confined to the system as it is constructed.

Our own practices of critical pedagogy should not be exempt from challenge. For a number of practitioners and their students, it appears to have become an ideology rather than a methodology. Critical pedagogy as an ideology contradicts the pedagogical principles and fundamental philosophy of peace learning that learners themselves should determine their own positions on public issues and bring a critical eye to every interpretation and assertion. In spite of efforts to bring a truly critical perspective to all aspects of education, too many students still read texts of critical pedagogy – and of peace research – as scripture, accepting it as the final word from an ultimate authority that requires their lip service if not their practice. Too often, the pedagogy is “taught” in the usual traditional manner of read, review, revere, and remember enough to quote on the exam and to season conversations with other students and teachers. The full extent of the transformative Freirean cycle is rarely pursued in our classes, most lamentably not even in most peace education classes. Nor do many educators provide consideration of the ongoing learning of the theorists themselves that makes such challenge of even the most value consistent and promising practices an enriching learning experience. Not long ago, a Freirean colleague and I were dismayed to hear a young peace educator say, “You can never dialogue with an oppressor,” inferring as well that it was pointless to attempt reasoned discussion with any whose political position is deemed outside the realm of the reason established by the basic *orthodox* critique, thus was dismissed the promise of facing the challenge of difficult dialogues and a large part of the hope for nonviolently realized transformative change. So, too, did we clearly see how deep the need is for fully open, critical, and reasoned reflection in all of our peace education practice, particularly in instances where resistance to injustice must be planned and undertaken. Had all African-American activists for justice in mid-twentieth century perceived as an unreachable oppressor Ku Klux Klan member, Robert Byrd, we would have lost the ardent civil rights advocate that Senator became.

The caution that such situations leads me to is not only that peace educators should be as self-monitoring and self-aware as we can, but also that we must practice what we teach, perhaps biting our tongues from time to time. Often, we need to maintain our own reflective silence in the face of ideas we would prefer not to hear expressed in our classes, taking time to formulate a responding question that might keep the inquiry open, even in minds that to us may appear closed. Critical inquiry is a methodology that avoids direct answers – other than to questions of fact or clarification – in favor of responses that keep the reflective learning possibilities open. In peace education, critical pedagogy should comprise a methodology of

provocative questioning rather than one of soliciting answers influenced by political ideology. Predetermined answers are the stuff of fundamentalism. Fundamentalism – which I take to be the claim to possess an unchallengeable truth – in all its forms, ideological as well as religious is the antithesis of reflective critical thinking. So, too, in its negation of the views of others, it contradicts a core principle of cosmopolitanism, a world view that respects the other, takes interest in multiple views, celebrates diversity, and manifests the widest possible range of moral inclusion.

While few of us aspire to turn out classes full of Thurgood Marshals, we might strive toward nurturing the capacities for open-mindedness, tolerance, and respect that characterized his personality and his roles as groundbreaking civil rights lawyer and revered Supreme Court Justice:

To the end Marshal believed in the humanness of those who opposed him – a largeness of spirit that allowed him not only to build coalitions on the court but to sit in smoky back rooms playing poker with some of the worst segregationist of the century. Never did he take the view that another human being, no matter how morally bankrupt, was beneath him. (Carter 2010)

In short, Thurgood Marshall was a politically efficacious cosmopolitan, a model of citizenship whose life and work are an example of the possibilities that are opened when critical politics practiced as ideology is trumped by ethics.

Morality and Ethics: Pursuing a Wider Scope of Justice and Moral Inclusion

The fundamental purpose of Marshal's public life was consistent with that of Martin Luther King, holding American society accountable for the fulfillment of its foundational political value, recognition, and realization of human equality. Although King's public work was initiated in the Southern Christian churches that germinated the civil rights movement, his political audience was the larger American secular society. His initiatives were primarily inspired by the religious morality of his Christian faith, while Marshal's inspiration was in the ethical principles of the U.S. Constitution. Both strove toward widening the American scope of moral inclusion by seeking the assurance of social justice through law. Both worked for moral goals, articulated as social justice through the exercise of the secular ethics imbedded in Constitutional law, the encoding of the "self-evident truths." While their efforts did not achieve the transformation of American society that King envisioned and articulated, they achieved the legal goals that to this day offer the basic tools for constructing a racially just society, demonstrating the uses of law as a politically efficacious instrument of nonviolent social change. In their common struggle, we see that morality and ethics complemented and reinforced each other without compromising the constitutional separation of church and state, the foundation of American secular civil society from which both sought support. This core principle of the American political system is now subject to compromise by the fundamentalisms that impede reasonable and civil public discourse, as it seeks to narrow to closing the open

inquiry so essential to a democratic society, and the *sine qua non* of reflective peace learning. Much of the assault on the separation of church and state by American religious and political fundamentalists is framed in the language of morality, which to all practical purposes rationalizes the moral exclusion that characterizes most forms of fundamentalism in this wide and diverse world. I find it both morally and ethically acceptable for religious conviction to motivate persons to political action as was the case of Dr. King and his followers, but it is neither morally nor ethically acceptable to infuse religious convictions into politics. To educate for the transformative change that has inspired so much of the peace education movement, we need to clearly distinguish between religious morality and secular ethics, so as to educate for the essential capacities of ethical reasoning without which political efficacy in the cause of social justice is not likely to be achieved. My argument about the inappropriateness of religious belief and practice in public education arises from the consequences that the blurring of morals and ethics have on public education.

It is widely agreed among peace educators – as argued by King and Marshall – that transformational change toward greater degrees of justice requires that societies develop stronger commitment to the norms that uphold principles of justice and non-violence. These norms are manifest in the practice of moral and ethical principles and the social values that derive from them. Social values are vigorously contested in the present climate. Conflicting moral claims are advanced by the whole range of political positions in the USA from Tea Partiers through various degrees of conservatism, centrism, and liberalism to the radicalism of the right and left. The contestation – conducted largely outside the realms of reason and civility – comprises mutual charges from short-sighted self-interest to irresponsibility, to immorality and dishonesty, and even to outright stupidity. There are similar political conflicts in other countries. No situation poses greater difficulties to dialogue as an instrument of political accord.

Dialogue, a means to political accord favored by many advocates of nonviolence, requires skills of communication, civility, and common conceptual language. Lack of the skills of ethical reasoning, little respect for the other that makes for civility, and contempt for the morality of the other stands in the way of defining mutually acceptable common norms, so moral exclusion prevails as a seemingly impenetrable barrier to constructive dialogue. As peace educators, we are called to work toward the development of the skills and the cultivation of civil communication styles based on respect for the other so as to widen the realms of moral inclusion. Widening realms of moral inclusion is a means to increase the political relevance of nonviolence, essential because it is through nonviolent political action that truly transformative change can be wrought (Lederach 2003). Striving toward the conditions under which we can negotiate the common norms that could lead to wider realms of moral inclusion among peoples of many belief systems, we are faced with the obstacle of irresolvable, conflicting moral claims. Clarifying the politically relevant functional distinctions between morality and ethics as they affect public issues in secular, democratic societies is one means to open the possibilities for peace education to transcend this obstacle.⁴

⁴ Some religious educators have addressed the issue of ethics education as a means to promote interreligious understanding (Interfaith Council on Ethics Education for Children 2008)

Reflective inquiry as a pedagogy for widening realms of moral inclusion would introduce publicly accepted ethical norms such as the international standards upholding universal human rights into the exploration and assessment of contentious public issues. Among the relevant factors considered should be both the social and human values espoused by the culture and the international norms. The potential consequences of the contending positions on the issues in question would also be assessed. Reflection on which of the contending values are most likely to lead toward policies with just and equitable outcomes would comprise a significant portion of such assessment. A primary query of the values clarification process would be, "Do the values in contention derive from moral precepts or ethical principles or some combination thereof? What are the sources of the precepts and principles?" Given this clarification, the inquiry could move to exploring possibilities for commonly accepted ethical principles to help resolve the contentions. Further questions might include, "Could some of the existing international norms facilitate a resolution of the contention? Are there other secular ethical principles that might help toward that end? Might we work toward the articulation of some common ethical principle under which we could move forward to remedial action?"

Morality and moral standards – that I would define as concepts of behavioral right and wrong – tend to be articulated as precepts, simply stated, straightforward injunctions regarding behavior, such as the Golden Rule and the Ten Commandments. Moral precepts derive mainly from moral authorities, most often religious authority, but also from philosophical, ideological, and professional sources such as articulated in the Hippocratic Oath, enjoining physician to do no harm – an oath that might well be taken by educators.

Ethics – that I would define as concepts of personal and social good – are articulated as principles that primarily derive from philosophical inquiry into goodness, truth, justice, and responsibility. Some philosophers have been as revered as have religious prophets and have in some instances had as significant an influence on how societies are organized. Religious prophets and political philosophers have also preached similar truths, each in his/her way seeking to teach human beings how to live personally meaningful and socially responsible lives. (A Russian friend and I, comparing notes on formative values, discovered that some values I had been taught as those of a "good Christian" she had learned as the attributes of a "good Communist." While we agreed that both sets of values were socially constructive, we also observed that we were certainly never encouraged to question them or the religious or political authorities that preached them.) Most moral authorities expect reverence from their respective adherents and, to understate this, usually discourage open challenges. The fundamental moral question asked within a framework of religious morality is, "In this kind of case, what does the prophet/scripture teach us to do?"

Within a framework of secular ethics it is more likely to be, "What is the fair or just thing to do?" (I do not argue that the responses to the two questions might not very well be convergent.) Ethics and ethical standards are principles, such as the "categorical imperative," and guides that may be simply stated, but are likely to be more complex than straightforward in application, subject to ongoing examination,

assessing consequences as in thinking of the potential human rights effects on all concerned by the proposed action or policy. An illustrative ethical parable often invoked by environmentalists is the “tragedy of the commons.” Morality may be best taught by example, but it appears that today more often it is by inculcation and reiteration, internalized through monitored behavioral application. (Again, I do not claim that people of faith never wrestle with moral issues. On the contrary, those who bring a reflective approach to religious morality, do a good deal of it. But those are not the forces whose moral certainty is infecting politics.) Ethics is learned through reflection and application of principled reasoning to position taking in problematic situations. Ethical reflection is a medium for the development of the kind of moral reasoning that is appropriate to public action toward transformative change.

Moral codes, derived from religious belief, conditioned by centuries of morally exclusive cultural practice, often rationalized by selective reading of scripture – viz., slavery, war, colonialism, and the oppression of women – are a strong factor in the debased public discourse of contemporary politics as described above. These codes are not put forward for reflective review, but rather as unchallengeable truth to be brought to bear on the issue at hand. As such, their respective standards are not appropriate to the assessment of public controversies through the kind of reflective inquiry I advocate as pedagogy for peace education. While many religions adhere to some version of the Golden Rule, they tend to vary in the actual behaviors that are permitted and prohibited within the religions’ interpretation of the rule and to whom it applies in their readings of their respective scriptures. From this variation arises so great a number of our contemporary crises and conflicts that peace education has begun to include the subject of religious belief, some of it with special reference to beliefs about peace and justice. This inclusion as subject matter, not as the basis of judgment making on public issues, as I have observed above, is reasonable and, I believe, in these historic times, necessary. There seem to be two assumptions that produced the inclusion of religion as a subject in secular peace education programs. The first and most widely held – what I call the empathy assumption – is that such education can produce interreligious understanding and thereby reduce religious conflict. The second – the political pragmatism assumption – is that religious beliefs have as profound an effect on world views and interrelationships among peoples of different religions and ethnicities as do political ideologies and power positions of nations and peoples, and so they are an important factor in communication and establishing less conflicted relationships. However, neither of these approaches assures reflective challenging of the moral absolutes that so often prevent conflicting parties from considering dialogue as a means to change relationships, the means toward which we seek to educate.

In peace education, as in the wider realm of public affairs, moral precepts and ethical principles need not be mutually exclusive. But neither are they functionally equivalent in conducting reasoned, reflective public discourse, especially not so in the process of education for political participation. As learning to make soundly and fully reasoned normative choices in the planning and projection of political strategy is limited within an exclusionary political or ideological framework, so too the introduction of morality may muddy the waters of reasoned

reflective inquiry. In spite of the fact that political realism, the dominant mode of thought in contemporary international affairs rejects morality as a practical factor applicable to international relations, some of the major contentious issues of contemporary world politics are couched in terms of morality. The preemptive war in Iraq, the US president informed us, was “a crusade.” Moral, even theological persuasions were put forward to gain support from other Western nations.⁵ Yet, subsequently (or consequently) some argued, the United States has lost the moral high ground (as if it had ever held it), in implementing its national security policies, the most egregious example, perhaps being the resort to torture.⁶ One religiously based group publicly opposing torture regularly asserts that “Torture is a moral issue.” And within the frame of my own religious convictions, I would agree with the assertion. But more relevant to the public discussion, within the frame of the responsibilities of citizenship, is that it is a legal issue and a gross violation of the international standards of secular ethics articulated in the International Convention on Torture and of the generations of Western political thought and practice that have denounced “cruel and degrading treatment” (Reardon 2008). These international standards and democratic norms are integral to the subject matter of peace education, providing a framework for inquiry into value contentions that is consistent with its political purposes.

While we may publicly affirm and bear witness to what we believe on religious grounds to be immoral public policies, in the arenas of secular public discourse and education, we need to find the secular ethical equivalents of those religious values, which may be relevant to the issue – but not necessarily disregard their effects on contentious issues. Given the constitutional separation of church and state, at least in the United States, religious belief should not be the basis of public policy making. All of these cautions apply equally to the teaching situation. Peace educators who hope to prepare learners for reflectively reasoned participation in contentious public discourse would do well to consider introducing the secular ethics of the relevant international standards, including human rights covenants and the Nuremberg Principles, negotiated within a discourse of diversity, but grounded in the common purpose of building a peaceful global community. Such standards serve in the present strivings for justice as instruments of moral inclusion and cosmopolitan values.

Tempting as it may be for peace educators to use only the moral frames now current in the public space, the better route to reasoned reflection is the secular ethics suited to contentious political discourse in our diverse world society. Preparing learners for participation in the secular sphere should involve them in practice of reflective reasoning through the application of ethical principles such as those articulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Nuremberg Principles, and The Earth Charter, all of which echo both the Categorical Imperative and the Golden Rule. It would serve effective political communication to assure, as well, that the moral

⁵ Jacques Chirac, former Premier of France in his memoir (2009) recounts such attempts at persuasion.

⁶ In a discussion of *Decision Points* (2010) George W. Bush justified water boarding.

and religiously based equivalents of the standards are also explored, as in the previous reference to study of spiritual beliefs as a component of multicultural education. Preparation for global citizenship might include study of various values perspectives and languages so as to improve possibilities for effective communication among those who hold different beliefs and worldviews.

The morality which stems from respect for the human person that inspired the Golden Rule and is stated as a specific set of social principles in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights may be subject to question regarding application in particular public situations, but its significance to the common life of society derives in large part from the acceptance of the secular moral authority of the world community. The United Nation, as politically weak, legally flawed – the most powerful member states would have it so – and in some instances as mistaken and corrupt as other institutions that have been regarded as moral authorities, has served this purpose for the world community since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Nuremberg Principles, and the promulgation of the treaties drafted to encode the core principles of the declaration into international law. At the world level, as at other levels of the global order, that which has been articulated as public morality, is socially responsible, humane behavior guided by internationally recognized norms that when egregiously violated cause the social shock often referred to as “moral outrage.” Some of these violations are identified as “crimes against humanity” – all people are humanly diminished by such acts – subject to prohibition and prosecution by law. The behavioral equivalents of these secular moral norms are ethical principles that may be taught by example, so as to become the habit of just relationships, fairness, and equity guiding daily communal life. They may be modeled in classrooms, organizations, and communities, at all levels up to the community of nations. These are such principles and values as lend themselves to the kind of reflective examination most suited to peace education. They are open to continual assessment and challenge as should be the application of all ethical standards, public policies, and acts of states. The right to challenge authority claimed by those who made the revolutions that gave birth to Western democracies was reflected in the Nuremberg Principles that established challenge of illegal orders to be both an individual right and a legal responsibility. The Nuremberg case that produced this ethical principle demonstrates a process of critical reflection and challenge that provides rich material for peace education as reflective inquiry. Further, it highlights a major objective of peace education and the capacity and motivation to challenge the unethical and to resist the unjust. This is one of the presumptions of human rights learning (Reardon 2010) as an approach to peace education that also advocates the international standards of human rights as the core substance of global citizenship education.

What is especially important in the Nuremberg case is that it is an example of a consequence of the exercise of a public “moral conscience,” clearly illustrating that the criminal actions in question are actions taken in public, with public consequences, to be publicly scrutinized. Such is not the case with other hotly debated moral standards in which religious customs and norms collide with secular norms, some falling into the realm of personal morality or specific religious practices that

do not really affect the well-being of the larger society, such as the headscarves controversies in French and Turkish secular public schools, an example of Islamophobia. Female students, who choose to wear headscarves out of personal belief without attempting to proselytize, are not a threat to the well-being or the freedom of, or from religion in secular society. Neither are they detrimental to those who wear them – as is agreed by many in the human rights movement – as is the case with some religious practices so harmful to health and well-being of women that they are prohibited by civil law: that is, polygamy, child marriage, and genital cutting. Nor do non-proselytizing, nonharmful personal practices represent an obstacle to the education of others in the public schools. Indeed, they may well constitute education in and for diversity, an essential component for the development of an attitude of moral inclusion, accepting the humanity and acknowledging the dignity and right to fair treatment of all, an avowed goal of peace education.

Such issues of personal practice and belief can divert public attention from concern about responsibility to fulfill the right to education as well as the principle of freedom of religion. The challenge to prohibition of this type of religious practice that is personal and not harmful to self or others is just as much a manifestation of ethical behavior as resistance to the above-mentioned harmful practices. Peace education should be providing learners with opportunities for critical and ethical reflection on such distinctions so that they might discern what is just and fair, and to define and articulate the relevant, underlying ethical principle or principles. Establishing distinctions between religious intolerance and legitimate secularism within a framework of human rights provides an opportunity to explore the relevance of human rights to the just and tolerant society that is implied in cosmopolitanism as a philosophic basis of peace education as advocated by Dale Snauwaert (2009).

The fully open reflective inquiry that I argue here to be the most appropriate means through which peace learning becomes preparation for political efficacy cannot be pursued in schools intolerant of diversity; nor where science curricula are censored, as in some American schools, because certain subject matter contradicts scriptural interpretations of particular religious faiths; nor where classical works of literature are withdrawn from public school because they challenge the beliefs of, or are morally offensive to some who seek to impose their own moral standards on others; nor in schools that would banish multicultural studies because they “undermine American values.” Public schools are to serve the entire public. What we have called academic freedom in universities is in secondary schools opportunity to engage in critical and ethical reflection on issues that affect students’ lives and the quality of the societies in which they live.

Education in a democratic secular society should neither limit legitimate personal freedoms of students nor freedom of inquiry into all knowledge available to the society. If we claim to defend such rights by our military interventions abroad, is it morally or ethically defensible to tolerate their violation in our own communities? Indeed, these issues of personal values and public ethics might well be the stuff of classroom discussion. But even more significant to my argument is that such controversies are indicators of the dysfunctional and antidemocratic consequences of multiple religious moralities in contention with public norms of tolerance in a secular society.

The point I see as relevant to peace education is that the conflation of ethical principles and standards as synonymous with, or functionally equivalent, to moral precepts confuses the normative discourses to which the field is committed. Arguing that the two derive from different sources and function differently toward social purposes that in our current political and cultural conditions do not, fully coincide, I assert that it is important to distinguish between the two in a pedagogy of reflective inquiry. While, both may have a place in peace education as practiced in all its varieties, religious differences have become so politicized that the blurring of these two concepts compounds the difficulties of dialogues on the most crucial political and normative issues of our times. Religious positions are faith based. It is neither effective nor politically constructive to debate them in a public secular setting. Ethics are principles applied through reasoning. Such reasoning is essential to democracy and to the practice of critical peace education. When public attention should be given to the ethical implications of torture, the structures of poverty, the broad scale violation of human rights, the oppression of women, focusing on questions made contentious by competing religious values and religiously motivated attempts to dictate public policy, capacities for ethical reflection remain stunted, and justice is frustrated.

Above all, ethical reflection in the service of peace should be guided by the fundamental principle of nonviolence: to avoid, reduce, and assess the possibilities for the elimination of all forms of unnecessary harm.

Reflective Inquiry as a Pedagogy of Cosmopolitanism

The pedagogies and concerns outlined in this essay, in my present view, are the core of the challenges to and possibilities for contemporary comprehensive critical peace education. Both the challenges and the possibilities of the developments of the next few years of our field's evolution are to be found in the growing interest in cosmopolitanism as framework and purpose of peace education. As a philosophy of educational purpose, cosmopolitanism provides a values framework conducive to the development of political efficacy in the struggle to achieve universal moral inclusion. I have tried to make the case that reflective inquiry is a pedagogy especially well suited to this purpose and to confronting the present problems of the field as I perceive them. I offer the following to sum up that case.

In brief, my preference for the use of ethical principles in peace education derives from current trends in American society toward rejection of diversity and lack of tolerance, civility, and reasoned discourse in the public space. My suspicion of the ideological bias in some practice of critical pedagogy stems from similar concerns and the limitations forthcoming from insufficient consideration of multiple alternatives. These concerns lead to the pedagogical argument I have put forward here that fully open inquiry is essential to the all the forms of reflection integral to peace learning. The conclusions of critical inquiry undertaken in the frame of prior ideological assumptions is as compromised as are ethical positions on public issues taken solely on the basis of religious morality. Responding to these concerns, I suggest

that the fully open inquiry of critical peace education would engage learners in at least the three forms of reflection outlined in this essay or alternatives that would provide similar reflective inquiry.

As noted, no one form or set of reflective skills is totally distinct nor separate from the others, but each may be emphasized when it has special relevance to a problematic and the nature of the inquiry and the learning objectives sought. Critical reflection on the inequities of access to power as structural obstacles to justice is the initial foundational inquiry of peace education that seeks to inspire and to prepare students to work to transform the unjust and violent conditions of the present world order. The reflective skills, relevant to learning toward the capacities of tolerance and appreciation of diversity, that characterize the cosmopolitan view are primarily those of ethical reasoning as is consistent with the philosophy of what I believe Metcalf and Hunt were advocating as reflective teaching for democratic citizenship. Contemplative reflection is at the heart of transformative learning and to releasing the creative imagination to envision the behavioral and institutional alternatives to violence to which peace education aspires.

The Freirean principle imbedded in critical/analytic reflection on political structures and processes is relevant and essential to inquiries into the problematics of disarmament and security, human rights violations, environmental destruction, and into the development of political and economic institutions to sustain a peaceful, just and democratic international order. Critical reflection on political issues raises questions of the causality of a particular problematic and calls for the assessment of the political and economic feasibility of proposed solutions that produce the political understanding from which political efficacy derives. Consideration of ethical principles deepens and extends the inquiry into areas of: equity, fairness, and desirability. Ethical reflection contributes to a sense of justice, a capacity enabling learners to confront contentious political issues within a framework of reason and respect for the other; even – perhaps especially – in confronting positions, they find politically wrong and ethically unacceptable. Contemplative reflection offers a more profound realm of learning in political interpretation resulting from critical and ethical thinking that can be integrated into the learner's sense of human and social meaning, including his/her relationship to larger realms of human experience. Contemplative reflection is the realm wherein commitments of the self to social purposes are formed.

We need not require learners to throw passionate commitment to a particular position or cause out the window of inquiry framed by reflective reasoning. Rather, we need to make responsible efforts to assure that commitment is clarified and strengthened through a process of authentic reflective inquiry. Difficult dialogues should be approached with open minds, not empty heads or vacant hearts. Informed, reasoning heads and sensitive, compassionate hearts provide the capacity and the willingness to challenge and question the structures and politics of moral exclusion, to argue constructively with civility and to act effectively toward moral inclusion. Sensitive, compassionate hearts are cultivated in the terrain of contemplative reflection, the profound thinking in which the human consequences, or the effects of our propositions and actions on well-being and spiritual vitality, are pondered in

that chamber of thought. It is in this chamber where the fruits of the intellect are plumbed for meaning and fulfillment – the two most fundamental purposes of authentic education – as the foundations upon which to build the transformative political efficacy through which universal moral inclusion, the vision of cosmopolitanism may be realized.

With commitment to purpose, clarity of concepts, and deeply reflected positions, we and our students should be well equipped to take to the pedagogical and political barricades of critical peace education.

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Chapter 2

The Cold Peace

Michael A. Peters and James Thayer

*There is no document of civilization that is not
simultaneously a document of barbarism.*

– Walter Benjamin

All we are saying is give peace a chance.

– John Lennon

Introduction

The Cold War that endured from the end of WWII until the early 1990s and dominated world history began as a tense, troubled and ideologically opposed relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union that had fought together as allies against the Axis powers. The Soviets resented American interventionism in international relations and the Americans feared that Soviet expansionism in Eastern Europe. The Cold War inculcated a sense that the tensions between USA and Russia could go at anytime from cold to hot and the term “Cold Peace” was used during this period to encapsulate such tensions that defined the geopolitical division and efforts at avoiding direct military conflict. A 1952 issue of *Time* magazine¹ referred

¹ Cold War and Cold Peace (Monday, October 20, 1952). Reference June 16, 2009: <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,817112,00.html>

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to the Cold Peace as “a sustained truce without a settlement,” which in the political milieu of Europe, became “the main topic of informed political conversation all over Europe” and reflected “a measure of how much a credulous Europe wanted tension relaxed.” It was thus seen that while the Cold War fueled a period of suspicion and tension, the Cold Peace reminded us of the often ignored underpinnings of the US-Soviet conflict that centered on stabilizing and mitigating ideological differences and ensuing military conflict.

Much of our historical account of this period and our understanding of peace are imprinted by a deep adherence to liberal theory and its conviction of Just War: *War in the name of peace*. Whereas this notion of peace as a justifiable cause for war stood out as a deep-seated ideological and nationalist dilemma, it is also true that peace for the sake of peace was a mitigating factor that helped put an end to the Cold War. Peace in this context, however, must be reimagined so as to entertain the convergence of global economic and governing functions of the world system emerging out of the late 1960s, and continuing as salient feature of the new world order in the twenty-first century.

It is the purpose of this chapter to critique prevailing notions of “peace” and its application to issues of social justice and citizenship as it underlies peace education and peace studies. It is our intention to emphasize how issues of conflict and security for the twenty-first century are embedded within a post-national and post-liberal framework that shifts our understanding of peace, security, and risk toward a post-Cold War and post-Cold Peace context. This displacement of the liberal nation-state and citizen is more accurately articulated by the neoliberal state and mobile though disciplined citizen-subject. In this setting, transnational activity, corporations, and governance have reinstated a new highly centralized global form of governance and governmentality that has positioned the nation-state as one of the multiple governing actors. Moreover, this has placed issues of peace and security as issues of what can and cannot be governed. As such, our critical understanding of peace and conflict must remade and reinstated. We begin by entertaining a notion of the philosophy of peace traced back to Kant’s minor essay as a basis for understanding liberal peace and liberal democratic theory. We continue this investigation by briefly discussing the “peace industry” as part of changed strategic context following the end of the Cold War in order to highlight the UN’s role in a post-9/11 world. In this regard, we reexamine the US Peace Corps as an arm of foreign policy as a means of maintaining spheres of influence with newly independent countries in the process of decolonization. We examine also the concept of “Crimes against Peace” and the way it was formulated after Nuremberg before discussing neoconservatism and the “new American century,” the globalization of violence, and the postmodernization of peace and the neoliberalization of security. These features constitute the new liberal montage that is recalibrating the concept of peace and peace education in the era of globalization.

The Liberal Philosophy of Peace

The early Western philosophical underpinnings of “peace” can be traced to Kant, who promoted the concept of peace as a foundation for liberal society. For Kant, the concept of peace is explicitly tied to a republic which is linked to a definition of

human rights that legitimates the international order as a juridical outcome of republicanism (Höffe 2006). Kant's minor essay "Perpetual Peace" is the foundational text of democratic peace theory in international relations and has been the site of philosophical work by Rawls and Habermas to revitalize the cause of a cosmopolitan juridical order. Kant's major contribution was to articulate the idea of cosmopolitan right as a moral foundation of peace that consists in the engagement of commerce, without hostilities, which is anchored in evolving conception of reciprocity. Vesna Danilovic and Joe Clare (2007: 397) indicate that the literature largely ignores the liberal elements of Kant's "republic" as a source of international peace and shows that "the respect for civil liberties and the rule of law—that is, liberal constitutionalism—represents even more fundamental elements of Kantian republicanism than procedural democratic institutions." These authors revisit Kant's notion of republic delineating its three constitutive elements—civil liberties and the rule of law, separation of powers, and representative governance—and show how all three are essential for Kant's reasoning behind the "liberal peace." The force of their argument leads to the recognition that liberal constitutionalism and democratic representation are both necessary features of the Kantian liberal peace.

Liberal democratic theory holds that democracies will never go to war with one another, but the theory does not entertain "trade wars" or the use of force to enforce trading relationships even though a number of theorists suggest that economic development and financial stability are necessary conditions for democracy. The traditional explanations of why democracies will not go to war with one another are linked to democratic norms and political structures. Liberal societies, it is suggested, face constraints on mobilizing for war.

Crimes Against Peace

Various treaties and conventions were struck in medieval times restricting the use of weapons against Christian peoples, and even during the days of the Roman Empire, the rights of plunder and pillage for barbarian soldiers were restricted to 3 days; sometimes, such rights were suspended altogether, especially when the local population belonged to territory considered originally part of the empire. Indeed, just war theory on one influential conception dates from Thomas Aquinas' influential "Of War."²

The modern concept of "war crime" surfaced at the Versailles Conference after WWI, but did not receive a comprehensive definition until the end of World War II in the form of the 1950 Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal, which was among the first international conventions to address war crimes.³ The principles of international

² See Aquinas "Of War," *The Summa Theologica* (<http://ethics.acusd.edu/Books/Texts/Aquinas/JustWar.html>)

³ Earlier drafts were contained in Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and Against Humanity, December 20, 1945, 3 Official Gazette Control Council for Germany 50–55 (1946) based on the so-called London Agreement of 8 August 1945, which served to establish a uniform legal basis in Germany for the prosecution of war criminals and other similar offenders, other than those dealt with by the International Military Tribunal.

law recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the judgment of the Tribunal were affirmed by the General Assembly and formulated and adopted by the International Law Commission of the United Nations in 1950, although the Commission did not express any appreciation of the principles as principles of international law. Their task was merely to formulate them. The Nuremberg Principles comprise seven major principles that assert the priority of international law over “internal law” in any case where a person, including a head of state or someone acting under orders, commits an act that constitutes a crime that falls under its principles. The priority of international law (Principles I–V) is based concepts of individual “responsibility,” “moral choice,” and “fair trial” that transcend national law and include complicity in the commission of such a crime (Principle VI). The substance of crimes punishable as crimes under international law is laid out in Principle VI as:

(a) *Crimes against peace:*

- (i) Planning, preparation, initiation, or waging of a war of aggression or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements, or assurances
- (ii) Participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the acts mentioned under (i)

(b) *War crimes:*

Violations of the laws or customs of war which include, but are not limited to, murder, ill-treatment, or deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory; murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war and of persons on the seas; killing of hostages; plunder of public or private property; wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages; or devastation not justified by military necessity

(c) *Crimes against humanity:*

Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhuman acts done against any civilian population, or persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds, when such acts are done or such persecutions are carried on in execution of or in connection with any crime against peace or any war crime

The Geneva Convention of 1949 embodied these principles and recognized how new weapon technologies exposed civilians to even greater danger. An addendum added in 1977, which the USA refused to sign, emphasized the right of civilians to protection against military activity, including genocide, defined as killing or causing serious bodily harm to individuals based on their nationality, ethnic, racial, or religious group and with the intent to destroy that group.

The Rome Statue of The International Criminal Court begins its overview by recognizing that the United Nations has recognized and sought for over 50 years to establish an international criminal court in order to prosecute crimes such as genocide. In 1948, the General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which both defined the crime and indicated that anyone so charged would be charged and tried by a competent tribunal either of the state in the territory of which the act was committed or by an international penal tribunal. In the

same resolution (260), the General Assembly asked the International Law Commission (ILC) to study the possibility of establishing such an international judicial institution. A draft statute was prepared in 1951 and revised in 1953, although the proposal was postponed pending a definition of aggression. In 1989, the General Assembly asked the ILC to reconsider the proposal with jurisdiction to include drug trafficking. With the spur of “ethnic cleansing” during conflicts in Yugoslavia erupting in 1993, the ILC completed its draft statute and submitted it to the General Assembly in 1994. After further discussion and revision, the General Assembly held a diplomatic conference on the establishment of an International Criminal Court in 1998 “to finalize and adopt a convention on the establishment of an international criminal court.”

The Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court summarizes the case for the court in terms of the following reasons:

- To achieve justice for all
- To end impunity
- To help end conflicts
- To remedy the deficiencies of ad hoc tribunals
- To take over when national criminal justice institutions are unwilling or unable to act
- To deter future war criminals

As the overview states:

An international criminal court has been called the missing link in the international legal system. The International Court of Justice at The Hague handles only cases between States, not individuals. Without an international criminal court for dealing with individual responsibility as an enforcement mechanism, acts of genocide and egregious violations of human rights often go unpunished. In the last 50 years, there have been many instances of crimes against humanity and war crimes for which no individuals have been held accountable. In Cambodia in the 1970s, an estimated 2 million people were killed by the Khmer Rouge. In armed conflicts in Mozambique, Liberia, El Salvador and other countries, there has been tremendous loss of civilian life, including horrifying numbers of unarmed women and children. Massacres of civilians continue in Algeria and the Great Lakes region of Africa.

Peace and Development

While early accounts of peace tied it to republicanism, in the context of post-World War II and the seemingly ever-present threat of nuclear war, attempts were made at systematically linking the two concepts “peace” and “development.” Jon Barnett (2008: 75) suggests:

Academic thinking about the intersections of peace and development arguably reached its zenith in the 1980s (Galtung 1989; Hettne 1983; Sørensen 1985)... These early explorations of peace and development sought to answer the question “what kind of development would facilitate the emergence of more peaceful economic, social and political structures?”

This conceptual work went on, while the international policy community investigated the economic and social opportunity costs of war and the relationships between economic growth and military spending (ICIDI 1983; ICDSI 1982). Barnett

goes on to note that since the end of the Cold War, there has been little talk of “peace” in the development literature and no new theory beyond democratic theory. The literature has focused on causes and costs of civil war identifying resource endowments (de Soysa 2000), poverty (Fearon and Laitin 2003), democracy (Hegre et al. 2001), rent-seeking (Weede 1996), financial flows (Gartzke and Li 2003), and economic and political transitions (Esty et al. 1999) as possible causes. Barnett seeks to articulate a theory that links Galtung’s (1969) theory of “peace as the absence of violence” with Sen’s (1999) theory of “development as freedom.” Barnett (2008: 86) suggests that:

By moving away from a theory based on what peace is not, by articulating the complex and interdependent characteristics of peace as freedoms and opportunities, and by focusing as much on processes as outcomes, the theory of peace as freedom facilitates a more nuanced and multivariate assessment of peace based on its contingent nature.

Barnett’s new synthesis is firmly related to the tradition of liberal theory with its emphasis on freedom and its progressivist teleology of change. Yet despite the inheritance of liberal principles and policies, the twentieth century was marked by unprecedented violence and more wars with greater casualties than at any previous comparable period: two world wars killing almost 29 million people, the nuclear arms race, the Cold War, and many civil wars and international conflicts.⁴

The quandary with this is that despite the tensions, sacrifices, and revelations that captivated and defined foreign affairs from 1945 to 1991 and the Cold Peace, the failure of liberalist principles and policies was readily forgotten. Neoconservatives and neoliberals from both sides of the Atlantic readily grabbed at the opportunity of championing the dominance of liberal democracy following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Neoconservatives such as Francis Fukuyama declared soon after the fall of the Berlin Wall:

What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government. (Fukuyama 1992.)

These declarations in turn substantiated a series of ideological turns and processes within the last 20 years that witnessed: first, the proliferation of *laissez-faire* market policies in the post-socialist economies following the collapse of the Soviet Union; second, the entering of Communist China into the World Trade Organization (WTO); and third, the decline of a bipolar world and the rise of a multipolar world with new divisions of power that saw the tenure and manifestation of new security risks and conflicts uncontained within the modern confines of the nation-state.

⁴ See *Death Tolls for the Man-made Megadeaths of the Twentieth Century* at <http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/warstatx.htm>; see also Peiro Scaruffi’s “Wars and Genocides of the 20th Century” at <http://www.scaruffi.com/politics/massacre.html>

American Foreign Policy and the Peace Corps

The Peace Corps was established by an executive order on March 1, 1961, following initiatives by Hubert H. Humphrey and President John F. Kennedy, declaring the program's purpose as follows:

To promote world peace and friendship through a Peace Corps, which shall make available to interested countries and areas men and women of the United States qualified for service abroad and willing to serve, under conditions of hardship if necessary, to help the peoples of such countries and areas in meeting their needs for trained manpower.

Since 1961, over 200,000 Americans have joined the Peace Corps, serving in some 139 countries. The development of the Peace Corps needs to be set against larger trends in American culture and the experience of other volunteer developmental organizations in the West. Elizabeth Cobbs (1998) nicely conveys the spirit of idealism that accompanied the birth of the Peace Corps in 1961 under John F. Kennedy. By the end of its first decade, significant criticisms were raised by scholars against it as a form of cultural imperialism based on self-interest, while many conservatives were writing it off as a waste of time. Ironically, its most important task and achievement concerned its reaffirmation of American ideals contributed to "nation-building" at home.

The foreign policy of the Peace Corps was born of the tensions between decolonization and the creation of the Third World on the one hand and the Cold War on the other (Cobbs 1996). Both used the threat of communism, and Kennedy used this threat to mobilize national resources to compete with Moscow for the hearts and minds of newly independent states. He recognized the anticolonial impulses of the new nationalisms and saw the Peace Corps as a way of shaping new relationships of influence with independent countries. The USA championed the use of volunteers and the use of private agencies and foundations to pioneer voluntary and private civilian development initiatives as an arm of American foreign policy as a fundamental Cold War strategy. It was one of the first examples of "soft power," and its success is to be judged in part by the way the Peace Corps was adopted as a model by other Western countries as a technique for dealing with ex-colonies to maintain its sphere of influence.

In this connection, Alyosha Goldstein (2008) argues that "U.S. policymaker conceptions of the foreign were constitutive for economic underdevelopment as an emergent category of poverty during the early Cold War" and that the "Peace Corps were one significant example of how the foreign served not simply as a boundary, counterpoint, or disruption to domestic norms, but as integral to the dynamics of liberal reform." Goldstein explores the Peace Corps community development field training as a means to explore the proliferation of investment in the discursive junction of foreignness and underdevelopment and concludes:

The limit of liberal universality was the particularity of its own historical and material conditions of possibility. Examining the foundational role of the foreign for liberal reform, and its specific dynamics within the mid-twentieth-century discourse of underdevelopment, reveals the ways in which U.S. colonialism served as both an impossible referent and a structuring absence in the U.S. Cold War construction of the "free world." (p. 55–56)

Liberal World Order and the Growth of the Peace Industry

The peace industry is a subset of the security industry and now the basis for a considerable *global bureaucracy* that includes the United Nations, UNESCO, and other world and national development agencies dedicated to such activities as: “peacekeeping,” “conflict resolution,” “humanitarian relief,” maintenance of “cease-fires,” “comprehensive settlements,” and “negotiation and mediation.” The UN as the world’s major peacekeeping organization has been engaged in 63 peacekeeping operations since 1948 when the first peacekeeping operation was established.

With the changing strategic context following the end of the Cold War, UN peacekeeping operations shifted from traditional military tasks to a more development-oriented complex of tasks that include building sustainable institutions of governance, monitoring human rights, security sector reform, and the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former combatants. The *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines* (2008), for instance, functions within the normative framework of international humanitarian law contained in the Geneva Convention of 1949 as well as the Security Council mandates and resolutions on women, peace and security (resolution 1325, 2000), on children and armed conflict (1612, 2005), and on the protection of civilians in armed conflict (1674, 2006). The UN model—the so-called capstone doctrine—emphasizes conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement although it is acknowledged that these rarely occur in a linear or sequential way. The core functions of a multidimensional United Nations peacekeeping operation are to:

- (a) Create a secure and stable environment while strengthening the state’s ability to provide security, with full respect for the rule of law and human rights
- (b) Facilitate the political process by promoting dialogue and reconciliation and supporting the establishment of legitimate and effective institutions of governance
- (c) Provide a framework for ensuring that all United Nations and other international actors pursue their activities at the country level in a coherent and coordinated manner⁵

The focus here is not just on minimizing conflict but a particular notion of peace and development that functions within a setting of “good governance” and a western-centric institutional and policy-sharing environment. A particular administrative vision ensues that posits peace and properly functioning government together.

In the post-9/11 world, good governance has become an even greater concern, notwithstanding the violence stemming from *intrastate* conflict, but the manner in which heightened surveillance and security in the name of peace has transpired.

Whereas previous geopolitical tensions were concerned with the lingering tensions and proxy wars of the periphery, in the context of a postmodern globalization,

⁵ See http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf

the military emphasis is now on the constant policing and information sharing of a global integrated network. For Canada and other countries, conventional warfare is focused against non-state entities and ensuing rogue nations that together constitute a new political-military challenge. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), for example, believes the main security challenges for Canada include terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, espionage and foreign interference, transnational criminal activity, information security threats, and security screening.⁶

This evaluation of Canada's risk and security in terms of nonconventional warfare ensures the constant mobilization of war efforts and demand for reflexive strategies that in part reflect the inability of states to manage their own issues but also the efforts required to keep these issues constantly relevant and in the public eye. From the position of globalization, this constant mobilization reflects the decreasing autonomy and sovereignty of states to regulate the people that flow in and out of its borders and the knowledge its citizens consume. Given the decreasing legitimacy and authority of the nation, Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt in *Empire* (2000) believe in a context where the nation-state is finding it increasingly difficult to define and claim absolute political authority and association to a primordial origin, "*no nation-state can today, form the center of an imperialist project. Imperialism is over. No nation will be world leader in the way modern European nations were*" (emphasis in original, p. xiv). That is not to say that the state will not continue to play a key and penetrating role in the lives of citizens, but we must look increasingly to global private and public institutions to understand the policy agenda and programs of nations.

Issues of security, defense, and national cohesion then arise not out of a liberal-centered vision of justice and morality tied to the nation but out of a global economic institutional framework that rests on an international system of relations and cooperation. It is within this neoliberal-military order that peace and security relies on a new political-legal order and global administrative system to regulate, control, and legitimize a vast network of spaces and actors that identify what is both governable and ungovernable and what is a risk and what is an opportunity. In the twenty-first century, peace has thus become more about coercion and centralization on a global scale, organized around a set of neoliberal political and economic regimes, networks, and programs.

Neoconservatism, War, and Peace

War is not only an ancient means of globalization, perhaps among the earliest forms along with trade and travel, but also arguably a form of globalization that encompasses many of the other dimensions. War and globalization go hand in hand. Indeed, war is *a form* of globalization, and globalization is a form of war. What is

⁶ <http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/prrts/index-eng.asp>

more, militarization and war are integral parts of the neoliberal agenda, and there are inextricable links between the US military-industrial complex, the free market, and world order (Peters 2004).

The focus of Foucault's 1976 course—"Society Must Be Defended"—at the Collège de France is a conceptualization of politics that analyzes power relations in terms of the model of war, based on the inversion of famous Clausewitz's (see Foucault 2003). In the first lecture, Foucault poses the question "Is power always secondary to the economy? ... Is power modeled on the commodity?" (p. 14), and he determines that there is an "economism" in the theory of power whether it be Marxist or the classical liberal juridical conception of power. In the case of the latter, power "is regarded as a right which can be possessed in the way that one possesses a commodity" (p. 13), that is, possessed, acquired, alienated, or surrendered through contract or by force. The object of Foucault's research is an alternative conception of power that is noneconomic and does not depend for its analysis on the reproduction of the relations of production. Once the economic conception of power is jettisoned, we are faced with two working hypotheses: power as repression or "Reich's hypothesis" (after Wilhelm Reich) and power as "the warlike clash between forces" or "Nietzsche's hypothesis." The two are not necessarily contradictory or irreconcilable.

Nietzsche's hypothesis becomes the basis for Foucault's celebrated strategic model of power based upon the historical examination of war as a grid for analyzing politics. He formulates the conception as "Power is war, the continuation of war by other means," and inverting Clausewitz's proposition, Foucault adds, "politics is the continuation of war by other means" (p. 15). As Arnold I. Davidson (2003: xvii) explains during the mid-1970s, Foucault was concerned to move beyond the analysis of power in the West that derives from the philosophical and juridical discourse of sovereignty and the law. The schema of war becomes central to Foucault's strategic model of power in his genealogical investigations, and as Davidson demonstrates, the emergence of this model can be detected in Foucault's works in the early 1970s in its application to discourse—discourse as strategic games—as well as its later development to practices and the field of the social per se.

The model for the National Security Strategy was a blueprint for US global domination that reveals President Bush had strong regime change ambitions for Iraq even before he took power in January 2001. The document, entitled *Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategies, Forces And Resources For A New Century*, was written in September 2000 by the neoconservative think-tank Project for the New American Century (PNAC), and it reveals that President Bush and his cabinet were planning a premeditated attack on Iraq to secure "regime change" well before he was elected. The blueprint, posted on the PNAC website (<http://www.newamericancentury.org/>), for the creation of a "global Pax Americana" was drawn up for Dick Cheney (now vice president), Donald Rumsfeld (defense secretary), Paul Wolfowitz (Rumsfeld's deputy), George W. Bush's younger brother Jeb, and Lewis Libby (Cheney's chief of staff). The document clearly indicates that Bush's cabinet intended to take military control of the Gulf region whether or not Saddam Hussein was in power.

The Project for the New American Century was established in 1997 as part of the New Citizenship Project by William Kristol (chairman) and Gary Schmitt (president).

Its stated goal is to promote American global leadership, and it originated as a set of conservative criticisms of American foreign and defense policy under the Clinton Administration. It aims to provide a vision for post-Cold War global politics:

As the 20th century draws to a close, the United States stands as the world's preeminent power. Having led the West to victory in the Cold War, America faces an opportunity and a challenge: Does the United States have the vision to build upon the achievements of past decades? Does the United States have the resolve to shape a new century favorable to American principles and interests?

(<http://www.newamericancentury.org/statementofprinciples.htm>)

The statements of principles then articulate what is required in a way that clearly ties increased militarism to neoliberal economic principles:

- We need to increase defense spending significantly if we are to carry out our global responsibilities today and modernize our armed forces for the future;
- We need to strengthen our ties to democratic allies and to challenge regimes hostile to our interests and values;
- We need to promote the cause of political and economic freedom abroad;
- We need to accept responsibility for America's unique role in preserving and extending an international order friendly to our security, our prosperity, and our principles.
- (<http://www.newamericancentury.org/statementofprinciples.htm>)

The document is signed by a group of neoconservatives that later came to play a central role in the Bush Administration, including William J. Bennett, Jeb Bush, Dick Cheney, I. Lewis Libby, Donald Rumsfeld, and Paul Wolfowitz.⁷

The Globalization of Violence

Amidst such a rapidly changing context, Edward Demenchonok (2009) argues in *Philosophy After Hiroshima* that the globalization of violence poses challenges to philosophy and calls for its transformation. Demenchonok forgoes a Hegelian classical historicism as a deterministic teleology that views war as a significant factor of dialectically understood progress, to focus instead on an “open history” developed by Kant, Jaspers, and Popper. Demenchonok notes that the postmodern critique in particular questions the historical necessity inherent in historicism and the triumph of modernity. Similarly, he casts doubt on the concept of linear time in modernist thinking and the metaphysical metanarratives that emphasized “an end of history.” In place of linear time and a form of Westernization as modernization, the

⁷The full list of signatories are Elliott Abrams, Gary Bauer, William J. Bennett, Jeb Bush, Dick Cheney, Eliot A. Cohen, Midge Decter, Paula Dobriansky, Steve Forbes, Aaron Friedberg, Francis Fukuyama, Frank Gaffney, Fred C. Ikle, Donald Kagan, Zalmay Khalilzad, I. Lewis Libby, Norman Podhoretz, Dan Quayle, Peter W. Rodman, Stephen P. Rosen, Henry S. Rowen, Donald Rumsfeld, Vin Weber, George Weigel, and Paul Wolfowitz.

postmodern critique pits a plurality of histories, the complexities of diverse societies, and “multiple modernities” that seek to overcome the simplicity of metanarratives of globalization by transcending the universalism/particularism couplet and avoiding Huntington’s “clash of civilizations.”

Thus, peacekeeping in the post-Cold War climate has changed from military interventions to more toward conflict prevention and development where “peace” and “peacekeeping” is viewed more broadly as an aspect of governance, development, and democracy promotion. Accordingly, education and training tend to reflect the UN’s normative model, which itself reflects the liberal ideology of peace. As Michael Pugh (2005) argues, “The ideology of the liberal peace has propelled the political economies of war-torn societies into a scheme of global convergence towards ‘market liberalisation’” as a result of neoliberal assumptions and policies enshrined in the “Washington consensus” and the growth of global governance. Pugh is almost certainly correct although it is also the case that there has been a strong tradition of liberal thinking that has promoted the relationship between peace and development, both liberal and neoliberal version.

The Postmodernization of Peace and the Neoliberalization of Security

Rather than witnessing the dominance of American Hegemony, the USA and NATO now confront new obstacles outside the scope of political-military regimes and programs. International tensions under a post-socialist and post-nationalist context are instead subsumed by a multipower division of power. Whereas the Cold War and Cold Peace were captivated by a bipolar division resting on economic-military regional blocs, the new division of power, as Richard Haass describes, occurs within our postmodern life and characterized by “a world dominated not by one or two or even several states but rather by dozens of actors possessing and exercising various kinds of power.”⁸

This displacement of military might does not exclude the real physical power that persists. But as Thomas Barnett emphasizes in a system of multiple sovereigns and non-sovereign actors, the ethos of war then becomes “Don’t plan for the war unless you plan to win the peace.” By this Barnett refers to the absence of:

An A to Z rule set for the world as a whole for processing politically bankrupt states. We have one for processing economically bankrupt states. It’s the IMF Sovereign Bankruptcy Plan, OK? We argue about it every time we use it. Argentina just went through it, broke a lot of rules. They got out on the far end, we said, fine, don’t worry about it. It’s transparent, a certain amount of certainty, gives the sense of a non-zero outcome. We don’t have one for processing politically bankrupt states that frankly, everybody wants one. http://www.ted.com/talks/thomas_barnett_draws_a_new_map_for_peace.html.

⁸ http://www.cfr.org/publication/16826/losing_the_cold_peace.html

Barnett's suggestion that peace and war should institutionally and militarily converge puts a case for how organization and administrative control is *the* concern at both the national and international level.

The future of the US military hinges on casting a larger and deeper network on operations. This has less to do with a greater direct military presence, but internationally coordinated and dependable agreements. Such agreements include technological standardization on behalf of nonprofit organizations and countries and business in the computing and technology industry now as military partners within cyberspace. Dan Schiller, for example, has observed that:

The U.S. military long has been the largest spectrum user on the planet; and DoD [Department of Defense] acknowledges that its ability to operate large weapons systems and satellites "depends on international agreements with other countries that allow DoD to use certain frequencies within other countries' borders..." The goals associated with the GIG [Global Information Grid] are breathtaking: It "is intended to integrate virtually all of DoD's information systems, services, and applications into one seamless, reliable and secure network" and thereby "to facilitate DoD's effort to transform to a more network-based, or 'net-centric,' way of fighting wars and achieving information superiority over adversaries..." (p. 134)...DoD boasted in 2006 that just one component of the GIG, its Navy Marine Corps Intranet, constitutes "the largest corporate intranet in the world" serving 550 locations and hundreds of thousands of users. (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2006, pp. 1, 6) (Schiller 2008, p. 135)

The military-(post)industrial complex of this system is further outlined by Schiller who quotes General James E. Cartwright in 2007 stating: "Cyberspace has emerged as war-fighting domain not unlike land, sea, and air...The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace describes cyberspaces as the nervous system of our country and as such, essential to our economy and national security" (p. 133). Given the recent 2010 cyber attack on Google, allegedly by the Chinese, it is not surprising that:

In 2005, the Business Roundtable—a group of 160 CEOs representing the top echelons of corporate America—called on government to "fortify the Internet and the infrastructure that supports Internet health." The vulnerability of U.S. companies was a function not only of terrorists but also of any number of other threats, from outages and hackers to disgruntled employees. (p. 132)

Given these partnerships between business and military, while not a particularly new occurrence, the issues of peace and security are embedded within a rationalized framework or governmentality that readily situates our definition of peace and security within market-based economic agreements and partnerships. It is no coincidence that the organization of the military and corporations is somewhat similar and overlapping.

What we label as antithetical to this system of administration and calculations becomes the focus of security risks and causes undermining peace. In this context, we have labeled such actors and entities as "failed-states" or "rogue nations" who represent a direct threat to our own peace and constitute a black market of global actors organized illegally and outside the boundaries of the legal system and policing.

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Chapter 3

Re-imag(e)ining the Cosmopolitical: Deconstructing the Other

Bryan L. Wright

*[The]guarantee [of perpetual peace] is given by no less a power than the great artist nature (natura daedala rerum). –Kant, *Toward Perpetual Peace...*1917 ed.*

*Are we responsible? For what and to whom? If there is a university responsibility, it at least begins the moment when a need to hear these questions, to take them upon oneself and respond to them, imposes itself. This imperative of the response is the initial form and minimal requirement of responsibility. –Derrida, *Eyes of the University**

*The ineluctability of the third is the law of the question. The question of a question, as addressed to the other and from the other, the other of the other, the questions of a question that is surely not first (comes after the yes to the other and the yes of the other) though nothing precedes it. No thing, and especially no one. –Derrida, *Adieu to Emmanuel Lévinas**

Re-imag(e)ining the future is a challenging thought given the panoply of images painted across the tapestries of our individual and collective lives. Whose image or imagery resonates in the picture of (y)our mind? What are the fundamental elements contained in its composition and affect? Do we recognise these elements, their nature, or their value? How do we as an individual *self*/subject properly cognise such thoughts, *and* more importantly, how do we re-*cog*-nise the similar or same inquiry by, for, through, and in an-*other*? In this chapter, I will address the import of many of these questions facing an emerging reflexive cosmopolitan peace education that acknowledges *other* in fundamental alterity (Lévinas 2000).

Cosmopolitan peace education is fraught with many ontic onto-epistemological challenges arising in and across the discourses of the social sciences in our shifting post-modernist age. These philosophical challenges, illuminated through a considered

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exposition of the existential nature of being, its human construction and meaning, as well as the very meaning or received value of such a critical gaze, open the space for an interrogatory discourse promising greater understanding of, about, and between the *self* and *other*, and thereby peace. While such discourses, to the degree they actually happen, are largely contained within Philosophy proper as a discipline within academe, their fundamental bearing rightly reaches into and across each of the social sciences to include, I might offer, all of the peace knowledges currently undertaken.¹ Consequently, exploring the onto-epistemological foundations of academic discourses related to human social relationality deserves the same scrutiny of structure, process, and *telos*, mindful of the constructions of subjectivity entering and influencing the very same discourse(s) within which we are presently engaged.

Drawing from the post-critical literature on subjectivity to deconstruct the *other*, I shall initially explore the fundamental alterity of the Lévinasian *other* as a discontinuity that inverts our commonly received notions of subjectivity in the Western paradigm, which critically structure issues of peace and peace education. An overview of many of the evolving discourses on cosmopolitanism and the cosmopolitical arising within philosophy, sociology, and educational philosophy, as well as peace education theory, follows next. Within this portion of this chapter, I will open the question of the *kosmopolitês* and the antinomies of cosmopolitanism revealing the onto-teleology of contemporary higher education and its import for peace and peace education. In this examination, I will remove the veil of syncretism that masks understanding of the disconnections between *demos*, *ethnos*, and *episteme* within an evolving (post-)critical peace education for the present age (Croce et al. 2010). The third part of this chapter looks at performativity and the role of educators for peace within the university. Challenging epistemological boundaries in the interest of peace education towards the noble end to promote cultures of peace in our increasingly globalised existence is a twofold process that requires simultaneous de-ontological analyses of form and process along with historicised contextualisation of social relationality (Derrida 2004). Closing this piece, I propose a paradigmatic shift in academic perspectivity, pedagogy, and praxis particularly in relation to peace education within academe.

Now the questions of peace are significant within certain disciplines and fields, yet many of the core philosophical roots of such questions remain largely unexamined. Consequently, the pedagogy and praxis of education for peace or, more particularly, peace education has minimal influence beyond the classroom door (Reardon 2012, Chap 1 *this volume*; Todd 2010; Wright 2011), yet this need not be the case forever. Peter Trifonas (2005), my co-editor in this volume, states that critical pedagogies

question...the ground of institutions and the reason of their institutionality with respect to the formation of subjectivity, [which] engages the real-world effects produced by the performative force of epistemological discourses and their responsibility as instances of founding and therefore of foundation, which forces us to rethink the nature of *what it means to be sovereign, to have rights, to be human* (p. 214, emphasis added).

¹ Andria Wisler (2008) expands on Betty Reardon's (1988) earlier definition of peace knowledges, which comprise peace studies, peace research, peace education, and peace action. Wisler understands peace knowledges '...as that which constitutes a country's or a region's own ways of knowing and living necessary for its own creation and sustainability of a culture of peace' (vii).

It is this rethinking that constitutes the very question of peace and therefore frames the depth and scope of the field of peace education. While the definition of peace education remains unsettled within the range of peace knowledges and in the broader academy, it is largely concerned with the nature of relationships across humanity and the ecological, social, and political factors that impact the same. Andria Wisler's (2010) own re-imagining of peace education sees the field as '... education *about* peace and education *for* peace...[as well as] education *from* war and violence' (p. 20). Leading scholars understand peace education to be transformative (Reardon 1988), creative (Lin 2008), teleological (Toh 2006), and necessarily enfram'd within pedagogy and praxis that would teach '...people about the threats of violence and strategies for peace' (Harris 2010, p. 11) in and between societies around the world. Moreover, while genuine reflexivity is imperative to peace education as an academic endeavour at both formal and informal levels, I offer that such reflexivity fundamentally shifts the ontology and epistemology of many of the social sciences within contemporary academe, and in this shift, the respective academic disciplines and fields are better poised to re-interpret their larger contribution to episteme and its role in and across diverse societies.

The question of peace encompasses the nature and understandings we hold regarding inter-subjectivity. What it means to be at or in peace is rooted in the very ontologies and epistemologies we hold as individual *self*/subject, which presupposes our respective social group ideologies regarding identity and relationship. But this frame or lens may not and indeed cannot reflect that of the *other*. Emmanuel Lévinas' oeuvre offers keen insight into the meaning of inter-subjectivity and the phenomenological in light of three themes: (1) transcendence, (2) existence, and (3) the human *other*. Lévinas, a Lithuanian-born Jewish man who studied under Edmund Husserl in Freiberg, sought insight into the human condition and held a paramount concern for social justice throughout his life.² His seminal text *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority* (1969) on the (inter-) 'subjectivity' of *other* was followed with a broader exegetical rendering of the topic entitled *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence* (2000) wherein the mould of inter-subjectivity was re-formed in the *aporea*, or non-passage, of *otherness*. Propounding a secular meta-ethics, Lévinas links the *self* to *aprioristic Other* to which this self, (each *self*, i.e., you and I) is obligated to the *other and all Other(s)*. I have previously drawn out the connections across subjectivity (Wright 2011) and the obligations therein but wish to elaborate on the point that the arriving *face*—the *Other* (Lévinas 1969)—comprises the totality of being and Being beyond one's known self. It is in this *aporea* that the limits of our being are manifest for we cannot, do not, and will not know or be known to any other in totality. Furthermore, within this ontic state, the fundamental nature of ontology and epistemology is revealed as limit, thusly exposing our very foundation as humanity.

² Lévinas was especially interested in the phenomenology of Husserl in his early studies. This interest grew throughout his experiences of WWII and the Shoah leading him to look deeper into the breadth of human experience. The body of literature from Lévinas has been explicated for decades now with two important works: *Re-Reading Lévinas*—Bernasconi and Critchley (1991) and the *Lévinas Reader*—Hand (2000).

Lévinas (2000) posits ethics as first philosophy and thereby frames the relationship of inter-subjectivity as de-ontological—that is, the nature of the relationship between *other* and *self* is one of necessary obligation or concern for *Other* who/which precedes *self*.³ In *Totality and Infinity*, Lévinas states this claim succinctly ‘*The other qua other is the Other*’ (Lévinas 1969, p. 71, original emphasis). The turn here in subjectivity is such that given the fact that an-*other*, or *Other* already exists prior to my arrival (be it birth, destination, or state of mind), when I as *self*/subject become present, the order of relationship is always already ordered. It is not that with my arrival, and the subsequent state of self-awareness that subjectivity is constructed, rather subjectivity, my subjectivity is, as an-*other* to an already existent *Other*. Thus, it is not a matter of constructing a relationship between *myself* and an-*other* without foundation. Further, Lévinas’ exegetical *Otherwise than Being* takes up the question of justice in the arrival of the *third*, or that which is *Other* reflecting a ‘deliberate apositionality’ between and among the *other*, *self*, and the *third* (Wright 2011). It is in his interpretation of ethics as justice (Lévinas 2000) that the relationship represented in inter-subjectivity removes any ‘distance’ of proximity and duly implicates my response and responsibility for the *other*. In the logos of Derridean inscription, the *aprioristic other* ‘...is indeed what is not inventable, and it is therefore the only invention in the world, *our* invention that invents *us*’ (Kamuf and Rottenberg 2007, p. 45). With this invention, we—you and I—are born as *self*/subject into existent subjectivity.

Jacques Derrida’s inscription found in *Psych: Inventions of the Other* (Kamuf and Rottenberg 2007) examines the quintessential connection of and in inter-subjectivity as the *only* invention. Herein Derrida draws our focus to the aporetic nature of being and Being framing our relationship as *self*/subject to the existent. It is the invention of the concept itself and the invention of subjectivity that he exclaims. Later in Derrida’s further exegesis of Lévinas’ *Totality and Infinity* and the aposition of subjectivity, we see in the opening or welcoming of *Other* the acknowledgement of reason as reason (Derrida 1999). Reason as reason—the welcoming of *Other*—is a fundamental receiving, which we may interpret as the state of learning, for he states the welcome—the welcoming of the *face* is ‘...a first language, a set made up of quasi-primitive—and quasi-transcendental—words. We must first think the possibility of the welcome in order to think the face and everything that opens up or is displaced with it: ethics, metaphysics or first philosophy’ (p. 25). Such an opening acts as *dis*-placement of our received onto-epistemological frame affording an-*other* focus and re-imag(e)ination to emerge. Through an examination of these ruptures in the fabric of ontology as posited in Lévinas, Derrida offers a glimpse of the subjective state of our very subjectivity and its consequences for learning along with an accompanying full score of the human symphony. Now with these honed lenses, I turn my focus to a consideration of the various cosmopolitical discourses that are developing within and across the social sciences and philosophy in relation to peace.

³ For greater exploration of Lévinasian subjectivity and ethics, see Bloechl (2000), particularly Chap. 6 Ethics as First Philosophy and Religion and Manning (2001) *Beyond Ethics to Justice Through Lévinas and Derrida: The Legacy of Lévinas*.

Cosmopolitanism and cosmopolitical discourses have primarily been the purview of philosophy as far back as the Stoics or Cynics, depending on referent. While much of the current academic discourse draws from the constructivist Kantian theme of moulding the will of humanity towards a peaceful future, philosophers (including many of hyphenated interest), as well as sociologists, anthropologists, political scientists, and educationalists, have both critically and *uncritically* assayed the onto-teleology of the theme. The topos of the respective mappings bear attention, but given the limits of this chapter, I shall only highlight the pertinent junctures herein.

Nature plays an indelible role in peace as duly noted in the epigraph above by Immanuel Kant (1917); however, this role is not as he would have interpreted it to be according to philosophers and scholars who have examined his treatise *Zum ewigen Frieden, Ein Philosophischer Entwurf (Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch)*. Rather than a bending of human will towards perpetual peace as envisioned by Kant wherein the ‘...mechanical course is clearly exhibited [as] a predetermined design to make harmony spring from human discord, even against the will of man’ (p. 143), we hear *other* interpretations of cosmopolitical discourse within philosophy. While Kant would project a transcendent *Providence* as actor upon humanity initially and later limited cosmopolitan rights (under law), Derrida challenges the limit through de-construction of the same. Kant’s limited cosmopolitan law only afforded immediate, temporary sanctuary to the stranger, whereas the Derridean view of cosmopolitanism and *unlimited* (or unconditional) hospitality received and welcomed this *other* and *Other* without reservation (Derrida 2001, 2000).⁴ However, Jørgen Huggler (2010) reminds us that Kant was not limiting the right of an individual to residence itself on the globe, but rather to the specificity of unconditional hospitality, or even citizenship within any given ‘state’. But I can hear Derrida exclaiming, ‘unconditional hospitality’ is necessarily and only unconditional; otherwise, it indeed is not hospitality.

Robert Fine’s (2003) examination of Kantian reason, or Kant’s reasoning of cosmopolitanism, offers a normative view of the theory of cosmopolitan right. In a politico-philosophical interpretation, Fine sees Kant and welcomes his fusion of the ‘...metaphysics of justice and philosophy’ (p. 615) as a transcendent mode that overcomes ethno-nationalism. Further, Fine interrogates Hegel’s inquiry of Right and its relation to the cosmo-political appreciating the critique of Kant in Hegel as the basis for a political philosophy in the present age. But if the ‘...task of political philosophy in this area of social life [law of right,] is to recognize precisely what cosmopolitan right is—as something knowable beyond our own particular feelings, hopes, or convictions’ (p. 622), then how do we know or experience the illeity—or

⁴For further exposition of Kant’s treatise, or peace treaty and hospitality, see Huggler (2010) and Derrida’s *Of Hospitality* (2000). The reader is cautioned to note the sociopolitical scene or milieu in which any philosopher has transversed, with particular note to those who have lived during times of heightened upheaval. Certainly, the two particular individual philosophers in this note deserve such scrutiny.

unbridgeable nature—of *Other* in the invention of subjectivity, our subjectivity?⁵ It seems to this author that political cosmopolitanism must rely on the derivation of and location of right due to an assumption of (post-Modern) subjectivity that is removed from the environment in which the *self* enters. Furthermore, I find a fundamental misattribution in human knowing and reasoning that assumes an exclusive provenance of *self*/subject, or of polity, in Fine's search for the 'politics of Right' and the state of political cosmopolitanism as anchor for episteme.

Cosmopolitanism in the guise of Jürgen Habermas resembles a radical rehabilitation of the Kantian theme and Right according to Fine and Smith (2003). Habermasian philosophy '...of right seeks by contrast to embed individual rights within processes of radical democratic praxis and develop the intuition that rights and democracy cannot be imagined apart from one another' (p. 481). As a feature of right, cosmopolitanism is currently in a renewed and renewing state given that according to Fine and Smith, 'cosmopolitan right is a particular form of right. It exists for a reason and there is no turning back from it. Yet it contains the contradictions of freedom and constraint, universality and particularity, which belong to all forms of right...' (p. 484). Comprehending these tensions related to cosmopolitanism, democracy, and patriotism is imperative to precise understanding of cosmopolitanism and socio-philosophical episteme (p. 484). Indeed, we must contemplate the nature of these tensions within a reflexive cosmopolitan peace education, but our apperception of each tension must look beyond the limits which define, for it is the limit that is the very conceptualisation of the concept—democracy, patriotism, cosmopolitanism—borne of the train of Enlightenment thinking captured and capturing disciplinarity itself. The concept of cosmopolitanism itself risks enchainment within the scope of the Habermasian theme of right and its roots in the power of the sovereign state that captures and limits derivation, meaning, and purpose in a particular onto-teleology.

Selya Benhabib (2006) offers an *other* cosmopolitanism in a *dis*-course with the progenitors of contemporary cosmopolitan theory through the Kantian strain. In *Another Cosmopolitanism*, she rereads Kantian cosmopolitan law and reinterprets its derivation and telos according to Robert Post who credits her with the '... profound insight... to conceptualize the emergence of cosmopolitan law as a dynamic process through which the principles of human rights are progressively incorporated into the positive law of democratic states' (p. 4). Benhabib proffers that '[c]osmopolitanism then is a philosophical project of mediations, not of reductions or of totalizations. Cosmopolitanism is not equivalent to a global ethic as such, nor is it adequate to characterize cosmopolitanism through cultural attitudes and choices alone' (p. 20). Her pursuit of a discourse theory of ethics, drawing Kantian theory into a diversity of presence(s), calls for a permeability of ontological barriers in democratic societies to welcome the '*otherness of others*' (p. 60). Permeability is

⁵ See Elizabeth Thomas' *Emmanuel Lévinas: Ethics, Justice and the Human Beyond Being* (2004) for a deep excursus of Lévinasian subjectivity and tertiality: *Il y a* and *Illeity* (Chap. 8). Also see <http://www.philosophypathways.com/newsletter/issue126.html> or http://www.philosophos.com/philosophy_article_142.html

crucial in *demo*-cracy according to Benhabib as more rigid borders espoused by Rawlsian visionaries and others ‘...cannot do justice to the dual identity of the people as an *ethnos*, as a community of shared fate, memories, and moral sympathies, on the one hand, and as a *demos*, as a democratically enfranchised totality of all citizens, who may or may not belong to the same *ethnos*, on the other’ (p. 68).⁶ Benhabib’s quest for a world in which individuals and societies both realise self-determination and genuine human rights commitments through *self*-reflexivity (Croce et al. 2010) is commendable to reflexive cosmopolitan peace education, but it bears constant scrutiny given its derivation in Kantian peace theory.

Reflexivity is also key in the sociological theorising of Ulrich Beck (2004) in his attempts to understand and interpret social change. Beck’s theorising has been largely focused on the interpretation of contemporary societal organisation which he labels ‘cosmopolitanization of reality’ incorporating both universalist and relativist aspects of being in realistic cosmopolitanism (p. 438) that affirms the *other* as both ‘...different and the same’ (p. 439). This connection of *inter*-subjectivity draws a similar link between the *self* and *other* as the operative part of Derridean *unconditional* hospitality. Contextualised, or realistic cosmopolitanism opens the space for acknowledgement of historicised ethnicity as well as various con-ceptions of nationalism merging into the modernistic transnational (p. 445). In his cosmopolitan outlook, Beck (2006) distinguishes five interconnected constitutive principles:

1. The principle of *the experience of crisis in world society*: the awareness of interdependence and the resulting ‘civilisational community of fate’ induced by global risks and crises, which overcomes the boundaries between internal and external, us and them, and the national and the international.
2. The principle of *recognition of cosmopolitan differences* and the resulting *cosmopolitan conflict character*, and the (limited) curiosity concerning differences of culture and identity.
3. The principle of *cosmopolitan empathy* and of *perspective-taking* and the virtual interchangeability of situations (as both an opportunity and a threat).
4. The principle of the *impossibility of living in a world society* without borders and the resulting compulsion to redraw old boundaries and rebuild old walls.
5. *The mélange principle*: the principle that local, national, ethnic, religious, and cosmopolitan cultures and traditions interpenetrate, interconnect, and intermingle—cosmopolitanism without provincialism is empty; provincialism without cosmopolitanism is blind. (p. 7)

The constitutive principles of Beck’s deontologised cosmopolitanism, or cosmopolitan outlook, prepare the sociological laboratory for methodological cosmopolitanism as a re-imagined ethos and discipline of and for Sociology (p. 17).

Beck would draw a strong distinction and even division between philosophical (or normative) cosmopolitanism and social scientific cosmopolitanism (or cosmopolitanisation) in an attempt to construct the aforementioned sociological laboratory

⁶ Also see Croce et al. (2010) for another discussion on the dis-con-nections of *demos*, *ethnos*, and the episteme.

of methodological cosmopolitanism for the second modernity (p. 18)⁷ yet, later he seems to search anew for his philosophical lens when examining the shifting foundation(s) of Modernity itself. While his distinction between the philosophy and science of cosmopolitanism may illuminate our understandings of the processes and nature of human social relationality in our shifting present age, each may inform the other and necessarily so. A sociological understanding of cosmopolitanism (read concretised/empirical) devoid of philosophical (or normative) insight will be limited and limit the work of a respected discipline and thereby episteme. However, the weight of redefining cosmopolitanism falls across disciplinary boundaries as Beck and Sznaider (2010) note saying the task ‘...is a trans-disciplinary one, which includes geography, anthropology, ethnology, international relations, international law, political philosophy and political theory, and now sociology and social theory’ (p. 382), which notably excludes emerging fields of study like peace education.

The re-cog-nised modern realit(y)ies of the world rightly call forth new forms and ways of knowledge and meaning making as nodded to in Beck and Sznaider’s ‘...re-conceptualized and empirically established...framework of a new cosmopolitan social and political science’ (p. 386). But there are important questions that also emerge when we acknowledge the new realities arising before us based on faulty social scientific assumptions of similarity and homogeneity previously established through epistemic categorisation. These two authors call for multiperspectival lenses that ‘...can and must observe and investigate the boundary-transcending and boundary-effacing’ (p. 398) *socio-cultural* realities of sociology itself and its field of inquiry. In this important call, we must ask what is our apperception of the socio-political positions we inherit and inhabit in the post-Modern age and what does that portend for one’s reflective capacity? Additionally, how does power elide, dictate, and/or affirm these analyses?

Cosmopolitan imagery and analyses continue to be complicated by the ontic frame and philosophical interpretations brought to bear on the concept. This is particularly true within educational philosophy itself as revealed in a recent special journal issue of *Studies in Philosophy and Education*. David Hansen (2010a) sees the ‘...central motif of cosmopolitanism...[as] the capacity to fuse reflective openness to the new with the reflective loyalty to the known’ (p. 153) at the nexus of the aporea—of the *self* and *other*—and the current known. Cosmopolitanism itself, as concept with its multinodal heuristic functions mapped and organised by Kleingeld and Brown (2006),⁸ according to Hansen (2010a) ‘...presumes as

⁷ Ulrich Beck (2004) offers a new theme on an old song, suggesting that the “second modernity” acknowledges the deconstructive nature of reflexivity in modernity (p. 430).

⁸ David Hansen notes the heuristic categorisation of Kleingeld and Brown (2006): (a) political cosmopolitanism, (b) moral cosmopolitanism, (c) cultural cosmopolitanism, and (d) economic cosmopolitanism. For further exploration of these types/categories, see Julia Kristeva (1993) *Nations without Nationalism*; Martha Nussbaum (1997) *Cultivating humanity: A classical defense of reform in liberal education*; Martha Nussbaum (1996) chapter on patriotism and cosmopolitanism; the aforementioned Immanuel Kant; J. Hill (2000) *Becoming a cosmopolitan: What it means to be a human being in the new millennium*; and M. Costa (2005) chapter on Cultural cosmopolitanism and civic education; and A. Barnett *et al.* (Eds.). (2005) *Debating globalization*.

mentioned an inter-subjective rather than atomistic notion of the person. Put another way, cosmopolitanism foregrounds the moral and cultural uniqueness as well as integrity of communities. The cosmopolitan idea presupposes individual *and* community diversity' (p. 157, original emphasis). Hansen seeks to re-position the cosmo-polis in and through a re-imag(e)-ination of the cosmopolitical acknowledging the symbiotic nature of con-cept and demonstrating that

cosmopolitanism points to the space between the known and the strange, the particular and the universal, the near and the far, that is constantly opened up by the contacts of life. It does not mean 'transcending' the everyday for some 'higher' realm of experience. In paradoxical terms, it is more a matter of *ascending downward*: of coming to penetrate or pay attention to local traditions more fully precisely by seeing them in juxtaposition with other traditions. (p. 159, emphasis added)

In the disrupting discourse of Hansen et al. (2009), we see the opportunity for humanity to transcend *dis*-continuity, separation, and alienation into an ascendent state wherein reflexive cosmopolitanism is exemplified in the openness of *being to other* that allows for the continual reconstruction of one's '...current values in light of a wider and deeper perception' (p. 605).

In another illuminating article on the critical issue of values, valuing, and education, Hansen et al. *re-pre*-sent an-*other self*, the dialogical self that is open to and welcoming of the fundamental alterity of the *other*. A reflexive, dialogical *self re*-cog-nises the *other* as

a growing being: a being with potential, with powers to express and expand as he or she moves in the world. The 'dialogical self',...is the self 'interested' in those creative modes of interaction between people wherein lesser, present powers can expand into larger, future powers. In turn, this process makes it possible for people to share broader meanings as well as to value the very process itself. (p. 599)

Such a generative reconceptualisation begins to open closed passageways of connection and acknowledges *Other* in presence as *other*. It is through this founding acknowledgement of the fundamental alterity present in the *other* that the opening to and for peace is realised and may be manifest in peace education (Wright 2011).

Despite the renewed and renewing interests in cosmopolitanism within philosophy, the humanities, and the social sciences, as Hansen (2010b) aptly notes '...with few exceptions scholars in these domains have not addressed its possible consequences for educational theory and practice' (p. 3). This lack of attention to praxis and theory within educational theory is particularly crucial to many streams of critical pedagogy, of which the field of peace education itself stands to benefit with diligent, considered inquiry open to *other* and the *Other*. Consequently, Hansen proposes a grounded educational cosmopolitanism as art or the art of living where a '...person...engages the larger world and finds *in* that engagement a renewed, revitalized, and creative mode of enhancing the integrity of the local, either directly through concerted action or indirectly by virtue of a way of being' (p. 13, original emphasis).

In his artful proposal, Hansen calls our attention to our nature as social beings, not as objects as we find in the sociologists among us, but rather as creative actresses and actors on the stage of a world of change. For Hansen, the arts of listening, speaking, and interacting take place in an embodiment of our world, which is both formed by and the form of philosophical and field-based inquiry (p. 15) in order '...

to learn to see the human in its uncontainable diversity as human and to aspire to dwell educationally in the world' (p. 24). Like Hansen, I find the critique of interpretation and method used in the social sciences to be growing across some of the disciplines and fields that engage the human condition within education. More particularly, a deeper analysis of the relationship between the individual *self*/subject and her/his connections with social group and society will best be examined in and through the transformative lenses fashioned under engagement with critical theory informed by praxis.⁹

The level of engagement called forth by Hansen is reflective of Reardon's (*this volume*, 2012) pedagogy of cosmopolitanism. As a leading scholar and theorist in the field of Peace Education, her insights offer a deeper vision of education for human rights, security, and peace. In her call for a pedagogy of reflective inquiry, she challenges the narrowness of contemporary critical pedagogy that selectively concerns *itself* with isolated groupings of communities of difference. Her expansive reflective inquiry deconstructs the nexus of critical pedagogy and education wherein the conflation evidenced need be challenged.¹⁰ Reardon's apperception and critique of critical pedagogy, though insufficiently critical of its own ontic frame is instructive, yet I must hasten to add, the varied and various fields of 'applied' critical theory (e.g. feminism, post-colonialism, racism, gay/lesbian/queer theories, among others) with their sometimes limited and often limiting perceptive attenuation(s) are also highly instructive for our purposes of seeking a truly reflexive cosmopolitical approach to peace education that constantly positions the *other* before *self*.

Peace education theory overall, excepting Reardon's opening (as noted above), has yet to engage in many of these fundamental inquiries concerning *onto-teleology* and *epistemology*. Recently, as this realm of inquiry has begun to form, an emergent *dis*-course offers some insight into the field for our consideration. Dale Snauwaert (2009) envisions the role of peace education as transformative learning that '...calls for a reclamation of the ontological perspective of Gandhi and Ancient Western philosophy' (p. 20) wherein the student/learner becomes more empathetic, compassionate, tolerant, dis-interested in *self*, and less fearful. For Snauwaert, the cosmopolitan ethic is exemplified in '...the inner transformation of the moral agent' (p. 21) towards the *other*. But transformation of the student/learner is insufficient as a goal in our emergent age. Reflexive cosmopolitan peace education—an intriguing possibility in the new millennium—can become fully transformative, a place and space in and through *différance* that examines the oft unexamined *onto-teleology* of its founding and foundation (Trifonas 2005) towards greater social justice and peace, and thereby transform our lives in the ecosphere we individually and collectively know.

Critical pedagogy has largely concerned itself with the notions and questions related to social justice since its inception. These questions and notions present as

⁹ Yasmine Soysal (2010) offers an erudite critique of sociological theory and cosmopolitanism which I draw on here.

¹⁰ This call and critique resonates with the interpretative play of Trifonas (2005) and the trace of Derridean deconstruction that would deontologise the façade of contemporary knowledge.

para-*doxa* under a cursory look across academe, yet Torill Strand (2010) suggests the making of a new cosmopolitanism is emerging in an ‘all-*doxa*’ (p. 229) as an evolving episteme in the present age. However, the crafted critical lens(es) employed in examination of the social is infrequently turned to interrogate the *ontic* and *onto-epistemological* nature of these respective pedagogies of feminist, critical, anti-racist or postcolonial, or gay and lesbian theories. The disjuncture of the current discourse(s) on social justice and cosmopolitanism as taken up in this chapter and the realignment of human conditions within academia are crucial in the cultural milieu of *self* re-presented in the totalising commodification of life in our postmodern age (p. 237). What is called for is a breaking away of common academic discourse to realise the Aristotelian *meta-phora* elucidated in Derrida.¹¹ Such meta-phora, or the ‘transposition of meaning’ (p. 237), articulated in Derridean *différance* bridges epistemic worlds while planting the very seeds of vision that blossom into a cosmopolitan future that is *other*. For Strand, the ‘...new “cosmopolitanism” is therefore not just a novel noun, distinction or category. Rather, the new cosmopolitanism is an event; a surprising *shift* between scenes; a *movement* from one realm of language to another; a *transposition* from one outlook to another’ (p. 237, original emphasis). Considering cosmopolitanism rightly vexes any preconceptions we may hold in the juxtaposition of the Modern in the post-Modern and the post-structural in the structural. However, the academy strives to both nurture and constrain the growth and fruit of epistemic systems and beings through strict adherence to heteronormative scripts. Yet it is the *para-doxa* revealed in the *meta-phora* of being that opens our discourse and furthers our understanding of Being against the desire for the safe cosmogony (p. 239).

Torill Strand’s suggestion that ‘...metaphor provides radically new ways of learning...’ (p. 240) as invention and mode offers a new perspective on the cosmopolitical. It is this emergent cosmopolitan-ism that may now open to the fundamental alterity of the *other*. And in the opening, we may find and hear the voice of the *other* that confounds our previous conceptions of a singular cosmo-political world(s). As new imagery unfolds in our presence—in the space between *self* and *other*—we are free to imagine together further universes of impossibilities and to pursue their indeterminate course. The breadth, scope, and interior and exterior depth of these universes of impossibilities cross many of the constructed borders of human awareness and existence.

It becomes the task then of peace educators, engaged pedagogues, and indeed all scholars, I might add, to challenge our notions of limit and understanding. We do this with humility, openness, reflective inquiry, and purpose that would acknowledge our fundamental responsibility to *Other* and all *others*. Just as Derrida (1999) expanded upon Lévinasian secular meta-ethics in the epigraph above saying ‘the ineluctability of the third is the law of the question’ (p. 31), our

¹¹ Here, Strand is bringing our attention to the action that is metaphor itself drawing on the transpositions of meaning in Derridean (1982) philosophy.

emerging reflexive cosmopolitan peace education can be and become a more inclusive, more comprehensive, inquiry based in unfolding *atemporal* knowledge(s) rooted in the lives of each *other*.

Re-framing, re-forming, or re-imag(e)ining the cosmopolitical in and through a de-construction of the *other* is process. The respective interpretations of cosmopolitanism offer interesting inter-sections and re-connections between episteme, ontology, and epistemology. Through deconstruction of inter-subjectivity, ontology, and epistemology as core concepts of Western academe, the space for this inquiry unfolds founded on a cosmopolitical view solidly grounded in post-structuralism. Peter Trifonas (2005), a leading critical pedagogue, re-visions pedagogy and education following Derridean deconstruction and writes

the emanation of the cosmopolitical view is a gathering of multiplicity in knowledge communities that articulates the ethical terms of a responsibility to acknowledge the profundity of differences within the same archive of knowledge and thinking, the unimaginable manifestation of many [of] it[s] parts and partners, nations, states, and peoples whose materiality comprises and cannot but exceed the conceptual totality of its essence. (pp. 214–15)

In this vision, I see a real opportunity for education in general and peace education specifically, with a repositioning of *self* in relation to the *other*, thus affording the creation of new pedagogies for peace through an inter-subjectivist cosmopolitical point of view. Additionally, this new vision of education would properly interrogate the contested role of education in society across the range of human experience, in a diverse world. But if we understand this role as the mere cultivation of a cosmopolitan ethos flowering only with democratic literacy and citizenship, then our vision of humanity narrows within the confines of the walls of our own constructivist prison (Strand 2010). The ideal of Western education is becoming increasingly more infused with questions of the cosmopolitical (Beck and Sznajder 2010; Hansen 2010b), yet it remains constructivist in purpose and utopian in tone, neglecting and effectively silencing opposing onto-epistemologies by ignoring the aporea of otherness (Lévinas 2000; Derrida 2001). Furthermore, it can be reductionist as well, automatically assuming a minimally amenable ontology to the interrogative gaze.

Fashioning onto-epistemological *lenses* to re-(en)vision cosmopolitical future(s) through reflexive peace education redefines and repositions the field within the academic corridors of our world. This process of re-imag(e)ining education repositions and offers greater legitimacy with the redefinition of the realities proffered within the social sciences through a critical examination of the methodological nationalism of contemporary social science (Beck and Sznajder 2010). Consequently, the field of peace education would be better poised to offer its students, faculties, institutions, and society a true education for peace that is soundly built on a reflexive cosmopolitical perspective rooted in the lives and experiences of the *other* rather than preconceived ethno-nationalist ontology. Furthermore, a truly poetic pedagogy of peace within peace education could be ontologically diverse and epistemologically strong. It is my belief that the future of peace education may be, and become, the space and place for the emergence of the *pedagogy-to-come* that would usher in the *democracy-to-come*, which could fully acknowledge our cosmopolitical nature in being (Trifonas 2005) and anchor our humanity firmly in a larger *humanity-to-come* in our emergent age.

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Chapter 4

The Transformative Power of Engaged Thinking for Peace Education

Robert Gould

If the challenge of peace education is to help us learn to think and connect across difference (a central element of cosmopolitanism), then we must look at a central difficulty in the way we teach critical thinking (both formal and informal logic). If critical thinking means careful thinking, then we are *not careful enough* when we solely focus on how to *develop a position* on a subject or argument. Unfortunately, the way we conventionally teach critical thinking amounts to argument construction—not connection across difference.

The centrality of developing a single argument or position prevents us from thinking across difference because it rules out more than one legitimate position.¹ Of course, there are cases when there is *only one* legitimate position; however,

¹ What is needed for “real democracy” is an alternative conception of rationality that is not merely the decline of objective reason into subjective self-interest. This basic problem of first-generation critical theory has been the lifelong theme of the work of Jürgen Habermas, for whom the public sphere (*Öffentlichkeit*) occupies precisely the right conceptual space. Habermas also replaces the expressive totality of a fully democratic society with the ideal of “undamaged intersubjectivity” and of universal solidarity established through “communication free from domination.” Totality is replaced by a conception of social complexity, which is not necessarily false or reifying. These shifts permit a more positive reassessment of the liberal tradition and its existing political institutions and open up the possibility of a critical sociology of the legitimation problems of the modern state. Habermas marked the return to normative theory united with a broader use of empirical, reconstructive, and interpretive social science. Above all, this version of critical theory required fully developing the alternative to instrumental reason, only sketched by Adorno or Horkheimer in religious and aesthetic form; for Habermas, criticism is instead grounded in everyday communicative action. Indeed, he came to argue that the social theory of the first generation, with its commitments to holism, could no longer be reconciled with the historical story at the core of critical theory: the possible emergence of a more robust and genuine form of democracy [this is taken from James Bonham’s description of critical theory in the (online) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy right before section 2.2].

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in many cases, there is *more than one*. Research shows that “sixty-nine percent of marital upsets perpetual[ly] arise from conflicting values, priorities, beliefs or personal tendencies for which there is no generally accepted standard” (Atkinson n.d.). Therefore, positions on these subjects can never legitimately be singular; insistence on singular positions often leads to divorce—or on a global scale, war.

I am suggesting a kind of thinking, that I call *engaged*, designed to help us think across difference and to reduce positionality by being more fluid and negotiable. I do not recommend that we stop teaching students to think as individuals to reduce the impact of group-think, but I am suggesting that a student can think for herself without the rigid positionality that has been traditionally taught in the name of the best kind of thinking. In the tradition of critical thinking education, the tension has been between autonomous thinking and group-thinking. I am suggesting the creation of a third element, engaged thinking, where one develops a capacity to think with others without losing the capacity to think for oneself.

Within this tripartite system, one can think for oneself, as well as think with others, without sinking back into group-think. It is important to note that we must acknowledge that, as social creatures, we can never fully escape the cultural influence of group-think. The best we can do is to become aware of ways that our thinking is shaped by culture and then move on to the liberating projects of critical and engaged thinking.

In the following, I outline the techniques of engaged thinking and how they help us think together without losing our capacity to think for ourselves. I explain how engaged thinking can be taught to young people, alongside of critical thinking processes, giving examples of engaged thinking within the context of peace education.

Ultimately, engaged thinking gives us the power to transform ourselves as well as our relationships, whereas the traditional practices of critical thinking can be liberating but tend to fall short of this fully transformative power. Such transformation can occur when we access the thinking, perspectives, and experiences of others because we are able to see ourselves and our relationships in the light of another person’s reality.

If we understand peace education as being both transdisciplinary and multiperspectival, then traditional forms of critical thinking do not serve to facilitate a level of engagement needed to synthesize our thinking across difference. With the skills of engaged thinking, the goals of peace education can be met through a fluid process of reframing our differences, while recreating the processes of our interactions and relationships. These recreated processes lead to the transformation of identities and relationships—key to an enduring peace.

First, it is important to explain the relationship between critical thinking and engaged thinking. In the sense that critical thinking is “careful” thinking, certainly engaged thinking helps enlarge the carefulness of critical thinking—and therefore, engaged thinking does not oppose that care. In the sense that critical thinking empowers one to think for oneself, rather than mindlessly dwelling in group-think, engaged thinking also depends on an escape from group-think. However, engaged thinking pushes past the limits of the conception of thinking for oneself toward the notion of thinking together. In all of these senses, engaged thinking does not deny the importance of critical thinking as normally conceived; it merely stretches the field of critical thinking to include thinking together—the province of engaged thinking.

Let's turn to an example of the interaction of group-think, critical thinking, and engaged thinking. There has long been a debate about the relationship of human nature, culture, and war. A group-think that seems to be dominant in the USA is that both human nature and culture tend to be violent; therefore, war is inevitable. On this view, peace is only an interlude between wars—and war is perpetually occurring somewhere on the planet. Critical thinking, by examining the evidence, shows that in the period between 1816 and 1992, nearly 57% of all states were not involved in any war, while the top 10% of all states accounted for 57% of all wars (Maoz 2004). This thinking challenges group-think by suggesting one of two options: first, human nature is not necessarily violent, and, second, some cultures can overcome human nature to create peaceful societies.

Engaged thinking goes further by arranging a dialogue from someone in a more violent country (USA) with someone in a less violent country. The thinking across this difference can reveal more about how human nature and culture play out in less violent countries that challenges USA group-think, while providing contextual experiences and values in a way that is transformative. The participants' identities and relationships are transformed by their encounter, whereas research done on the critical thinking model only adds information to the evidence ledger.

Key to the distinction between critical thinking and engaged thinking is that critical thinking relies on *evidence that is abstracted* from context, relationship, perspective, experience, and identity, whereas engaged thinking *relies directly on* context, relationship, perspective, experience, and identity. Isolated, both critical thinking and engaged thinking can omit important ways to think. Together, they can complement each other.

However, there is a deeper worry about the disconnected, isolated way that critical thinking takes place. Arguably, Aristotle contributed heavily to the mechanics of critical thinking. He created a massive number of discrete objects, genus, and species, and he constructed syllogisms to facilitate our thinking based on these disconnected objects (Copelston 1985). Heidegger critiqued Aristotle's legacy by claiming that even though Aristotle maintained the background notion of a "ground of being" that underlies our world—free of distinction and discreteness—what followed was a tradition of division and disconnection that contributed to the loss of a "ground of being" (Heidegger 1959). Without such a "ground of being," we, in the Western tradition, lost our ability to think with connection. Heidegger tries to reinvigorate this notion of thinking with connection by asserting that thinking is "engagement by being for being" (Heidegger 1967).

Heidegger further develops this loss of engagement or a ground of being by asserting that critical thinking is essentially calculative thinking and that thinking with connection is a kind of meditative thinking (Heidegger 1966). Current mainstream critical thinking processes tend to be influenced by what Heidegger describes as calculative thinking:

[Calculative thinking's] peculiarity consists in the fact that whenever we plan, research, and organize, we always reckon with conditions that are given. We take them into account with the calculated intension of their serving specific purposes. Thus we can count on definite results. This calculation is the mark of all thinking that plans and investigates. Such thinking remains calculation even if it neither works with numbers nor uses an adding machine or computer. Calculative thinking computes. (Heidegger 1966, p. 46)

This description of calculative thinking appears to describe much of the way we think about the critical thinking process. We “reckon with the conditions that are given.” We take these conditions “into account with the calculated intention of their serving specific purposes,” in our case, the purposes of developing arguments and positions. In essence, we calculate our way through the thinking process, starting with the evidence given to us by the premises of our arguments and going through an “organized plan” that leads to a “definite result,” our argument’s conclusion or our position to be defended.

In contrast to calculative thinking, Heidegger suggests meditative thinking as a way to “contemplate[] the meaning which reigns [sic] in everything that is.” He defines meditative thinking as a four-way combination of connected meaning (above), “releasement from things,” “openness to the mystery,” and an engagement with paradox or contradiction—“what at first sight does not go together at all” (Heidegger 1966). These qualities suggest insights from the traditions of Buddhism, narrative, and paradoxical insight. Critical thinkers who already work within these traditions may have incorporated some or all of these insights into their practice.

Those who teach critical thinking may have an interest in Heidegger’s critique, if they are already sympathetic toward Heideggerian discourse, frustrated with limitations of mechanical thinking, or willing to take a leap of faith into a view of the world as fundamentally connected (perhaps even run-through with being, consciousness, subjectivity, personality, and the sacred). In such a universe, the world is *more* than a mechanistic relationship of energy and matter—nature’s “gigantic gasoline station” (Heidegger 1966, p. 50)—with epiphenomenal extensions, *more* than a world of empirical sensibility and collapsible/extinguishable chimera.

Whether our world is fundamentally connected or disconnected cannot be proved with empirical data or logical argument because there are no secure premises for either side—nothing *before* this metaphysical choice. Both views are coherent, and importantly for Heidegger, each suggests a radically different kind of thinking.

Calculative thinking follows from a mechanistic worldview; meditative thinking follows from a worldview not limited to the material. Interestingly, on Heidegger’s view, both kinds of thinking have a role to play in our lives. It is like affirming that energy behaves as both particle and wave. In the following, I will not attempt to make an argument for the worldview presupposed by Heidegger, I will merely accept it as a logically possible description of our world—one that may be compelling to people with quite diverse metaphysical perspectives.

To begin our inquiry about how meditative thinking can help improve critical thinking practice, I suggest that we start by realizing how powerfully we are committed to calculative thinking within Western culture. To illustrate this, we should consider our common notion of intelligence. We generally think one is smart who knows a lot of things, scores well on IQ tests, can communicate complex ideas and facts, can construct and test theories, is, perhaps, a member of Mensa, etc. We think this person is smart because they know a variety of complex things and can do complicated things. On Heidegger’s account, a smart person is an expert in calculative thinking, certainly reflecting a kind of intelligence.

However, Heidegger warns us that calculative thinking can become dangerously ungrounded, insensitive to context, confounded by paradox, and incapable of thinking beyond the examination of things and the manipulation of concepts. To overcome those limitations, Heidegger suggests a form of wisdom that balances the benefits of calculative thinking with a kind of thinking that enables us to find deeper meanings and insights—beyond mere calculations (Heidegger 1966).

On his account, calculative thinking is abstracted from context, is based on logically distinct universal categories, and assumes that the universe is constructed like a mechanism with parts and features that interact, while remaining separate. Heidegger believes that, *to a certain degree*, this is an *accurate* account; however, it is not a *complete* account. A complete account of the universe must include a notion of connection and context that is not reducible to its salient features—because the aggregate of salient features does not equal the whole—one’s being-in-context (Heidegger 1966).

Heidegger uses the term, “rootedness,” to describe the intimate and complete connection that we have with our context. For Heidegger, a person is not a thing among other things, rather a person is a specific and personal being intimately connected to the specific ground or totality of being, which is the person’s greater context in the world that is not merely our material reality alone. In other words, this greater being runs throughout the world, whose center is a personal human being (Heidegger 1966). This has powerful implications for peace education, where connection across difference is a key to overcoming lethal conflicts.

None of this talk about human beings and their irreducible contexts undermines the facts of mechanical nature; it merely seeks to enrich our understanding that our life in this universe is not reducible to the interactions of mechanical matter alone. Personal or subjective being and our greater context are irreducible dimensions of our connected universal existence. The paradox being embraced here is that the universe is both a collection of separate entities and a unified connected whole—centered on each individual being—within the totality of a greater being. In other words, the universe may be thought of as both a unified, overarching context, and a diversified set of matter.

Heidegger’s insights about the nature of the universe play out in our thinking patterns. Calculative thinking assumes that knowledge can be constructed from logical relations between significant factors and features of our shared lives. Meditative thinking, while not denying the virtues of calculative thinking, digs deeper into the contradictions, paradoxes, dramatic tensions, and creative opportunities lying in the background of our ordinary calculations and our absorption in the technology that surrounds us (Heidegger 1966).

Because our thinking, at times, engages contradictions, paradoxes, dramatic tensions, and creative opportunities, meditative thinking is particularly useful because it is designed to embrace a universe understood where these qualities are not aberrations but intrinsic features.

To review these different categories of thinking, calculative thinking is at the basis of critical thinking, in that we tend to construct arguments and positions on the

basis of calculations derived from the manipulation of abstractions and categories. Meditative thinking is at the basis of engaged thinking, in that we seek a meaning that arises from connection, while giving up our attachment to the objects of calculation, opening ourselves to mystery, and engaging paradox.

When we think about the issues of peace and war, we sometimes need to use critical or calculative thinking to help us understand the way that facts and statistics describe our social and physical reality. At other times, we need to use engaged or meditative thinking to help us connect across the cultural and contextual differences that drive people to war. If we want to help find peace in the Middle East, we have to calculate the diverse elements of geography, population, economics, and politics, as well as cultural and religious history, in order to construct the social and physical reality of those struggling against each other. Additionally, we have to engage the people and their lived lives so that we can find a way to connect across the differences of identity, perspective, experience, memory, and narrative. Within this meditation, we can find shared meaning, mysteries, and paradoxes slowly revealing and resolving themselves.

At this point, I take up the challenge of teaching engaged-thinking approaches to peace education during students' formative ages. First, it is most important to teach the traditional critical thinking skills so that students can free their minds from the tyrannies of group-think. Part of this process includes the students' awareness of how their thinking has been culturally constructed—and that all thought has culturally constructed components that cannot be easily escaped. Language is shaped by culture, and thinking is shaped by language. New thinking often changes language, as neither language nor culture is immutable. So one's thinking is not overdetermined by language and culture. One can grasp new insights that are then translated into language and culture.

An example of how insights can lead to shifts in language and culture is the mystical experience. Different cultural and religious traditions describe mystical experiences in terms of their culture and religion. However, there are common elements of mystical experiences that can be described independently of cultural and religious differences. Following these redescriptions, different religious and cultural traditions can use these new terms to alter their own linguistic descriptions of mystical experiences. Mystical experience is both profoundly local and universal. From this paradoxical insight, different traditions can work with the tension to mediate between both the local and universal linguistic descriptions of mystical experience.

The first step in teaching about thinking processes within peace education is to focus on the contrast between critical thinking and group-think. The process of learning to think critically can be dramatized by challenging elements of group-think with facts. Young people can be asked about the group-think elements of patriotism and nationalism. At an extreme, patriotism and nationalism can take the form of "my country, right or wrong."² It can be pointed out that such a group-think attitude could easily lead to endless war. Critical thinking asks each individual to determine if loyalty is a stronger value than morality. If morality is necessary for

²Critiqued by McLaren (1986) and Giroux (2005).

international peace to prevail, then morality must be more valuable than national loyalty. If morality is a stronger value, then it follows that “my country, right or wrong” does not follow. In this exercise, the teacher has called group-think into question in matters of war and peace by means of critical thinking.

The second step is to move from critical thinking to engaged thinking. In the Iraq war, the citizens of the USA were told that a unilateral invasion of Iraq was justified because Iraq had weapons of mass destruction and because its leader was perceived as belligerent and hostile to the USA. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks and with the US citizens perceiving that those attacks could be associated with Iraq, US nationalism and loyalty was triggered. Therefore, our invasion was, initially, widely perceived as justified within the USA.

First, students should *think critically* about the lack of evidence for the presence of weapons of mass destruction and the lack of evidence for any connection between the 9/11 attacks and Iraq. Second, students should *engage the perspectives* of US citizens about Saddam Hussein’s belligerence and fears about his relationship to terrorism, along with Arab perspectives on the threat they experience by a US invasion. These two steps transition the student to the third kind of thinking—engaged thinking.

US and Middle Eastern Arab perspectives come alive watching the film *Control Room*. Therefore, the engaged thinking experience can be generated by watching this film and discussing the perspectives shown. The teacher might mention that the Central Command Press Officer, Captain Josh Rushing, who is featured in the film, left the US military not long after the filming and got a job with Al Jazeera, the Arab television station. Captain Rushing provides an optional audio commentary on the DVD, which illuminates his transformation from the US perspective toward a more balanced US/Middle Eastern Arab perspective. Captain Rushing demonstrates *critical thinking skills* as he defends the US role in the war; however, his dramatic transformation occurs when he *engages and thinks with Arabs* who have different identities, experiences, historical memory, and perspectives about the war.

There is an important pedagogical shift that takes place as the teacher moves between the two transitions—first, between group-think and critical thinking, where students learn rational skills, and, second, between critical thinking and engaged thinking, where students learn to think together by being engaged with others. In the first transition, the teacher provides skills to students, as a mentor. In the second transition, the teacher engages with students as an equal.

This second transition can be difficult for the teacher, if she has solely relied on her classroom presence as an authority figure. One way to soften the transition from *mentor* to *co-learner* is to facilitate classroom discussions as an impartial neutral. Whenever discussions are pedagogically required, the teacher should refrain from interposing her views. She should merely facilitate the discussion by encouraging participation and maintaining order. At the end of the discussion, she can summarize what has been said, acting as a mentor only to give depth and context to what has been discussed.

Teaching as a co-learner (Freire 2000) is necessary to the engaged thinking process because one is engaging others in a way that fully respects differences of

identity, experience, memory, perspective, and worldview. This respect for difference is expressed in compassionate listening and empathetic validation of the experience of students. The insight here is that we can judge facts and evidence, but we cannot judge experience, emotions, and perspectives. These individual realities must be accepted and not falsified. Otherwise, we alienate students as partners in the co-learning process.

In the Iraq War exercise, detailed above, the teacher could role-play Captain Rushing from the film, *Control Room*. Captain Rushing is internally conflicted between his identity as a press officer for the US military and his increasing sympathies for Arab viewpoints on the US invasion. Within this role, the teacher engages students as an equal co-learner, by respecting whatever views they have. If students reflect mainstream views about *fighting terrorism*, the teacher should not challenge those views as “wrong.” Rather, she should explore them and—in role—explain how she has held those views too, until they were modified, as she became familiar with Arab views on the *perceived terrorism* of the US bombings and ground attacks that killed massive numbers of civilians. The insight expressed here is that connecting with other people’s experiences can expand our views but that does not mean our previous views were wrong—they were only more limited.

Furthermore, the teacher could explain the concept of “blowback,” which refers to the US policies in the Middle East that arguably triggered the 9/11 attacks (Johnson 2000). The teacher, as co-learner, models the engaged thinking process by helping broaden students’ views on a subject, rather than denying the validity of their experiences, identities, perspectives, and affiliations. In the engaged thinking process, the teacher gives students something to think about, rather than doing the students’ thinking for them.

At this point in our discussion, I turn to a possible objection to the grounds for supposing that engaged thinking is actually possible. A common concern can be summarized in the following question, “Do we ever really engage other people’s lives, or are we forever isolated within our own minds, merely interpreting what people say to us in terms of our own experiences and perspectives alone?”

To address this question, I suggest that we look at two ways to describe how we think when we are in dialogue. The mainstream Western view is that dialogue engages individual interpretive centers, thinking apart; the alternate view is that dialogue can connect people into a unified effort at thinking together. An example of the latter was explored in detail by Edwin Hutchin’s (1995) analysis of international shipping navigation in *Cognition in the Wild* by illustrating at least one kind of thinking that is, arguably, out in the world, rather than isolated in brains.

The common Western view is that all communication is a kind of interpretation of each word or gesture that is expressed by another. As this account goes, we have brains more powerful and sophisticated than current computer technology, so we can interpret and translate in virtually an instant. This instantaneousness allows us to experience smoothly flowing dialogue and a seamless stream of mutual understanding (Churchlands 1990). However, on this view, there is only the illusion of connection—only an approximate understanding of the other’s expressions. Isolated brains can only roughly, and self-referentially, know the realities of other isolated

brains. In contrast, a less fragmented and more holistic perspective presumes that even when our experiences are radically different, there is a connected reality that underlies these differences.

As the reader can clearly see, there is a serious disjunction between these two metaphysical views. The mind-as-brain view asserts the incomprehensibility of consciousness transcending the boundaries of the brain. On the other view, the mind or soul is not restricted to the physicality of the brain; minds and souls can connect through an overarching consciousness—a world run-through with consciousness. A mind or soul can be emergent in the world (mind as world), not merely the brain (mind as brain). Mind as world can have intelligence; mind as world can have memory, hold history, and gesture toward its and our future.

My purpose is to show that reconciling these two metaphysical views is seemingly impossible when articulated in either/or polarized form. However, if we shift our focus from metaphysical presumptions to a description of thinking phenomena, we find that we experience both autonomy and connection (Deleuze and Guattari 1994). Using the wave/particle analogy, we can experience our thinking as either isolated particle or wave of dialogue. If we experience waves of dialogue flowing smoothly with mutual understanding, then we may be reasonably safe to presume that we are thinking with one mind.

Only when misunderstandings, or other obstructions to clarity, occur do we rebound to a sense of a more isolated mind. Even when a misunderstanding occurs, it is likely that both parties will experience a mutual disjunction—in this way, even somewhat isolated minds seem aware of their overarching unity (through an awareness of difference) within a given conversation. This awareness is facilitated by the cosmopolitan acts of respect and hospitality. It can be argued that the overarching unity of cosmopolitanism is found precisely in a universal respect and hospitality. First, we must bring the other into our lives; then we can begin to truly think together.

Therefore, if it turns out that metaphysical unity is impossible, we still must affirm that we experience the phenomena of thinking together—and can point to people who do this well and those who do it poorly. If engaged thinking is an illusion, then it is a workable and productive illusion. As an analogy, fiction is not metaphysically real, but it is certainly workable and productive.

In the following, I summarize my description of engaged thinking. This kind of thinking starts with the presumption that our experiences and our thinking are not always isolated within ourselves. In many cases, we experience and think together, without the divisions between self, other, and world. As an example, it is likely that the experience of infants is more unified, without divisions, than adult experience. However, it is also possible that adults, in some cultures and circumstances, retain this unity. In some cases, individuals may even have difficulty establishing an independent sense of self because they are so enmeshed with a unity of experience.

Ultimately, engaged thinking is also about thinking together *within oneself*, as well as with others and the world. We internalize other people's experiences, perspectives, identities, and worldviews—which create an internal dialogue across difference that parallels the external dialogues we have with others. Therefore, engaged thinking works on both levels—internal and external. Without the

techniques of compassionate listening and empathetic validation, both of these dialogues can generate irresolvable conflicts. Engaged thinking, being respectful of difference, can bridge both internal and external differences. Teaching young people to engage in this way is a fundamental element in peace education because it establishes the “we” in peace against the “us and them” of war. Indeed, we can connect across difference—and this knowledge can save lives.

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Chapter 5

Critical Pedagogy and Peace Education: Understanding Violence, Human Rights, and the Historical Project of Militant Peace

Panayota Gounari

As I am typing these lines, we are running the last months of the *International Decade for a Culture of Peace and Non-violence for the Children of the World* that started back in 2000, a year designated as the *International Year for the Culture of Peace* by the United Nations (UNESCO International Decade for a Culture of Peace and Non-violence for the Children of the World 2001–2010). The timing is important, since, with less than two months left in this *decade of peace*, a critical review of the events that took place in the past ten years is more than necessary for the purposes of any discussion on peace. If we were to do this in great detail, we would notice how violent and bloody this decade has been. Despite the hard work, strides, and achievements made by peace organizations, movements, and activists worldwide; despite the positive interventions and the increasing awareness on issues pertaining to nonviolence and peace; and despite the rapid development of peace education as an autonomous field with a growing body of literature, the history of humanity remains one of atrocities, pain, and devastation. Since 2000 until today, we have witnessed not only the proliferation of existing major conflicts that have loomed for years but also the genesis of more fierce conflicts worldwide: the Middle East conflict with the Second Intifada in Palestine, the visit of Sharon in the Temple Mount, and the unimaginable violence and death that followed; the 9/11 attacks; the ensuing war in Afghanistan and then Iraq (coupled with the Abu-Ghraib atrocities, the Blackwater scandal, and so forth); US military interventions in Yemen, Philippines, Colombia, Liberia, Haiti, Somalia, and Sudan; the Beslan massacre in South Ossetia by Chechen rebels (2004); the US/Canadian military plot to overthrow Haiti's president Jean-Bertrand Aristide; the London Underground bombings; the Paris race uprisings; the intensification of the civil war in Sudan, Congo (2008), and Somalia (2009); and the US-sponsored coup deposing Honduran president Manuel Zelaya (2009),

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only to mention a few. The task of listing all conflicts, atrocities, aggression, and violence that took place in the last decade is beyond the scope of this chapter. However, for the ambitious and dedicated reader of history, this would be an important task and a great challenge before one even starts thinking about a “culture of peace.” The events listed above are only instances of overt, direct violence, but we should also consider here the multiple forms of economic, political, symbolic, and discursive violence and their very real human consequences, as well as the intensified move toward militarization as the penetration of military ideology and values, worldwide. In this context, how do we reconcile a decade dedicated to the “culture of peace” with the ongoing wars and aggression worldwide? Here, I am not implying that the difficult and challenging task of world peace is the sole responsibility of the United Nations as a global intergovernmental organization or that of similar organizations. I rather want to underline a paradox: through the designation of an *International Decade for a Culture of Peace*, institutions like UNESCO that are legitimized to define, process, and work on peace produce their discourse in reports, news briefs, and other antiviolence and pro-peace material and provide specific recommendations and directives; researchers dedicate a great deal of energy, time, and effort to investigate peace. On the other hand, violence is produced and reproduced materially and symbolically in multiple sites worldwide, and it produces its own discourses of aggression. The two discourses are not necessarily opposing pairs; they are dialectically interconnected. They also construct and articulate one another in very real ways since “it is an error to imagine that civilization and savage cruelty are antithesis ... both creation and destruction are inseparable aspects of what we call civilization” (Bauman 1989, 9). In a similar way, we can view history as essentially creation—creation and destruction. Both creation and destruction are rooted in very real socioeconomical and political grounds that often are not taken into consideration in the discourses of peace, especially those that carry the official stamp of mainstream legitimacy. In this context, there is a pressing need to rethink the ways in which we conceptualize and understand creation and destruction, violence/war, and peace, discursively and materially; redefine them; and reconceptualize a curriculum that would address the aforementioned paradox. This is an important task for educators and others who strive to reveal the inherent contradictions in the war-peace, violence-nonviolence, human rights-injustice binarisms; to link them to larger sociopolitical, economic, and cultural questions; and to make them part of the school curriculum.

In this chapter, I am attempting to set up a more radical agenda for peace education drawing on the work of critical pedagogy. In this framework, I am discussing the dominant discourse on peace and human rights. I am analyzing their “universal” character and the way they have been used to neutralize or even promote aggression, particularly in the context of the United States foreign policy. This has been done through a liberal ideology of *missionary politics that promotes tolerance*. I interrogate this missionary politics of tolerance in the context of some general thoughts on violence, terror, and the construction of fear. I am drawing on the seminal work of Slavoj Žižek, Herbert Marcuse, Walter Benjamin, and Hannah Arendt in an attempt to provide a nuanced theoretical framework of understanding the concept of violence. Finally, I offer a more radical educational discourse and pedagogy, through

the concept of “militant peace” to suggest ways to integrate pressing questions about peace/violence in the curriculum. The turn to the “critical” in peace education was initiated in the mid-1970s (Wulf 1974) when “critical peace education” was understood as a criticism of societies. Since then, more attempts either to connect peace education with the work of Brazilian educator Paulo Freire (Diaz-Soto 2005), to define and reclaim a “critical peace education” (Bajaj 2008), or at least, to bring a critical perspective in peace education (Page 2008, Shapiro 2001) were recorded. So far, scholarship in peace education has taken less advantage of the more radical aspects of critical pedagogy in order to frame its political/pedagogical project. In this chapter, I hope to bring out these radical elements and discuss ways of integrating them to the new agenda of peace education.

A Theoretical Framework for Understanding Violence

In any attempt to define the boundaries, content, vision, and goals of peace education, it is important to establish a framework for understanding violence as a concept and as a practice, particularly as nonviolence is promoted as a medium for conflict resolution. In the vast bibliography on the topic, there are many different typologies in conceptualizing and understanding violence. Here, I will use a typology proposed by Slavoj Žižek (2008) since I find it coherent, flexible, and nuanced at the same time. Žižek differentiates between three types, what he calls *subjective*, *objective* (symbolic), and *systemic* forms of violence. *Subjective* violence is the most visible (crime, mass murder, terror, etc.) because it seems enacted by social agents, evil individuals, disciplined repressive apparatuses, and fanatical crowds. *Objective* violence that is invisible (racism, hate-speech, discrimination, and other forms of dehumanization) is inherent to the normal state of things, and it includes *symbolic violence*. Objective violence is also embodied in forms of language (discourses). Finally, *systemic* violence is inherent to a system, and it is sustained not only through direct physical violence but it is also manifested through “more subtle forms of coercion that sustain relations of domination and exploitation, including the threat of violence.” Systemic violence includes the often catastrophic consequences of the smooth functioning of our economic and political systems (Žižek 2008, 9).

The successful manufacturing of fears in the United States is dependent on the intentional use and broadcast of specific instances of subjective violence that, in turn, create a spectacle that distracts us from the true source of violence. In a pragmatic society that lives in the here and now, immediacy is at its core. In subjective violence, it can name perpetrators and victims and represent/illustrate the atrocities to elicit the desired reaction. With respect to the United States’ own violent acts worldwide, those play out mostly at the objective and systemic level, and they succeed in maintaining and expanding relations of domination and exploitation. Subjective violence always stands in need of spectators since it is through their gaze that it takes on meaning and importance, and it is the spectators’ interpretations that make it what it is. At the same time, this type of violence uses material implements, while

objective violence relies on discursive, ideological, and symbolic means. These, however, have very real material manifestations, as exemplified, for instance, by the relentless attacks on illegal immigrants through racist talk that becomes physical violence and the institutional racism that gives rise to these attacks in the first place.

In the discourse of peace education, with few exceptions, the focus is often on subjective violence (as is the case, for instance, in many of the UNESCO publications), while ignoring forms of objective or systemic violence that possibly generate and sustain subjective violence. By examining violence at the subjective level, we remain spectators and often succumb to the trap of immediate action, what Žižek calls a “fake sense of urgency.” We are bombarded by media about humanitarian crises. The humanitarian sense of urgency is mediated, indeed overdetermined, by clear political considerations. This let’s-act-now type of reaction more often addresses the symptom and not the real cause of the problem and only succeeds at making us feel better about ourselves or washing away our guilt rather than achieving any type of fundamental structural change or intervention. For instance, despite the vast material on how to achieve peace through nonviolent means that includes bibliography, handbooks, reports, etc., relatively little is achieved in the real world. This could be explained by the fact that sudden calls for action as prescription and recommendation cannot resolve deep structural problems in the very fabric of human societies. Instead of offering one more prescription or a cry for “world peace,” a catchphrase so popular even in beauty pageants, “the truly difficult thing is to step back, to withdraw. Those in power often prefer even a ‘critical’ participation, a dialogue, to silence- just to engage us in ‘dialogue, to make sure our ominous passivity is broken” (Žižek 2008, 217). The problem is that nothing happens beyond this “critical” participation, partly because participants are not willing to explore the underlying workings of power that would expose a violent and oppressive system that preserves and reproduces itself through this “oppositional” material. These underlying workings of power include the construction and dissemination of danger and fear in any given society. Subjective, objective, and systemic forms of violence are closely knit with the workings of danger and fear, in that they rely a great deal on them to produce a symbolic referent to explain (justify?) or legitimize aggression. Fear and danger are not the consequences of a real threat of violence but often its causes.

Zygmunt Bauman (2006) suggests a helpful typology of dangers: (1) those that threaten the body and the possessions, as is the case with natural catastrophes, calamities, and chronic illness, foreign-brought viruses, and world epidemics; (2) those that are of a more general nature, “threatening the durability and reliability of the social order on which security of livelihood (income, employment), or survival in the case of invalidity or old age, depend,” as is the case with the current collapse of the finance and credit system, unemployment, debt, and so forth; and (3) those “dangers that threaten one’s place in the world,” which include one’s position in the social hierarchy, identity (class, gender, ethnic, religious), and more broadly, “an immunity to social degradation and exclusion” (136). How are these dangers constructed, in the first place, and what is their real basis? How are they appropriated in the dominant discourse to become forms of subjective violence?

Or how are they used in subtle forms of objective and systemic violence? If peace education is understood as the transmission of knowledge about the requirements of, the obstacles to, and possibilities for achieving and maintaining peace, training in skills for interpreting the knowledge, and the development of reflective and participatory capacities for applying the knowledge to overcoming problems and achieving possibilities (Abdul Aziz and Reardon 1999), we should explore how fear and danger affect knowledge and reflective and participatory capacities and limit their possibilities.

Obviously, the first type of dangers (those threatening the body and the possessions) has a more immediate, palpable impact (resonating with subjective violence) and a stronger visual effect. We can see the impact or at least visualize it. The fear machine mostly manufactures this kind of danger since it threatens a very real materiality (our bodies, our properties, our material goods). However, of equal importance are those dangers that work at a more transcendental level (again here resonating with objective and systemic violence): beyond material possessions, they also threaten our sense of safety, social status, financial security, cultural recognition, and so forth. These belong to a more collective conception since they are interdependent and co-articulate with public interests and social provisions. It seems that most fears are constructed to threaten our individual existence and well-being and those that threaten our collective core are conveniently left out or silenced, as is the case with the gradual disappearance of social provisions and welfare (public education, universal health care, workers' rights, and so forth). Under the auspices of neoconservative ideology that divests any responsibility of the state for social provisions (as evidenced in the elimination of welfare for the poor, degradation of anything public, including education and universal health care, rollbacks of affirmative action, cutbacks in housing), the weakened social and welfare state resorts more and more to material and symbolic violence (as illustrated in increased militarization, booming of the prison industry, which makes the United States the country with the highest number of prisoners, most of whom are Blacks or Latinos which, in turn, exponentially increases the police forces and the presence of police in public schools). There is a shift from the collective to the personal, from social issues to individual problems. Concerns of personal safety overwrite concerns of participation in the public sphere. Maybe that explains in part why often people so alienated in capitalist societies remain idle in the face of the violation of other people's safety, until their own safety is at stake. In this sense, visible or invisible violence (i.e., both symbolic and real) or the threat of violence becomes another prolific source of contemporary fears. In the peace education agenda, it would be worth investigating the manufacture of fear through danger and the reasons behind it since it could yield interesting insights about individual and collective agency.

Let me now turn to the concept of violence drawing, among others, on Hannah Arendt's classic discussion where she makes it possible to capture nuances and understandings of violence in the age of terror and modern warfare. Arendt's seminal work makes a very interesting distinction between violence and power. Beyond the simplistic notion that power is nothing but a façade for violence—where violence is seen as a flagrant manifestation of power and deemed absolutely necessary to maintain

it—she inverts Weber’s famous formulation that modern states have been constituted through the gradual process of attaining a monopoly over the means of violence that “the rule of men over men [is] based on the means of legitimate, that is allegedly legitimate, violence” (Arendt 1970, 35). Arendt claims that violence is distinct from power because force or strength always needs implements and that “the very substance of violence is ruled by the end-means category whose chief characteristic is that the end is in danger of being overwhelmed by the means which it justifies and which are needed to reach it” (4). On the contrary, power is an end in itself in the sense that it is the condition enabling a group to think and act in terms of the end-means category (51). She cautions that abuse of violence could result in the means overwhelming the end.

According to Arendt, “one of the most obvious distinctions between power and violence is that power always stands in need of numbers,” that is, a solid human basis, whereas “violence up to a point can manage without them because it relies on implements” (1970, 41–42). Violence can always destroy power, “out of the barrel of a gun grows the most effective command, resulting in the most instant and perfect obedience” (53). However, she claims that power can never grow out of raw violence. Rule by sheer violence comes into play where power is being lost, as is the case, for instance, with totalitarian regimes since “no government exclusively based on the means of violence has ever existed. Even the totalitarian ruler, whose chief instrument of rule is torture, needs a power basis—the secret police and its net of informers . . . Even slavery was based on superior organization of power (i.e., on the organized solidarity of the masters) and not on superior means of coercion” (50). Arendt is not claiming that there is no violence inherent to power, but rather that violence always seeks legitimization or justification in power, and there is no such thing as raw violence. In her view, the implements of violence alone would not succeed. Individuals without others to support them do not seem to have enough power even to use violence successfully. This is definitely something to consider when thinking about the power of consensus and of individual and collective agency. Arendt further insists that power and violence are opposites: where one rules absolutely, the other is absent. The opposite of violence is not nonviolence, since to speak of nonviolent power is redundant (1970, 56) and violence does not constitute a means to power: it is the people’s support, she claims, that “lends power to the institutions of a country, and this support is but the continuation of the consent that brought the laws into existence to begin with. Under conditions of representative government the people are supposed to rule those who govern them. All political institutions are manifestations and materializations of power; they petrify and decay as soon as the living power of the people ceases to uphold them” (41).

These nuanced distinctions are important to the degree that today, boundaries between them are blurred as power is gradually removed from politics. Power is no longer the essence of the state, and violence takes central stage, especially as instrumental rationality intrudes in every sector of public life. Violence today seems to have found Arendt’s prerequisites, that is, “guidance and justification through the end it pursues” (1970, 41).

Who Is the Perpetrator of Violence?

Arendt's analysis begs an important question that is also often absent in the mainstream discourse on peace education: who is the perpetrator of violence? Peace educator Birgit Brock-Utne (1996) illustrates this point in a somewhat different context: in the *Education for All (EFA) Conference* in Thailand, in discussing resources for education in the so-called Third World, the resolution of the economic crisis associated with debt and North–south economic relations was set as a prerequisite in order to extend education for all. The debt of all Third World or developing countries to big Western financial institutions was a clear impediment to developing quality education, yet the global financial institutions holding the debts were not perceived as “aggressors” who exercise a form of objective/systemic violence to these countries. In the same conference, a very strong proposal came from the African Association for Literacy and Adult Education (AALAE) that stated “we call on all governments of the North and all international financial institutions, to cancel all existing debts, as these are an intolerable burden on the people, making it impossible for them to mobilize the resources necessary for basic education, and ferment revolt and strife” (1996, 172–173). We can talk about peace and education for all, as much as we want, but unless the structural inequalities and wealth distribution change radically, our attempts will remain just talk. On an international level, multinational financial institutions have the power to impose rules to the “poor south” countries, but when violence erupts in the interior of these countries, we rarely look at the inhuman conditions of life imposed because of the very debts, so the aggressors are the people and not the institutions that threw them in a status of sub-humanity. These financial institutions have the monopoly of setting the rules of the trade globally with the sole aim of capital increase at the expense of national resources, work conditions, social welfare, and quality of life in the countries in debt. Global financial institutions as perpetrators of subjective and objective/systemic violence should be questioned and explored in the agenda of peace education.

While this type of aggression takes place on an international level, on the national level, the state has a legal monopoly to set the rules and use violence to support its edifice and defend its interests (that are often dictated by the external global capital). This positions all other forms of violence as “illegal,” since institutionalized violence is the norm/law that legitimizes the perpetration of violence. For example, by naming anyone as “enemy (or unlawful) combatant,” the United States is free to torture them, to deny them their rights to habeas corpus, and to incarcerate them without ever being charged with a crime such as is the case with prisoners in Guantanamo. Therefore, we have here two concepts of violence: institutionalized state violence and oppositional violence that is by default illegal (Benjamin 1996; Marcuse 1967a, b). Or as Walter Benjamin asserts, it is not possible to separate violence from law since all violence is either lawmaking or law-preserving, and all law, however remote it may seem from its origins and from the forces that maintain it, is latent violence. Along the lines of what constitutes legality, Marcuse accurately

notes that “it is meaningless to speak of the legality of resistance: no social system, even the freest, can constitutionally legalize violence directed against itself. Each of these forms has functions that conflict with those of the other. There is violence of suppression and violence of liberation; there is violence for the defense of life and violence of aggression. And both forms have been and will remain historical forces” (Marcuse 1967a, b). He gives the example of the Bolshevik Revolution where, at the beginning, “there was no cruelty, no brutality, no terror going beyond resistance against those still in power. Where in a revolution this sort of terror changes into acts of cruelty, brutality, and torture, then we are already talking about a perversion of the revolution.” Benjamin seems to be on the same page when, in his “Critique of Violence,” (1996) he wonders whether violence in the social and political realms could be justified as pure means in itself, independent of whether it was applied to fair or unfair ends. He posits that an acceptable form of revolutionary violence is the one exercised by the proletariat, not only in the form of strikes, but in the form of the general class war that was to bring down the bourgeoisie and the state (1996). According to Mikhail Bakhtin, the constitutive moment of all earthly powers is “violence, suppression, falsehood” pointing to the “dominion of the state and the ‘trepidation and fear of the subjected’ as primarily, or even exclusively, the subjects’ fear of the state, oozing from the perpetual practice and even more constant threat of the state’s violence” (in Bauman 2006, 155). Obviously, this goes back to Lenin’s “bourgeois pacifism” that distracts workers from the revolutionary struggle. We cannot forget, insists Lenin, that we live in a class society where the oppressor class is always armed. If we translate this in international terms, in the dialogues for peace, where there is aggression, there is always a party that is by default “armed.” Important questions include, again, who is armed and why, what kind of arms are used, and where were they found. A call for peace that promotes nonviolent means of resolving conflict, while ignoring the de facto violence inherent in these conflicts, can offer very little to the project of peace education. How can we establish a dialogue between two or more parties when one is always armed and unwilling to sign armistice? And if we do give up on arms (material and symbolic), how is the warfare industry complex going to react to the loss of billions of dollars in profit? Again, these are fundamental questions that need to be asked in the context of building and promoting peace education. As warfare is radically changing, both in terms of strategy as well as in terms of implements, we should rethink peace education at a time when preemptive war has become a new military trend. Preemptive aggression is a phenomenon that should be analyzed as we talk about ways to conceptualize an education for peace. As a consequence of war preemptively unleashed, aggression requires the expansion of a booming military industry, on the one hand, to create the necessary military infrastructure to “expand democracy” and “protect our freedom” and, on the other hand, to support our troops by keeping them well equipped with the latest and most sophisticated war gadgetry. As a result, the invasion of foreign countries on false pretense precedes the provocation or aggression on the part of the “enemy” (thus, the new concept of “preemptive wars”). Peace education as an ongoing process that works on prevention has now to deal with preemption. The fear of terrorist attacks comes before any terrorist aggression, triggering multiple forms of

symbolic violence such the curtailment of civil liberties exemplified in the unauthorized wiretapping of private conversations for the sake of a sense of security promised by homeland security. It feels like watching a movie that starts from the end; first, you see the corpse and then the crime, closely resembling Gabriel Garcia Marquez's novel *The Chronicle of a Death Foretold* where everything starts with the knowledge of the crime; the killers are known; and an entire community is aware of what is about to happen, yet no one lifts a finger to stop the killers from executing their plan because they are a priori paralyzed by the fear of involvement that looms over the town. In Garcia Marquez's story plot, the more that is learned, the less is understood, and as the story races to its inexplicable conclusion, an entire society—not just the two murderers—is put on trial. In the same way, most inhabitants of the small Latin American town in *Chronicle of a Death Foretold* console themselves with the pretext that “affairs of honor are sacred monopolies,” and the US public finds moral and rational legitimization for both their apathy and US aggression worldwide in an anti-politics of fear. The more we know, the less we seem to understand or at least we pretend to not understand, and consequently, we now all seem to be complicit with the government crimes perpetrated both at home and abroad in the name of “homeland security,” “democracy,” and “freedom.” Garcia Marquez's eerily assertion that “there had never been a death more foretold” unveils a troubling truth that haunts an entire society, both in the fictional town in South America as well as in the international scene of affairs where complicity through a self-imposed silence betrays the often exaggerated sense of righteousness and morality. It is troubling to think that currently, we either still remain paralyzed in the face of a death foretold or we fall into a “fake sense of urgency.” Garcia Marquez story reflects the current situation vis-à-vis aggression and questions of human agency. How can we use the “knowledge of the crime,” the knowledge of aggression, and the knowledge of injustice toward an understanding and action against this violence, without ending the effort at its genesis? How can we avoid paralyzing our thinking? How can we deconstruct the language of common sense around war to understand the underlying sociopolitical and economic basis? How can we convert the fear of involvement to a powerful sense of agency and action?

Beyond the Politics of Compassion: Discursive and Material Violence in the Age of Human Rights

Tolerance and the Liberal Ideology of Missionary Politics

The concept of “tolerance” is often encountered in the literature on peace, peace research, conflict resolution, and so forth. One of the core principles in the very definition of UNESCO's culture of peace is tolerance, along with solidarity and human rights. The “culture of peace” has been a central concept in UNESCO's work since the end of the Cold War as the alternative to a culture of war and violence.

According to the United Nations General Assembly, the “culture of peace” is defined as “ (...) values, attitudes and behaviours that reflect and inspire social interaction and sharing based on the principles of freedom, justice and democracy, all human rights, tolerance and solidarity, that reject violence and endeavour to prevent conflicts by tackling their root causes to solve problems through dialogue and negotiation and that guarantee the full exercise of all rights and the means to participate fully in the development process of their society” (UNESCO). Most of the UNESCO-produced documentation and material seems to espouse this idea of tolerance as a mediative, redemptive tool in contexts of difference and conflict. The same term is often encountered in peace education literature (Bajaj 2008, Page 2008; Harris and Morrison 1970; Duffy 1992) at times problematized, others as part of a recommendation—as in the idea of tolerance of different modalities of expression and differing opinions—or as a key concept of peace curricula.

In the peace education discourse, tolerance is a form of redemption rather than a democratic process of locating and questioning power hierarchies and exclusions. It also positions the different other as responsible for “being tolerated.” David Theo Goldberg points out that “liberals are moved to overcome the racial difference they tolerate and have been so instrumental in fabricating by diluting them, by bleaching them out through assimilation or integration. The liberal would assume away the difference in otherness, maintaining thereby the dominance of a presumed sameness, the universally imposed similarity in identity. The paradox is perpetrated: The commitment to tolerance turns only on modernity’s natural inclination to intolerance; acceptance of otherness presupposes as it at once necessitates delegitimization of the other” (1993, 6). The call for tolerance never questions the asymmetrical power relations that give those who tolerate their privilege to tolerate the other. That is, tolerance presupposes a subject and an object, and the way these two are positioned in the equation is based on power issues. Thus, many liberals willingly call and work for tolerance and pacifism but are reluctant to confront issues of inequality, power, wealth redistribution, and relations of production in a way that could actually lead to questioning the very structure that produces the need to tolerate. It is actually violence that ends up being sustained in this notion of tolerance.

In the often faceless representation of symbolic and material violence, in the face of a “death foretold,” it is necessary to step back and conceive a strategy. Humanitarian compassionate arguments are of little use when they remain simply rhetoric. After all, as I also mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, it is humanity itself that gives rise to terror. Denouncing terrorism or violence, defending human rights, and professing tolerance do not constitute politics in and of itself. To claim that one is interested in human rights and yet ignore entirely organizational and structural problems in society shows a total lack of political coherence. Instead, it is important, for example, to try to make the linkages between human rights and particular historical, geographical, and sociopolitical conditions. It is equally important to remember that violence is not self-sustained or autonomous; it is always positioned and functions in a context. We cannot proclaim to offer universal solutions for local problems, a kind of one-size-fits-all prescription for world peace, since humanity is built on conflictual politics, situated identities, and diverse struggles. The call for

nonviolence should be accompanied with and infused by an understanding of our industrial, capitalist, multinational, and extraterritorial realities coupled with the advances in modern warfare and war technology, where asymmetry of access in power and economic resources is a fact.

In a framework of constant violation of human rights, both at home and abroad, that are now used not only as an excuse for neoliberal/neoconservative policies but also as a catchphrase for anybody who wants to be considered a concerned citizen, we need to resist “pseudoactivity, the urge to ‘be active,’ to ‘participate,’ to mask the nothingness of what goes on. People intervene all the time, ‘do something’; academics participate in meaningless debates, and so on” (Žižek 2008). Currently, liberal attitudes (the humanitarian jump to action) promote a reaction mostly to subjective violence (that which can be seen), making all other more subtle forms invisible. Underlying this is a hypocritical sentiment of moral outrage. The same moral outrage that we find in the dominant discourse on “tolerance” often applies in the case of “human rights.” The very war on terror waged by the United States and its allies has been based discursively on the protection of “human rights,” yet it took two presidential terms for the American people to show any type of moral outrage for their government. Human rights are among the preferred phrases of the US State Department since Jimmy Carter in 1977 put them at the core of US foreign policy. According to the US State Department, the promotion of respect for human rights consists a central goal of US foreign policy, because it “understands that the existence of human rights helps secure the peace, deter aggression, promote the rule of law, combat crime and corruption, strengthen democracies, and prevent humanitarian crises.” This is done by holding “governments accountable to their obligations under universal human rights norms and international human rights instruments; Promoting greater respect for human rights, including freedom from torture, freedom of expression, press freedom, women’s rights, children’s rights, and the protection of minorities; Promoting the rule of law, seek accountability, and change cultures of impunity; Assisting efforts to reform and strengthen the institutional capacity of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the UN Commission on Human Rights; and Coordinating human rights activities with important allies, including the EU, and regional organizations.” These are official statements from the biggest country aggressor in the globe, the country that has repeatedly violated the rights of its own indigenous people, people of color, and after September 11, the rights of every “terror suspect.” In line with these aggressive policies, the United States has not ratified the Protocol to the Convention against Torture and voted against the Declaration of Rights of the Indigenous People. In May 2001, the US Senate decided to reject the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC) over American citizens. As a reminder, the ICC is established to help end impunity for the perpetrators of the most serious crimes (genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, among others) of concern to the international community and operates above the authority of national courts.

With hundreds of military operations worldwide—always in the name of “human rights”—these are repeatedly violated at home and abroad. Human rights have long been the excuse for military interventions worldwide, for preemptive wars, and for

the perpetuation of US aggression. In the new authoritarian vocabulary, “our” aggression is legitimized protection, while “their” mere existence is considered aggression. In other words, the validity of human rights depends on the subject that is naming them. It is interesting to look at how this aggression is also constructed as liberal missionary politics and is legitimized discursively. This is done through neutralizing and universalizing the discourse around human rights. Only since the US invasion in Iraq in 2003 we count 99,000–108,000 documented civilian deaths, around 4,400 dead American soldiers (and over 100,000 wounded), and the war still wages. How is it that the protection of human rights ends up in violation of those very rights? Human rights are almost always linked to “promoting democracy abroad.” How is it that this “democracy” always comes at such a high cost? In the dominant discourse of US foreign policy, within the confines of a market-driven politics, the market itself becomes tautonymous to democracy, embracing a “convergence dogma” whereby market and democracy converge. Freedom is generally invoked in the foreign policy discourse not to talk about oppressed human subjects but rather when issues of trade and markets are at stake. We hear terms such as free trade and free market when discussing the “democratization” of a given country. At the same time, human rights and social justice take on new meanings and are brought to the forefront to give a humanitarian aura to the operation. The discourse around human rights is used only as a humanitarian cover to penetrate other countries’ economies and/or to legitimize military interventions abroad. The United States has made capitalism into an exportable good, a commodity labeled “democratization,” and it has been trying to export it all around the world. However, democracy cannot be exported. The notion of “exporting democracy” becomes just another ideological trick to veil the imposition of the neoliberal order, the quest for new markets, and the expansion of corporate interests around the globe. William Tabb (2003) notes that “it is increasingly clear that much of the talk about democracy is really about the imposition of the will of a most dangerous set of policy makers who have usurped power in the United States.” According to Bajaj (2008) from the perspective of peace education, “human rights, and the debates surrounding them, should not be treated as static and fixed. Instead, students should be taught the complexities and messiness of the human rights system in ways that empower them to engage with larger international standards. The primacy of the nation state, the limitations of enforcement, and the Western biases in human rights discourse should be interrogated.” I think Samuel Moyn (2010) is on target when he claims that human rights have many faces and multiple possible uses and often serve as a brand name for diverse schemes of global governance in which vulnerability and inequality persist. He insists that “like all universalist projects, human rights are violated every time they are interpreted and transformed into a specific program. Because they promise everything to everyone, they can end up meaning anything to anyone.” It is exactly the universality of the language of “human rights” that robs them of a particular political project, neutralizes them, and allows them to be reappropriated by the most reactionary groups that turn them into empty slogans.

It should, therefore, be among the tasks of peace education to challenge the “common sense” language used both in official and unofficial discourses on peace/

war and human rights. Paulo Freire brilliantly captures this pedagogical dimension when he cautions about “vague phrases” stressing that “I cannot be a teacher if I do not perceive with even greater clarity that my practice demands of me a definition of where I stand. A break with what is not right ethically. I must choose between one thing and another thing. I cannot be a teacher and be in favor of everyone and everything. I cannot be in favor merely of people, humanity, vague phrases far from the concrete nature of educative practice” (Freire 1998: 93).

A “common sense” definition is also often implied for the very concept of peace that has been largely emptied out of its political and ideological content and has been resold as apolitical, universal, and all inclusive. How else can we explain, for example, the fact that both Barack Obama and Al Gore have been recipients of the Peace Nobel Prize? And if one could find arguments in support of these two, what arguments are there for Henry Kissinger, recipient of the Peace Nobel Prize in 1974 and now considered in many parts of the world a war criminal? Maybe an ambitious project for peace education would be to define what peace *is not*. Obviously, this last point raises the issue of aggressors and victims on the international level, as the example with Education for All illustrated earlier and questions about support of totalitarian governments and coups d’état by Western democracies and support of other countries’ aggressors with money and arms. Should not a discussion about the North and the South in terms of resources, access to production, and national wealth be part of the peace discourse? The following section discusses the pedagogical implications from the discussion of violence and terror for a critical peace education.

Peace Education and Critical Pedagogy: Making Militant Peace a Political Project

In a Texas district, teachers are allowed to bring guns to class. Teachers who wish to bring guns will have to be “certified to carry a concealed handgun in Texas” and get crisis training and permission from school officials. How are we to open up a space to talk about peace and nonviolence in the curriculum in this context? Arendt is hopeful that we “have the right to expect some illumination [that] may well come less from theories and concepts than from the uncertain, flickering, and often weak light that some men and women in their lives and their works, will kindle under almost all circumstances and shed over the time span that was given to them on earth” (Arendt quoted in Bauman 2002, 51).

In this chapter I have attempted to critically interrogate the often projected neutrality and universality of the discourse on “peace” and “human rights” that is stripped both from its ideological and historical content but also from its political project. I have also tried to question the liberal language of humanitarianism. This is a depoliticized language that can hardly serve for critical peace education. As noted earlier, educators need to “choose between one thing and another thing,” and the language of common sense imposes one thing over the other. This, in the

case of peace education, means avoiding empty slogans and providing peace education with a true political project built on a language of critique and possibility, a language that names, questions, interrogates, and takes a stance. We cannot be in favor of everything and everyone, and we should fill with *meaning* and *history* concepts like peace, justice, and human rights. Above all, we need to ground them on a politics of location and stress their political nature. I strongly believe that politics must always find its point of departure in the concrete situation, and therefore, it is important to identify the ideological and material conditions that block individuals from developing pertinent subjective positions in concrete situations. Similarly, peace education must find its point of departure in the concrete situation. Making peace education critical raises the issue of ethical responsibility about the degree to which individuals, concerned with public affairs, are promoting their own special interests. It is this ethical responsibility that moves people to subjective positions since, according to Alain Badiou, “a person is composed into a subject in a given moment, mobilized in order for a truth to proceed” (2002, 26). When we raise questions about the space politics (as a project) inhabits and the ways it neutralizes itself through a liberal humanitarianism, thereby depoliticizing politics, we are also exposing the various types of agency that this process produces or suppresses. Locating, questioning, and analyzing the anti-politics of violence and war, and the institutions that produce and maintain them, is a first step toward reinventing a political concept of peace.

What I am suggesting here is a concept of “militant peace” that draws from the best critical traditions within pedagogy. Recent connections of peace education to critical pedagogy are important since critical pedagogy raises again and again the connection between power and knowledge and builds around collective projects that promote democratic, participatory, and transformational structures. Some of the attempts to link peace education with critical pedagogy seem to miss the point or reduce its political and ideological content to pedagogical recommendations by focusing mostly on the encouragement of authentic forms of cultural expression or a “concept of tolerance of different modalities of expression and differing opinions” (Page 2008). Other ventures in the framework of peace education remain at the subjective level, discussing how individuals “brought up and educated in democratic environments, [...] can just as surely respond to authority with critical attitudes and a readiness to resist inhuman commands,” and note the emphasis on the development of critical imagination (Shapiro 2001). There is also an attempt to make the work of Brazilian educator Paulo Freire relevant by discussing foundational concepts that have been or could be used in peace education, such a critical consciousness, the banking model of education, and critical literacy (Bartlett 2008; Page 2008; Bajaj 2008; Shapiro 2001). Monisha Bajaj is clearer in trying to articulate a critical peace education project. She classifies critical pedagogy under what she terms “the politicization approach” that “acknowledges that education along with other efforts towards social change outside of schools has a constructive role to play in promoting peace.” She stresses the importance of anchoring school in its larger social context and calls for “action around peace and justice issues, with attention to conceptions based on in-depth knowledge and investigation of local

realities” (2008, 137). She also calls for “renewed attention to larger structural realities, particularly in the global South, and through engaged and systematic research would prove beneficial in understanding the possibilities and limitations of peace education” (143).

Undoubtedly, critical pedagogy can offer important insights and strategy in the development of critical peace education, since it has been making the pedagogical more political and the political more pedagogical for over three decades now. Critical educators have been insisting that education is never neutral; on the contrary, it is deeply political (and not politicized). “Political” implies that there are asymmetrical power relations, conflicting interests and identities, and deliberately choices on what consists knowledge and how it is produced, what experiences it legitimizes and/or marginalizes. A political education is conducive to conscientization, that is, critical awareness of the world, where students realize their subject position. It further constitutes a terrain of action with a vision to a more equal and just future in terms of class, race, ethnicity, gender, disability, sexual orientation, and so forth. As a political project, pedagogy “should always function in part as a provocation that takes students beyond the world they know in order to expand the range of human possibilities and democratic values. Central to critical pedagogy is the recognition that the way we educate our youth is related to the future that we hope for and that such a future should offer students a life that leads to the deepening of freedom and social justice” (Giroux 2010). The vision for a peaceful world is first and foremost a political project that could develop in schools, but it is equally crucial for peace education scholars to understand that education is not an autonomous powerful organization that will impose changes on social structures. There are important limitations in education, especially at the absence of a clear political will for real sociopolitical transformation. Education is not a stable project characterized by consent; it is rather shaped through political, cultural, and economic conflicts. These conflicts are dynamic and interrelated, they mutually inform each other, and they are rooted in structural antagonisms, compromises, and struggles. This is why the concept of “militant peace” is useful in the context of peace education, because it reveals the antagonisms, contradictions, and asymmetries inherent in the discourse and practices of peace, because it does not hide behind humanitarian noninvolvement or liberal urgency; because it acknowledges peace as a process and a product in a net of socioeconomic, historical, political, and geographical conflicts; and finally, because it sees the pairs violence/nonviolence and war/peace as mutually defining each other.

As I have implied throughout this chapter, among the important challenges for critical peace educators and progressive policy makers is to historicize the educational discourse around peace. This would result in the inclusion of multiple histories and experiences that reflect the lives, struggles, aspirations, and dreams of both dominant and subjugated groups. As a result, it will help move these subjugated groups from the periphery of our school curricula into a center stage where they will be able to recount their own histories while at the same time questioning and redefining the dominant version. Along the same lines, one fundamental element in peace education should also be the historicization of conflicts. Bjerstedt notes that

students should have historical and current knowledge about war and peace and insights into the instabilities and risks of violence-based solutions (2003, 21). School curricula have had enormous success in shaping and reproducing histories of violence and aggression. Despite the advent of critical pedagogy to raise critical consciousness, educational curricula are still embracing a nationalistic ideal that anesthetizes students' perceptions of the "other." A curriculum that seeks to promote peace and nonaggression should necessarily incorporate history in a dialectical way. This is another part where critical pedagogy can provide a framework for conceptualizing peace education. That is, narratives of memory could enable people to read the world and position themselves in it, make the appropriate choices, and assume responsibility for themselves and the societies they live in. Along these lines, the educational dimension of public memory has to bear relevance to students' lives and histories today. It should function as a stimulant that incites them to raise critical questions rather than paralyzing their thinking. As mentioned earlier, horror of violence often prevents us from thinking. However, "if we paralyze our thinking, ... we will fail to take collective responsibility for a thorough understanding of the history which brings [us] to this juncture. We will, as a result, deprive ourselves of the very critical and historical resources we need to imagine and practice another future" (Butler 2002, 11).

Part of the problem today is that as Cornelius Castoriadis notes, "we live in a society, that has instituted with the past a type of relationship that is entirely original and unprecedented: total disinvestment. ... The relation to the past is, at best, touristic" (2000, 98). More often than not, students become spectators of the past and not participants in a different historical imaginary. Given the approach to history largely promoted by the conservative agenda, one should question the versions of history that are deemed worthy to be taught in schools, as well as the broader cultural and political context that disarticulates the present from questions about the past. This disarticulation is inextricably related to the increasing irrelevance of politics in people's lives as well as the erasure of the social "as a constitutive category for expanding democratic identities, social practices, and public spheres. In this instance, memory is not being erased as much as it is being reconstructed under circumstances in which public forums for serious debates have been eroded" (Giroux 2001, 10). In other words, remembering becomes problematic when it privileges some histories at the expense of others, considering them less worthy or less atrocious. Rearticulating the past with a view to making the present political is a great teaching challenge because it offers possibilities to make the past-present-future relationship meaningful. Viewed from a critical perspective, the lessons of history should be unsettling; memory should not be perceived a refuge but rather an open arena of struggle. Unearthing and articulating dangerous memories should contribute to our notion of political agency in that it would force us to move beyond a depoliticized comfort zone. The traumatic impact of violence should be overcome in order to have time to reflect and engage in "patient critical analysis." In this sense, how can we mediate events through public memory and use disturbing memories to produce a kind of ethical referent for explaining the world without justifying it? How can disturbing memories serve as a translative tool for understanding the conditions that

shape our present existence in the world? Finally, how can we conceptualize critical peace education without having to recur to some sort of transparent language of truth and universality?

Against a static and disarticulated view of the past, we should position historical memory as a pedagogical force that “makes claim on certain histories, memories, narratives and representations” (Giroux 2001, 22). In this instance, history is not the predetermined sequence of the determined but “the emergence of radical otherness, immanent creation, [and] non-trivial novelty” (Castoriadis 1998, 184), and therefore, remembering should rupture history’s successive character. History opens up the possibilities for a kind of transformative learning and an ensuing discourse of possibility. Under such conditions, the questions that need to be addressed would necessarily include what is it in learning about other societies in other times that would enable us to understand our current historical social and cultural location, and how would this understanding or remembrance ultimately lead to our exercise of agency? How can remembering encompass a superficiality of celebration or mourning to become the axis of our transforming agency? How are we as agents to reinvent a language of critique for the past and possibility for the future that would promote a project for peace? Addressing the above questions implies viewing history as the means to an unlimited self-questioning of the individual, the society, and its institutions. Historical literacy, as intervention in the world, positions public memory as a political and pedagogical project that unfolds identities, struggles, and desires that can mobilize the present. Public memory as a set of lived experiences, representations, histories, and identifications creates space for subjective or individual positions that are not fixed spatially or temporally. While we cannot speak about a common history as a set of common identifications and images shared by everyone, we can nevertheless talk about knowledge of the past that is open to all. Within this framework, agency “becomes more than the struggle over identification, or a representational politics that unsettles and disrupts common sense; it is also a performative act grounded in the spaces and practices that connect people’s everyday lives and concerns with the reality of material relations of values and power” (Giroux 2000).

Obviously, for the purpose and goals of critical peace education, we cannot change what has been, but we can change how we gaze upon it, and knowing—instead of merely remembering—these histories, we can create new histories that are less exclusionary, less violent, less unjust, and more humane and peaceful. It is in this examination and creation of what has occurred that our role as critical educators should focus. By ceasing to be “tourists,” “visitors,” or “spectators,” and instead becoming authors of our own post-memory, we can begin raising questions about our agency and subjectivity. The real challenge is to reconstruct the pedagogical role of history, moving beyond the limits of the discipline and creating a discourse that underlines the importance of keeping dangerous historical memories alive as a requirement for “world peace.” History as possibility must invariably be understood pedagogically so as to be relevant and meaningful. A language of possibility has necessarily to be ground to a notion of history since it is necessary to examine the past in order to see what is possible for the future. A great deal of critical pedagogy

theory has been shaped in the context of an understanding of the historical and the social and what promise these hold for the collective destiny of social classes. Understanding the historical aims not just simply at empowering the individual but at the transformation of society where education serves as a radical plan for action for the economic political and cultural change in which power relations will be transformed.

A patient, dynamic critical analysis of the contemporary state of terror, fear, and violence finds fissures in the already-cracked wall of a hawkish neoconservative authoritarianism. It is in these weaknesses, these fissures, that we are able to articulate new political projects as we break away from the violence of anti-politics. Critical peace education could be one of those projects. According to Herbert Marcuse, “the fissures are deep enough. The internal contradictions of the system are more acute than ever” (Marcuse 1967a, b). A critical understanding of these fissures will enable us to “nourish those pedagogical practices that promote a concern with keeping the forever unexhausted and unfulfilled human potential open, fighting back all attempts to foreclose and preempt the further unraveling of human possibilities, prodding human society to go on questioning itself and preventing that questioning from ever stalling or being declared finished” (Freire quoted in Giroux 2010).

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Chapter 6

Cosmology, Context, and Peace Education: A View from War Zones

Michael G. Wessells

In many war zones, half or more of the population consists of children, defined under international law as people under 18 years of age. Growing up in highly militarized societies best described as systems of violence, many children and youth see models of violence in the soldiers who control the streets or who attack their homes and schools. In such settings, violence tends to become normalized at different levels (Machel 2001). In families, the stresses of meeting basic needs may lead to increased violence at home (e.g., Annan and Brier 2009), while out in the streets, children and youth are frequently seen acting out violent movies or scenes they have witnessed.

In addition, significant numbers of young people become fighters or supporters of armed groups and forces (Brett and Specht 2004; Wessells 2006). Under a steady barrage of propaganda and guided by adult role models, many children and youth undergo political indoctrination and become willing fighters in what they regard as a liberation struggle. Having experienced attacks, losses, detention, and mistreatment at the hands of the Other, they may decide to take up arms as a means of gaining revenge or protecting the security and honor of their families and people. Indeed, this type of uncoerced recruitment into armed groups has been visible in recent years in political struggles in countries such as Afghanistan, Colombia, Liberia, Nepal, Palestine, and Timor Leste, among others (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers 2008; UNICEF 2009). After they leave armed groups, young people who have little education or prospect for a civilian livelihood may decide to engage in crime and banditry. The continuation of widespread violence even after the signing of a ceasefire blurs the lines between war and peace, making talk about “post-conflict” zones misleading.

Contextually appropriate peace education programs stand to make a positive contribution to peace building in and the stabilization and development of war-torn

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societies. However, significant challenges to the development of contextually appropriate peace education programs exist in most war zones. To begin with, issues of ongoing insecurity, social injustice, and lingering social divisions and distrust make it very difficult to construct meaningful peace education programs. Aside from operational difficulties such as accessing insecure areas, there is an omnipresent risk of creating isolated peace education programs that make little contact with the lived realities of children and people in the local context. For example, it would be relatively easy to create peace education programs in schools that teach children values and skills of nonviolence. Yet these may have little basis in the social context, as attempts to practice nonviolence on the streets of a very dangerous neighborhood could lead to children getting hurt. Peace education efforts need to part of coherent efforts to achieve systems change, yet too often they are developed in a microcosm such as a school and are disconnected from wider change processes.

Dynamics of the international humanitarian system can also impede the development of contextually appropriate peace education. In emergency settings, donors often make available large amounts of funding and demand that programs achieve quick results. In the rush to implement peace education programs, international NGOs (nongovernmental organizations) frequently impose approaches that do not fit the local context, thereby marginalizing people at a moment when they are already vulnerable and in need of empowerment.

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the importance of taking a contextualized approach to peace education that builds on local beliefs and practices and includes a systemic perspective. Using examples from Angola, it explores how the development of such approaches requires understanding of local cosmology and practices and deliberately avoidance of the imposition of outside epistemologies. The second part of the chapter examines the importance of adopting a systems orientation that seeks to align micro- and macro-social elements in a manner that promotes social justice and peace. A central element of this orientation is a focus on the agency and empowerment of the disenfranchised young people whose rights had been trampled preceding, during, and after the war.

Cosmology and Peace Education

In many war zones, peace education programs are developed by Western and Northern people and agencies whose epistemologies reflect Enlightenment values and emphasize the importance of scientific ways of knowing and mechanistic world views. Typically, they assume that the definition of terms such as *peace* and *education* is universal and that approaches developed in urbanized, industrial societies can be applied with some minor tailoring or adaptation to war-torn countries, including ones that have very different systems of beliefs and practices. This assumption, however, encounters severe challenges.

An illustrative case is Angola, which suffered a bloody war of nearly four decades beginning in 1961 (Lodico 1996). The war involved many actors, including international ones. Following the end of the liberation struggle from Portugal in 1974, the country held elections, the results of which were contested. The country again returned to war in which the primary antagonists were the Angolan government and the opposition group, UNITA (the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola). The war had many periods of intense fighting along with periods of relative quiet. At the peak of the fighting in 1993, the war killed an estimated 1,000 people each day, and UNICEF estimated that one in three children died before reaching 5 years of age.

Several features of the Angolan war created strong need for efforts to educate young people about peace. The fact that the war continued for nearly four decades means that several generations grew up with war being a normalized, constant part of people's daily reality—many young people had never experienced peace. During the war, it was nearly impossible to discuss peace because the term *peace* itself was politically contested. Talking of peace could get one killed by people who regarded *peace* as a code word for not supporting the government's war efforts, supporting the enemy, or both. Fighting and violence were pervasive, visible features of everyday life, as soldiers were seen frequently in the public places such as markets. Also, the news and media images were saturated with battles and movies featured wars and war heroes. In the streets, children could be seen acting out martial arts moves they had seen recently in war films, which were ubiquitous. In addition, UNITA controlled particular provinces for extended periods, making Angola a country inside a country. Inside UNITA-dominated areas, life was highly militarized and carefully controlled. Young people and adults had little exposure to outside ideas. As one 20-year-old from a formerly UNITA-controlled province told me in 2002 when the war had just ended, "We did not know this word, 'peace'...."

Although the need for peace education seemed enormous, it was not clear what currency Western ideas about peace had in Angola. Many people lived in rural areas and adhered to traditions that embodied spiritual cosmologies that are markedly different from scientific, mechanistic cosmologies. Epistemologically, many people regarded channeling with spirits as a way of knowing that was at least as important as those that are more familiar to people in Western societies.

The importance of learning about Angolan cosmologies became apparent in a project that aimed to enable former child soldiers to reintegrate into civilian communities. In one case, a 14-year-old Angolan boy who had previously been a soldier exhibited nightmares, sleep problems, and hypervigilance. To a Western psychologist, these would likely be viewed as symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (Yule et al. 2003), which has neurological components and has natural causes via exposure to life-threatening events. However, the boy said, "When I sleep, the spirit of the man I killed comes to me and asks 'why did you do this to me?'" In his view, he was haunted by the unavenged spirit of the man he had killed, and he needed not Western counseling but a ritual cleansing performed by a traditional healer. This and

other events triggered extensive documentation of indigenous Angolan cosmologies by Alcinda Honwana (1998), a Mozambiquan social anthropologist. Her key findings and the implications for peace education are discussed below.

Angolan Cosmologies

In Angola, no single cosmology is dominant, and beliefs vary considerably by region and ethnicity (Altuna 1985). People who live in major cities such as Luanda (the capitol city) are less likely to adhere strictly to the traditional beliefs and practices that are more prevalent in rural areas. Even in the rural areas, traditional cosmologies and practices are fluid and dynamic and are likely to change when outsider ideas such as Christianity or Western approaches to medicine are introduced. Because Angolan people are skilled at intermixing beliefs and practices from diverse socio-cultural systems, it would be a mistake to think of “traditional” practices as homogeneous and fossilized. With this in mind, it is possible to outline some of the core features of indigenous beliefs and practices that are relatively widespread.

In general, Angolan cosmologies are spiritually centered and collectivist in orientation. They explain the events in the visible world in terms of events and processes that take place in the invisible world of the ancestors. Whereas illness in Western societies is explained in physical terms, in rural Angola, it is often attributed to spiritual problems. For example, if the former boy soldier mentioned above became physically ill, many people would attribute the illness to intervention by an angry spirit, which is believed to have tremendous power. The collectivist orientation of local beliefs is apparent in the tendency of local belief to view problems in group or collective terms rather than individual terms. For example, people tend to see the problem of the formerly recruited boy not as an individual psychological affliction but as a group affliction because they believe the angry spirit would likely hurt not only the boy but also his family and members of the community. According to local beliefs, angry spirits can cause illness and death in one’s family, crop failure, drought, and even more fighting.

Traditional Angolan beliefs emphasize the importance of spiritual harmony and reciprocity between the living community and the ancestors (Altuna 1985). When this harmony exists, the ancestors are obligated to protect the living. However, this harmony does not occur automatically but requires that the living community practices the traditions that honor the ancestors. In the case of the former boy soldier, the traditions dictate that such a boy should receive from a traditional healer a ritual cleansing, which often entails a sacrifice to the spirits, ritual cleansing to rid the boy of spiritual pollution, and presentation to the community as “clean” and able to live among community members without problems (Wessells and Monteiro 2001, 2004). The completion of this ritual in a collective setting with the community members present is believed to restore harmony and enables community members to accept the boy into the community. Similarly, when people die, the living must perform burial rites in order to make it possible for the spirits of the deceased to transition to

the realm of the ancestors. If they cannot make transition, they remain trapped between worlds and are believed to cause a variety of problems for the living. This is a system of mutual obligations in which people must practice the traditions in order to receive the protection of the ancestors. The foundation of the system and the lens through which people understand events is the set of traditional beliefs that are transmitted across generations.

In this cosmological system, *peace* and *conflict* are terms that are understood not solely in Western terms but also in spiritual terms. To be sure, Angolans understand that peace is more than the absence of war, and they appreciate the importance ending structural violence and social inequities that permeated Angolan society during the war and that continue at present. However, events and relations in the visible world do not constitute peace, which entails harmonious relations between the living and the ancestors. For a formerly recruited boy, peace between him and his community required the restoration of spiritual harmony achieved through the conduct of the appropriate ritual. The rituals often entail elements of restorative justice since they may include payments or sacrifices intended to make amends for harms that had been done. The rituals are not viewed as social norms or things that are nice to do but as necessities, without which individual and collective well-being are jeopardized. Within this system of beliefs, then, peace has important spiritual dimensions.

Perils of Imposition

As these findings indicate, terms such as *peace* are constructed differently in societies that have divergent belief systems and ways of knowing. To Western humanitarians and also Angolan people who have been educated in Westernized universities, the term *peace* refers to relations, systems, and events in the visible world. The spiritual dimensions that many Angolans regard as important are typically not included in Western definitions.

These findings raise an important question in regard to peace education in Angola: who defines peace and peace education? At stake is whose epistemology matters most and who holds the power to set the agenda. If the definitional tasks are performed by external agencies that bring outside cosmologies and epistemologies and that use preconceived, Western ideas about peace, there is significant risk that peace education will be an imposition that does not reflect Angolan culture and views. Such an imposition would embody the very power imbalance and arrogance that peace education seeks to prevent.

The risk of imposition in post-conflict settings is high because of the donor and agency pressures for immediate results, which frequently lead NGO staff, including national staff, to take a top-down, didactic approach that reflects agency needs rather than the needs and orientation of survivors. Also, the power dynamics of the situation often promote such imposition (Wessells 1999). In desperate situations, external agencies have significant power and are seen by affected people as their life rafts. People who live in squalid camps and are unable to meet basic needs frequently

“play along” with NGO projects—even ones that they regard as having little intrinsic value—in hopes that the NGO presence will bring their families and communities more money and increase their chances of meeting survival needs. Sadly, expatriate peace workers may not take the time to learn about the sociohistoric and cultural context of the society in which they work. Whether this is an act of arrogance or excessive fixation on one’s preconceptions (or both) can be debated. Either way, the knowledge, values, and approach of the outsiders are privileged.

Internal dynamics can also enable imposition. Often, national staffs who have been hired by international NGOs and who are relatively well educated and cosmopolitan in outlook may view with scorn local beliefs and practices, which they are quick to gloss over as “primitive.” This tendency to denigrate one’s culture is in part a legacy of colonialism, which led people to develop an internalized sense of the inferiority of their own culture. Also, it is natural for people in war zones to harbor doubts about their own culture. In Angola during the war, numerous adults who had very different levels of education commented that the war had some cultural causes and dimensions—implying that culture was part of the problem—yet the culture did not end the war. This devaluing of Angolan culture by Angolans led many people to turn away from their own cultural resources and to look to outsiders—many of whom were hailed as “experts”—and Western science as sources for solving Angola’s problems.

The imposition of outsider views of peace and peace education has profound negative implications. As emphasized by Freire (2002), the process is as important as the actual content of peace education. When outside views of peace are imposed, peace education becomes a neocolonial enterprise that subverts the very values of equality and social justice that it aims to support. Although peace education ought to build respect for diversity and learn from different perspectives, imposed approaches usually seek to universalize and to reduce the diversity of epistemologies and peace education activities.

The imposition of outside approaches causes harm in numerous ways, not least of which is the waste of scarce monetary resources. Since imposed approaches are unlikely to be “owned” by local people, they tend to be unsustainable. When the project is over and the funding cycle has ended, the peace education projects are likely to collapse. Even greater than the monetary losses, however, are the negative psychological and spiritual impacts. The imposition of outside approaches marginalizes local culture, which is an important source of meaning, identity, and continuity for war-affected people. To undermine or weaken cultural beliefs or resources at a moment when people need to make meaning, affirm their sense of identity, and cope with difficult circumstances only adds to people’s vulnerability.

To avoid imposition, it is useful to take a grounded, community-based approach that vests power in local people and works in a bottom-up modality rather than a top-down, didactic modality. In this approach, community people are empowered to make key decisions about what is peace education and how to design, implement, and evaluate peace education activities. Outside agencies can play an important role as resources and facilitators by, for example, bringing forward ideas and practices that have proven useful in other contexts. Yet community people rather than external agencies actually take the key decisions.

A significant advantage of grounded approaches is that they tend to embody and build upon local beliefs and practices. Also, they tend to be community owned in that community people feel responsible for their success and see them as their own. As a result, they tend to be better adapted to the context and more sustainable. At the same time, it is important to maintain a critical stance that avoids the reification of “community.” In many situations, when local communities take decisions, the decisions are in fact made by a small power elite. Not uncommonly, women and other marginalized people have little or no voice. In addition, the valorization of local cultural beliefs may tacitly or explicitly support patriarchal norms that oppress women. To add value in such contexts, peace education practitioners should avoid romanticized ideas about community and culture and use critical awareness and a social justice lens in developing a grounded approach.

A Systems Approach to Peace Education

In war zones, peace education is frequently conceptualized and implemented as a “project,” for example, as a set of activities in a school or a set of dialogues between young people from opposing sides. Projects can be useful if they are connected to a wider process of building a system of peace with social justice. However, many peace education projects are developed in a compartmentalized manner that is isolated from wider systems—they are micro-social approaches that make little contact with macro-social systems and realities. As a result, the peace education efforts tend to be decontextualized and may cause unintended harm.

A Case from Northern Uganda

Gulu, a town in northern Uganda, was hit very hard by the two decades of war and was attacked regularly by the so-called Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), which is believed to have abducted nearly 60,000 children (Annan et al. 2006). In 1998, well before the end of the fighting in 2006, I visited a secondary school that was hailed as a model because of its rigorous curriculum. A lead teacher excitedly explained that he included peace education in his classes since he did not want the children to grow up locked into feelings of anger and hatred toward their attackers or toward the government, which some people viewed as having allowed LRA attacks. The peace education activities included discussions of past, present, and future and enabled learning about peaceful times in the past (prewar and before the brutal administration of Idi Amin) and reflecting on the problems of the present and how to solve them. Visioning exercises were conducted to help children imagine living without war and with social harmony between the Acholi people of the north and the government. Students commented that they liked these discussions and activities, which made them feel more hopeful. They demonstrated little desire for revenge and spoke passionately about how badly they wanted peace.

Beneath this positive veneer, however, profound injustice and harm occurred daily. In private discussions with teenage girls, girls indicated that their biggest problem at the school was that their teachers traded grades for sex. This sexual exploitation was reportedly widespread in the school since teachers viewed sex with students as a fringe benefit. Initially I refused to believe that the seemingly kind, peace-oriented teacher whom I had talked with had been involved in such horrible activities. Subsequently, he and other teachers were judged by peers to be guilty of sexual exploitation, and he and others were removed from their teaching posts.

This case illustrates how easy it is to construct peace education activities in a manner that is compartmentalized and unresponsive to the most pressing issues of violence experienced by the participants. In my experience, many peace education programs are limited because they have been designed to meet the preconceived needs of the designer rather than the felt needs of the participants. A better way of organizing peace education is to take a grounded approach that starts with the lived experiences of the participants, identifies the key issues of violence and peace in their lives, and takes a participatory approach to addressing these issues. Taking this wider approach, however, requires a systemic orientation that does not focus on particular peace education activities in isolation but links those activities with wider efforts to produce transformation for peace and social justice. In this case, transformation was needed in the education system, but transformations are needed in regard to the wider political arena.

Sociopolitical Disconnects

In war zones, peace education efforts frequently suffer from a disconnect with the wider sociopolitical context (Kupermintz and Salomon 2005). For example, participation in efforts such as cross-conflict dialogues and other experiential learning venues has sometimes elicited backlash against the participants, who may be viewed as enemy sympathizers or as having compromised the well-being of their group or nation. Similar dynamics occur even in situations of relative peace, as peace educators in the USA during the Cold War were sometimes denounced as being traitors or soft on Communism. The difference is that war zones are typically rife with open emotional wounds, fear, and hatred that can create unusually intense backlash, which may be difficult to constrain in a context where there is little law and order. Because unrestrained, intense backlash can cause harm, it is vital to use a protection lens in working on peace education. In short, peace education activities and their timing and contextual adaptation should be organized in a manner that protects the participants' physical and psychological well-being and respects the humanitarian imperative Do No Harm.

When disconnects with the political situation occur, there is a danger that peace education will become little more than a Band-Aid that offers some temporary relief but does little to address or prevent the ongoing, systemic causes of violence and injustice. Consider, for example, the limits of introducing peace education into

schools in Gaza without wider steps to build peace. Conceivably, such programs could help young people in Gaza to develop values and skills related to nonviolence. However, these values and skills would do little to address the main problems in Gaza, which have political, economic, and social roots. People in Gaza experience daily the hardships of the blockade and limits on movement, very high levels of unemployment, and ongoing attacks, not to mention the complexities of living under Hamas rule. To succeed in such a context, peace education efforts cannot be compartmentalized but must be integrally connected with efforts to end the Israeli blockade and denial of basic rights and also with efforts to end oppression and construct peace in the region. Although this point applies to peace education programs in many zones of political violence, few peace education programs are integrally connected with visible efforts to address the political, systemic causes of violence and injustice.

A third source of sociopolitical disconnect is the tendency to create adult-centric approaches to peace education that disempower youth. In war zones, many young people feel politically disenfranchised and struggle with their sense of hopelessness about the future, and many have their rights violated on a daily basis. In fact, their sense of disempowerment is part of the system of violence, as it is not uncommon for groups of disempowered, idling youth to become ripe for recruitment by armed forces and groups (Brett and Specht 2004; Wessells 2006). In such contexts, the fulfillment of youth's participation rights ought to be a high priority. Yet in many settings, youth are reviled as a problem (Boyden 2003) or regarded as beneficiaries of adult-constructed programs and activities. Where youth participation occurs, it tends to be tokenistic rather than deep and meaningful from the perspective of young people themselves.

Although these challenges are significant, they are not insurmountable. The best way to address and prevent them is to take a systemic approach that avoids these and other disconnects and embodies the grounded orientation outlined earlier.

Toward a Systemic Approach

Systems approaches to peace education have many properties, yet three are particularly relevant in the context of war zones. The first is an analysis of the sociohistoric, political, and economic dimensions of the current situation and also of the root causes of the violence. Without such a multidisciplinary analysis, it is all too easy to create decontextualized approaches. Used appropriately, such an analysis can guide the construction of peace education efforts that are linked systematically with wider efforts toward protection and transformation for social justice and peace.

Second is a multilevel approach that connects and harmonizes efforts at one level to the situation and change efforts at other levels of the social system. In practice, this means that efforts initiated in schools should be linked with mutually supportive efforts to promote social justice at the family, community, and societal levels. In the case of Gaza, for example, peace education efforts in schools or communities could

be linked with strong international advocacy campaigns to end abuses of human rights on all sides and to enable freedom of movement and the flow of essential goods and services. Since it would be unrealistic for any particular agency, program, or individual to work at many levels simultaneously, the emphasis should be on a collaborative, interagency approach in which different partners work at different levels in a coordinated manner that is guided by a careful situation analysis.

Third is a youth-centered approach that supports the agency and resilience of young people. In many war zones, young people are demonized and written off as a “Lost Generation.” In contrast to such stereotypes, most young people, including those who had been drawn into armed forces and groups, manage to cope and exhibit remarkable resilience. A fundamental task for peace education in war zones is to end the invisibility and marginalization of young people and to build upon their resilience and ability to help rebuild civil society. Ultimately, peace education must support the agency and empowerment of young people as they work to transform systems of violence into systems of peace.

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Chapter 7

Critical Emotional Praxis: Rethinking Teaching and Learning About Trauma and Reconciliation in Schools

Michalinos Zembylas

Introduction

Traumatic events, such as wars, genocides and terrorist attacks, generate powerful emotions, most notably fear, grief, anger and hatred (Hutchison and Bleiker 2008). These emotions fuel people's perceptions and actions and make wars and genocides imaginable (Des Forges 1999). Some theorists argue that it is often these powerful emotions, rather than material interests, that pose the most serious obstacles to peace and reconciliation efforts (Retzinger and Scheff 2000). While attention to the role of emotions in traumatised societies has become an integral part of research and development in several fields (e.g. Bennett 2005; Scheff 1994; Svašek 2006), there has been limited educational research on the emotions of trauma and their implications for teaching and learning about trauma and reconciliation in schools. And, yet, in such traumatised societies as Rwanda, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Japan and Northern Ireland, education is expected by some to lay the foundation for reconciliation (Cole 2007). Reconciliation here is understood as a complex, multifaceted and long-term process of restoring harmony and transforming hostile emotions between rival sides after a conflict (Kriesberg 1998; Lederach 1997); it is important to emphasise that reconciliation is not synonymous with amnesia and forgetting.

A major challenge for critical educators in traumatised societies which struggle for reconciliation is that emotions of trauma are often appropriated by social and political institutions, including schools, to justify particular collective narratives and ideologies (Zembylas 2008, 2009). Research studies in conflict and post-conflict societies provide evidence of how schools stimulate prejudices and stereotypes and contribute to the normalisation of emotions of trauma (Bekerman and McGlynn 2007; McGlynn et al. 2009). This means that traumatised individuals act out from

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experiences of emotional injury, that is, emotions of trauma remain essentially unassimilable and often acquire a moralistic sense. One wonders, then: Is there anything that critical educators can do to challenge the political appropriation of emotions of trauma in schools? How can reconciliation be given a real chance in schools without being outrightly rejected or becoming another moralistic ‘regime of truth’? What is the philosophical basis of teaching and learning about trauma and reconciliation as a critical pedagogical response to the normalisation of emotions of trauma?

In this chapter, I examine how psychoanalytic and sociopolitical perspectives of trauma and emotion can work as a pedagogic resource for developing critical insights into teaching and learning about trauma and reconciliation in schools. To this end, I consider what kind of orientation to teaching and learning about the emotions of trauma can allow students to examine trauma without being bound by it in ways that foreclose the possibility of reconciliation. While the emotions of trauma are a very real and a very devastating feature of life in conflict and post-conflict societies, I argue that education can work towards a new direction, one that does not remain stuck in trauma yet approaches it with humility, rearticulation and criticality. For this purpose, I propose an approach to teaching and learning that places psychoanalytically informed perspectives and sociopolitical conceptions of emotions and trauma at the forefront. Such perspectives are valuable in developing pedagogical spaces that shift from an uncritical adoption of trauma to an informed insight that ‘imagine[s] the world altogether differently’ (Georgis and Kennedy 2009, p. 20).

Aware of the essentialising features of many approaches towards reconciliation education (Zembylas 2007), I want to clarify at the outset of this chapter that rethinking teaching and learning about trauma and reconciliation requires a subtle understanding of the ambivalence of emotion and the need to rearticulate the meaning(s) of emotions of trauma as well as their manifestations in practice (Ahmed 2004). In other words, the effects of emotional injury are powerful, yet they are also temporary and ambivalent, and do not solidify into moralistic law unless the political appropriation of emotions of trauma remains unchallenged. By paying attention to this temporality and ambivalence of emotions of trauma in the context of schools, teachers and students are essentially invited to confront the psychic, social and political dilemmas of their traumatic histories as ‘they’ encounter ‘others’ who are often defined as ‘mortal enemies’. I call this practice of teaching and learning, *critical emotional praxis*; its aim is not only to understand what emotions of trauma *do* in everyday life (Zembylas 2008) but also to invent new interpretive approaches and practices of relating with ‘others’—pedagogies that do not fossilise emotional injury but *move forward*.

The Psychic, Social and Political Influence of Emotions of Trauma and the Implications for Reconciliation Efforts

I want to begin with a conception of trauma that acknowledges both its psychoanalytic and its sociopolitical perspectives. Generally speaking, trauma refers to unthinkable catastrophic events that, when witnessed, evoke painful feelings. Psychoanalytic

theories have usually treated trauma as an unclaimed individual experience that needs to be somehow dealt with, using various therapeutic strategies (Caruth 1996). Kristeva (1993, 2000), in particular, teaches us that the psychic origins of unclaimed experiences are linked to identity and its affective meaning. As such, psychoanalysis is valuable in understanding how individuals come together and allow collective feelings to emerge (e.g. national identity) that differentiate between 'us' and 'them'.

Within Kristeva's work, emotions are ever present and align the individual and the collective (Ahmed 2004); this suggests that emotions do not come from either the inside (psyche) or the outside (collective) but allow for the creation of attachments, that is, what connects us to this or that (Ahmed 2005). Emotions, then, are bound up with how we inhabit the world *with* others; they are about the relationships between selves and others. Ahmed (2004, 2005) builds on Kristeva's argument by suggesting that it is through moving towards and away from others that individual bodies become aligned with some others and against other others. What this means in specific terms is that, if we have suffered from a traumatic experience (e.g. war violence), the affective meaning of this experience is not only psychic but also relational because it makes sense through our attachments to other members of 'our' collective with whom we feel aligned.

Two concepts from the psychoanalytic theorisation of emotions are particularly helpful in this chapter. The first one is the concept of the 'ambivalence' of emotions, that is, the presence of both positive and negative emotions. Positive and negative, however, are not attributes of emotions or bodies, but are provisional readings and judgements of others that have powerful effects (Ahmed 2005). Ambivalence, then, is bound up with the relation between the 'I' and the 'we'. But, as provisional readings, we need to investigate the 'we' as the very affect and effect of the attachments that are constructed; individual bodies are attached to a 'we', but the 'we' is also affected by the attachment of individual bodies. Hence, in hating the 'enemy' who caused 'us' unimaginable pain, 'we' also love ourselves and come together as a group made up of other 'me's' (who may have also suffered by the same 'enemy'), of others that are loved as if they were me (Ahmed 2005). The terms and conditions of this emotional ambivalence, however, are not fixed; a differentiation of the psychic dimensions of our attachments and a rearticulation of trauma can provide the beginning of alternative affective meanings about the 'we' and others. This notion can be better understood using another psychoanalytic concept, that of 'revolt.'

By revolt, Kristeva (2000) points to a challenge to authority and tradition that takes place within an individual. Revolt has a psychic dimension that provides an opportunity for new affective meaning. A traumatised individual who has repressed something cannot have meaningful experiences but only traumatic ones because meaningful experience requires some assimilation into the social order (Oliver 2005). Revolt is the return of the repressed that opens the possibility for meaningful experience because it provides the conditions for reassessment and rearticulation. Re-evaluating the emotional remainders of past trauma, for example, through critical strategies deployed not simply for survival but to question the dehumanisation that takes place (regardless whether this involves one's self or the 'other'), creates new social spaces. Revolt as a return or questioning of the past, for the sake of renewal in the future, engenders both the psychic and social dimensions of the individual

who belongs to a community. This questioning of normalisation of trauma is what creates openings to overcome its fossilisation and operates as an invitation to find new ways of relating to one's self and the 'other'. Through this questioning of who the 'we' and 'others' are, the negativity of trauma is transformed from a destructive or merely discriminatory force that separates self and others into a positive force of creativity and rearticulation (Kristeva 2000; Oliver 2004).

In addition to the psychoanalytic lens, work in the post-Holocaust era has begun to engage the social and political implications of trauma (Bennett 2005). Trauma enters the social and political terrain as an expression of personal experience, explains Bennett (2005), but 'it is always vulnerable to appropriation' (p. 6). As Kansteiner (2004) also notes, trauma after the Holocaust has risen 'as one of the key interpretive categories of contemporary politics and culture' (p. 193). A recent case in point is the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the ways that the US government politicised trauma to gain support for its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Similar patterns of the political appropriation of trauma are found almost on a daily basis in the Middle Eastern conflict as well as in other conflicts around the world.

The political appropriation of emotions of trauma contributes to building a sense of identity and community that rests on stark *us-and-them* dichotomies (Ahmed 2004). Emotions of trauma, in this sense, are conceptualised as having an affective force that is not only individual but also political (Bennett 2005). Certain affective investments are made to social imaginaries (e.g. the nation-state, a religion, cultural heritage) and forge identities and communities that form certain inclusion and exclusion boundaries—who should be inside and who should be outside (Ahmed 2004). In this way, emotions associated with trauma (e.g. grief, hatred) are more likely to be worked through familiar identities and communities that are grounded in exclusionary patterns than in the formation of any opportunities for inclusion and reconciliation (Fierke 2004).

Understanding trauma in both its psychic dimension and its sociopolitical happenings within particular historical conditions (e.g. nationalism, racism, religious fanaticism) calls attention to the discourses and practices that constitute hostile and monolithic emotions—such as feelings of superiority about one's own group and inferiority for an adversary group (Card 2002; Eisenstein 1996; Scheff 1994). Emotions of trauma, understood as the persistent remains of a past that has had difficulty in dealing with otherness, return to reveal their darkness but can also provide the conditions for reassessment. This reassessment is not fixed on the repressive power of trauma but involves questioning the multidimensional implications of trauma in everyday life. Consequently, revolt against the oppressive normalisation of trauma halts the repetition of destructive strategies that remain stuck in negativity and opens up possibilities for rearticulating constructive ways of considering trauma—such as restoring the humanity of subjects who have been stripped from it and build solidarity on the basis of common suffering (Georgis and Kennedy 2009; Gobodo-Madikizela 2002).

Exploring what it might mean to acknowledge the psychic, social, and political influence of emotions of trauma for reconciliation efforts is, therefore, a valuable task for pedagogues. First of all, the acknowledgement of the psychic, social and

political influence of emotions of trauma highlights the complexity of the connection between the individual and the large group, the personal grief and the collective human capacity to feel. The failure to recognise this connection and the resulting tension will increase the likelihood of not appreciating the powerful and persistent emotional forces of trauma that are up and against any reconciliation efforts. For example, teaching students of a traumatised group that they have the ‘wrong’ feelings (e.g. anger or hatred) towards an adversary—because empathy is a ‘better’ response—is not a very encouraging strategy to promote reconciliation in schools (Zembylas 2007, 2009). This strategy will fail not only for psychological reasons but also because the political rhetoric of trauma narratives remains essentially unchallenged.

In other words, the goal is not simply to teach students competences of empathetic understanding; the challenge is much more complex and demands the constitution of alternative psychic, social and political spaces. Psychoanalytic perspectives move the discourse of trauma towards an opening of psychic spaces in which re-mission, restructuring and revolt become possible (Kristeva 2000; Oliver 2005). Perspectives that engage with the social and political implications of trauma also invite us to do a different kind of work: to constantly question the strategies that are used to appropriate trauma in public and school discourses, creating dichotomising tendencies between ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Bennett 2005). Exploring both the restrictive and the productive forms of engagement with trauma narratives (e.g. in schools) creates the spaces that critically expose how trauma is appropriated by ideological-political forces and limit opportunities for reconciliation. In the following part of the chapter, I analyse a detailed example of the political appropriation of one emotion—*fear*—as it stems from a particular context, and show how reconciliation possibilities are essentially ‘undone’ by the restrictive engagement with trauma narratives. In the last part of this chapter, I use the theoretical perspectives discussed here to sketch what I call ‘critical emotional praxis’ as a productive form of engagement with trauma narratives in schools.

The Political Appropriation of Emotions of Trauma in Schools: The Example of *Fear*

A classic example of how emotions of trauma can be politically appropriated not only in society at large but also in schools is the case of ‘fear’; schools seem to be particularly successful institutions in passing down fear (Fisher 2006). In general, fear—for example, of the ‘evil other’ who is deemed responsible for unspeakable trauma against ‘us’—works both at the psychic and the sociopolitical levels and structures how the ‘other’ is viewed through unconscious feelings, expectations, anxieties and defences. Followed from my earlier theorisation of emotion and trauma is the idea that fear *does* something extraordinary, as Ahmed (2004) explains; it establishes a distance between bodies that are read as ‘similar’ and those that are considered to be ‘different’. In other words, fear is politicised by establishing boundaries

between ‘us’ (the ‘good’) and ‘them’ (the ‘evil’); the others are fearsome—and thus it is easier to dehumanise them—because they are constructed as a danger to ‘our’ very existence.

A new kind of collective imaginary is being shaped by the fear of the ‘other’ or what Fisher (2006) has termed *fearism*, that is, ‘a process and discourse hegemony [which] creates an experience of fear that is normalized ... keeping the cultural matrix of “fear” operative and relatively invisible’ (2006, p. 51). The concept of fearism shows how various social and political mechanisms (e.g. political parties, the media, schools) have been the key elements in promoting the contemporary fear culture (Altheide 2002; Furedi 2006) and popularising hostile feelings towards the other. Once the other is constituted as a threat to ‘our’ existence, then ‘we’ learn to desire and demand their exclusion from the sphere of human values, civic rights and moral obligations (Papastergiadis 2006). Fear, then, is solidified through the ‘good-versus-evil’ narratives of how ‘they’ are always to blame thus ‘forcing’ us to be constantly alarmed and rejecting any reconciliation with ‘them’.

As noted earlier, alignments between individual and national bodies have important implications for teaching and learning about trauma and reconciliation in schools because fearism provides a hostile emotional culture against the other in the educational system (Zembylas 2007). Scholars highlight the systematic political appropriation of fear both in public discourses (Bourke 2006; Furedi 2006; Robin 2004) and in schools (Giroux 2003), especially in educational systems of conflict and post-conflict societies (McGlynn et al. 2009; Zembylas 2008, 2010). In light of the political appropriation of fear in schools of traumatised societies, critical educators are faced with serious dilemmas concerning how to respond to the implications of fearism. How can critical educators interrogate different forms of inclusion and exclusion that are established through fear in schools, without under- or overestimating fear? Recognising and critiquing the political appropriation of fear in schools is an important strategy in efforts to create new and yet not uncritical spaces that embrace healing, humanity and collaboration. It would probably be helpful at this point to contextualise and exemplify this analysis through a specific example.

In my own research, I focus on how trauma is linked to the formation of ethnic belonging in Greek-Cypriot schools (e.g. see Zembylas 2008, 2010; Zembylas and Karahasan 2006; Zembylas et al. 2011). For the last 50 years, Cyprus has had an intractable political problem that has created considerable trauma and still keeps the country ethnically divided between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. In divided states like Cyprus, education is an important vehicle through which conflicting sites legitimate their positions (Davies 2004). One aspect of my research shows in particular how Greek-Cypriot students and teachers learn over the years to fear, resent and even hate members of the ‘other’ community (i.e. the Turkish-Cypriot community), considering them responsible for the traumatic experiences of the Greek-Cypriot community. Analysis of school practices and discourses (e.g. school curricula, pedagogical practices) reveals a Greek-Cypriot hegemonic narrative emphasising that the main problem is one of Turkish aggression, thus legitimating fear and distrust for any reconciliation efforts. These hegemonic discourses and practices systematically build a sense of (Greek) ethnic identity and community that

rests on absolute *us-and-them* and *good-versus-evil* dichotomies, thus encouraging Greek Cypriots to define themselves as the only victims of violence in Cyprus. In this manner, there is no middle ground left for revolt or emotional ambivalence—for example, for acknowledging the other’s suffering and victimhood too.

Furthermore, this research indicates how school curricula and pedagogical practices in the Greek-Cypriot educational system contribute to the conservation of prevailing psychological and sociopolitical norms in relation to the other community. For example, the teaching of *us-and-them* and *good-versus-evil* narratives from an early age imposes certain affective associations that stick various signs and symbols together—that is, the Turkish element is the ‘fearsome other’ and the ‘evil enemy’ for Greek Cypriots. Turks, in general, are constructed as fearsome because it is widely believed that they have the military power to take over Cyprus, and they will do it when they find a fitting opportunity. In fact, one of our investigations (Zembylas et al. 2011) suggests that there are Greek-Cypriot teachers who invest in the value of purposely appropriating some emotions in schools (e.g. fear, anger) because such strategies are considered to be ‘legitimate’ defences against the enemy’s threat. In other words, the challenge for critical educators in this context is not whether fear as a response to traumatic experiences is politically appropriated; there are teachers who consider this appropriation both legitimate and desirable. But what are the pedagogical consequences for reconciliation education in light of such political appropriation of fear, even in cases in which there may be ‘legitimate’ reasons to feel fear?

My research reveals that the culture of fear in Greek-Cypriot schools prevents pedagogical opportunities for healing, humanity and collaboration with the other community. The emotional orientation of fear limits the perspective of students and teachers by binding the present to past traumatic experiences and by preventing new relational encounters to be developed (see also Bar-Tal 2001; Bar-Tal et al. 2007). The overwhelming power of fearism increases mistrust, dehumanises the adversary and prevents the development of any reconciliatory orientation in teaching and learning. This does not mean that fear or anger at past injustices should be rejected altogether. Rather, my argument raises the need for a critical interrogation of the consequences of fearism in schools to show both the constructive and the destructive workings of fear. The ultimate pedagogical goal, then, is to engage students with their fear in ways that do not foreclose but restore humanity and share victimhood with members of the other community who have also suffered.

A critique of the politicisation of fear in schools helps us understand the multifaceted dynamics of trauma; if students and teachers are susceptible to trauma through the normalisation of fear, then it is incumbent upon educators and policy-makers to consider the force of fear and its pedagogical implications. In fact, it may be argued that educational discourses and practices that promote fearism and the normalisation of trauma are essentially *miseducative* (Worsham 2001) and exert pedagogic violence because trauma is politically used to reject the humanity of the other and perpetuate hostile relations with them (Zembylas 2008). Social psychological research in Israel (e.g. Bar-Tal 2000, 2003) and Northern Ireland (e.g. McGlynn et al. 2004) confirms the negative pedagogical implications of fear

on multiple aspects of life in schools. If students and teachers in traumatised societies want to create a new psychic and sociopolitical order where they do not simply remain traumatised ‘objects’ of history, then they must encourage a new affective relationship with the other. Students and teachers need to consider what it might mean to allow the ‘adversary’ and, themselves, to become new people in relation to this history. They must come to terms with sharing responsibility as well as blame and victimhood, which is to say they must come to terms with the emotional, discursive and material remains of the traumatic legacy in which they are implicated. But how will students and teachers, who live in hegemonic cultures of fear and trauma, allow themselves to be touched and get closer not only to their own losses but to the other’s losses too and, therefore, our common humanity (Georgis and Kennedy 2009)? Our pedagogies, as Georgis and Kennedy assert, need to account for this common humanity, and thus in the last part of this chapter, I propose that learning from a critical approach on the emotions of trauma is an important departure point for generating new insights into what it might mean to overcome past enmity and division and become open to reconciliation.

Critical Emotional Praxis for Reconciliation Education

A major argument in this chapter has been that if emotions do indeed play a significant role in constituting identities and communities, then emotions should be seen as central to how schools can break the cycle of enmity and division and promote healing and reconciliation in the aftermath of trauma (Hutchison and Bleiker 2008). The example shared previously illustrates how emotions of trauma such as fear, when normalised, impede discourse and action for reconciliation in schools in numerous ways—in the denial of the other’s humanity, in the refusal to challenge cherished beliefs and in the perpetuation of the moralistic regime of considering one’s self an eternal victim and the other a permanent perpetrator. In order to oppose the normalisation of emotions of trauma and to enact reconciliation practices in schools, pedagogues need a theoretical and practical resource that will illuminate the interplay between emotions and reconciliation education. Here, I build on my previous work (Chubbuck and Zembylas 2008; Zembylas 2008) in suggesting that *critical emotional praxis*, consisting of three elements, can provide such a theoretical and practical tool to support emotional resistance to the normalisation of emotions of trauma; furthermore, this pedagogical tool, as it will be shown, emphasises that coming to terms with trauma implies acknowledging its relationality: ‘that we have been wounded by the other and that we wound the other—as unequal as that might be’ (Georgis and Kennedy 2009, p. 29). The three elements of critical emotional praxis are discussed below.

First, critical emotional praxis clearly acknowledges that emotions play a powerful role in either sustaining or disrupting historical and political expressions of power relations in all aspects of a traumatised life. As seen in the previous example, emotions of fear are inextricably woven into historically based ideologies that teach students

and teachers how to perceive themselves and act towards others. Teachers and students need to interrogate how emotional investments in core beliefs (e.g. the perception of moral superiority for one's own community; the belief in the exclusivity of one's victimhood), derived from unexamined interpretation of psychic and sociopolitical norms, may contribute to the perpetuation of divisions and hostilities. Critical emotional praxis is primarily grounded in a psychoanalytic and sociopolitical analysis of emotion and trauma and, thus, provides a platform from which teachers and students can critically interrogate their own emotion-laden beliefs. This analysis exposes privileged positions of psychic and sociopolitical power and moves beyond the comfort zones in which teachers and students are usually socialised in a traumatised society. While engaging in this critical interrogation does not guarantee liberatory action in itself, the process challenges teachers' and students' understanding of emotions (e.g. fear, grief, anger and hatred) and the ideologies in which they may be grounded (e.g. nationalism, racism, religious fundamentalism). Equally, this critical interrogation opens opportunities for different emotions—such as empathy, humility, and compassion—to create new spaces for reconciliation.

But, how do these spaces look like in the classroom and what can they do? These spaces are essentially terrains that permit encounters 'between the open expression of the painful past, on the one hand, and the search for the articulation of a long-term interdependent future, on the other hand' (Lederach 1997, p. 29). These terrains allow for the flow of alternative ideas and encourage students and teachers to realise that what they share with those they had classified as 'the enemy' may be greater than what divides them. These spaces are messy, troublesome and emotionally demanding, and have three important features: first, developing a willingness to meet the other in humility and openness; second, acknowledging not only one's own pain but also the pain of the other as well as admitting responsibility for having wounded the other; and third, putting into practice strategies that promote empathetic and humanising ways of reconciling past grievances without establishing new moralistic regimes (Porter 2007).

In building new spaces for reconciliation education in schools, it is important to deepen awareness and criticality about the ways that trauma stories can be used to teach fear, hate and mistrust (Ramanathapillai 2006) and perpetuate a trauma-based worldview. However, the same trauma stories may also be used to bring adversaries together—an admittedly difficult task—by highlighting compassion, empathy and acknowledgement of evil wrongs and wrongdoing. All narratives, according to Kreuzer (2002), even the ones from the perpetrators of violence, need to be considered seriously because they help us understand the emotional complexities of conflict and they point towards openings for pedagogical interventions. At the same time, humane connections between victims and perpetrators need to be highlighted, emphasising the unpredictability of the emotions of compassion, empathy and humility despite contrary expectations (Gobodo-Madikizela 2002; Zembylas 2008). In the context of unpredictability, revolt offers a chance of creating one's self anew.

A second feature of critical emotional praxis is that it recognises the transactional nature of emotions in the local context of the classrooms, schools and communities. Those transactions, however, produce complex, often ambivalent,

emotions which can either support or hinder the pursuit of reconciliation efforts. Ambivalent emotions—for example, resentment and bitterness but also feelings of common vulnerability and empathy—emerge from teaching and learning that recognises the relationality of trauma; that is, if we can narrate ‘our’ stories of trauma to ourselves and to those who have wounded us and listen to the narratives of those we have wounded, we might set up better conditions for imagining new political relations (Georgis and Kennedy 2009; Zembylas 2008). The ambivalence of emotion, then, highlights that positive and negative emotions are provisional readings and judgements of others that change, when there are opportunities to rearticulate the past in new ways. One major challenge of this endeavour, however, is dealing with our own personal emotional demons to acknowledge that we have wronged others (Dlamini 2002; Berlak 2004; Boler 1999). Boler’s (2004) account of her own emotional demons (e.g. irritation and discomfort) around this process is illuminating. Boler introduces the notion of ‘critical hope’ to outline how teachers and students may take seriously the emotional and ethical implications of ‘shattering someone’s familiar and comfortable worldview’ (p. 131). Critical hope, writes Boler, is an approach ‘that recognizes with compassion the need for something to hold on to as the world is made to seem ambiguous and chaotic when learning to see differently’ (ibid.).

The final feature of critical emotional praxis is that it illuminates the conditions of revolt and emotional ambivalence, creating pedagogical opportunities for critical inquiry into how emotions of discomfort, despite making the world seem ambiguous and chaotic, can restore humanity and encourage reconciliation. As teachers and students encounter ‘emotional landmines’ (Boler 2001, p. 1) in addressing emotions of trauma in classrooms, the process of critical emotional praxis shows how one’s emotional attachments and identity are implicated and how each one’s attachments and identity intersect. While such a process can be emotionally disconcerting—for example, acknowledging that after all ‘we’ share the victimhood with our ‘adversary’—it can also be a source of critical hope, as noted earlier, and supports new relations with others marked by connection, understanding and compassion.

Rethinking teaching and learning about trauma and reconciliation in schools ultimately seeks transformation of the public and educational discourses and practices on trauma. Critical emotional praxis is a pedagogical tool able to produce action because teachers and students can translate their new emotional understandings into new ways of living *with* others. The discomforting emotions that can occur as the very result of attempting to address the ‘difficult’ emotions of trauma in schools, in fact, serve as the springboard to uncover and undone the mechanisms with which hegemonic values and beliefs about others continue to operate in daily habits, routines and unconscious feelings. Critical emotional praxis highlights the ability to incorporate other people’s perceptions, *see* an experience with their eyes and formulate solidarity bonds on the basis of common humanity and common suffering (Halpern and Weinstein 2004).

To conclude, reconciliation education can be aided by critical emotional praxis, a pedagogical resource that involves reimagining identity and community in terms of inclusion rather than exclusion. Critical emotional praxis problematises the political

appropriation of emotions of trauma, acknowledges the importance of the ambivalence of emotion and offers new insights for revolt. As a pedagogical resource and tool, critical emotional praxis does not necessarily lay aside the orthodoxies of divisions and traumas; however, it enhances teachers' and students' capacities to form critical responses to the political appropriation of trauma and interrogates the persistent danger that revolt and emotional ambivalence might become the new moralistic and normative regimes.

Conclusion

The task of curricula and pedagogies that are critical of any normative emotional regimes is to constantly question the practices, strategies and spaces within which emotions of trauma are appropriated—including the ways that reconciliation education may be politically manipulated. This chapter cannot possibly provide an exhaustive account of the multiple ways with which emotions of trauma can promote social healing and reconciliation through teaching and learning as well as analyse extensively all the dangers emanating from the political appropriation of reconciliation education. But it has emphasised two things: First, it has shown how teaching and learning about trauma and reconciliation in schools creates possibilities for the destabilisation of certain emotional boundaries and norms, and, second, it has suggested that the newly created spaces of teaching and learning can help reframe trauma and reconciliation in constructive ways, that is, in ways that do not marginalise, ostracise or exclude any emotions (e.g. fear, resentment, anger) but render visible the implications of appropriating trauma or reconciliation for different political purposes.

The challenge that makes critical educators' work hard is the extent to which it is possible to nurture such spaces in schools in light of a conflicting emotional ethos that may be dominant in the society at large. On one hand, these spaces do offer opportunities for the acknowledgment of humility, common pain and compassion in schools; on the other hand, it has to be recognised that education alone cannot do much for reconciliation unless there are significant structural changes in the emotional orientation of the society at large (Bar-Tal and Bennink 2004). Nevertheless, what critical educators *can* do is to highlight the crucial linkages among emotion, trauma and reconciliation—through corresponding education programs that involve students in active learning, trauma healing, meaningful social interaction between adversary groups, intercommunity cooperation, peace education and civic society education (Danesh 2006; Gallagher 2004; Salomon and Nevo 2002). It should be acknowledged that each other's narratives of trauma are real events, but they are also constructed and learned and as such they may be deconstructed, reassessed and transformed (McKnight 2004). Inasmuch as certain hegemonic discourses (e.g. fearism) are perpetuated, critical educators need to constantly look for ways to disrupt the modes through which emotions of trauma are authorised by, implied and embodied in pedagogies and curricula (Zembylas 2008).

Schools are already political terrains in which emotions are ideologically appropriated; however, the role of schools can be further radicalised if they are turned into places of humane connections with adversaries. It is such connections which constitute spaces that oppose polarised trauma narratives and open possibilities for reimagining the sense of community and identity. Destabilising the rhetoric of binary opposites and the hegemonic ways of thinking and feeling about past traumas engages students and teachers in a politics that radically re-evaluates the emotional culture in which they live. From this perspective, reframing trauma stories can help restore both one's own and the other's humanity and counteract the confrontational content of competing narratives that lead to dehumanisation.

I have argued that the emotional aspect is crucial to understanding self/other relationships in the educational settings of traumatised societies, and thus schools need not be afraid in facilitating such an understanding. Re-educating the emotions (Worsham 2001) constitutes a significant political and ethical act of reforming the emotional connections with others and arguably represents an effort to change the negative implications of the political appropriation of trauma. Constituting spaces for reconciliation education is very demanding and never easy, yet an important idea can guide these efforts: any emotional attachment and terrain needs to be scrutinised; no emotion is to be taken for granted as a normative value. This criticality does not take away the challenges involved but it highlights how identities, communities and emotional attachments are provisional, and thus they may be shifting towards a deeper understanding of our common humanity.

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Chapter 8

What You See Depends Where You Stand: Critical Anticolonial Perspectives on Genocide Education Addressing the 1994 Rwandan Genocide

Lisa Karen Taylor, Marie-Jolie Rwigema, and Sollange Sauter Umwali

This chapter traces some of the key tensions and questions at stake in critical, anticolonial research into contemporary practices of genocide education regarding the 1994 Rwandan genocide against the Tutsis¹ in Canadian schools. In sketching out the central concerns of our collaborative inquiry, this piece traces a conversation in three voices among Rwigema and Umwali—two community-based researchers and educators—and Taylor—a university-based researcher and teacher educator.

The discussion emerges from a series of conversations among and between Rwandan-Canadian community activists/popular educators, NGO- and local school-based educators, and university-based researchers concerning the politics of knowledge production and representation within institutional initiatives to commemorate and learn from the 1994 genocide. These conversations have raised key questions driving our research:

- How mass atrocity and trauma are remembered, commemorated, and studied by different stakeholders.
- How genocide comes to be constituted through the complex processes and embodied politics of academic knowledge formation and curriculum development

¹ We are offering primacy to the designation “the Rwandan genocide against Tutsi” in recognition of the reality of discourses of denial and revisionism (i.e., the propagation of theories of “double genocide” and outright denials that the 1994 genocide was primarily aimed at decimating the Tutsi population of Rwanda). Nonetheless, we recognize that those targeted for massacre extended beyond ethnic lines to include those identified as sympathizers, traitors, or internal threats. We will use a range of terms including “1994 Rwandan genocide” and “Rwandan genocide.”

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(how, e.g., it comes to be constructed as something foreign; how it gets mapped onto particular bodies while leaving others unimplicated)

- How diverse nonacademic collective knowledge forms shaped through histories of trauma and genocide are produced, represented, and engaged as an object of study.
- How such knowledge is shaped by institutional processes of selecting, organizing, constituting, and teaching curriculum, as well as by curricular goals of human rights, global citizenship, or peace education. In other words, what are the ethics of studying accounts of the suffering of others as a vehicle for developing what is constructed as “global citizenship”?²
- How these collective forms of memory and knowledge might be constituted as institutionally recognized expertise, given the exclusionary conventions through which authority is constructed within the social sciences and the academy.³
- How the Rwandan genocide might be ethically studied: this broaches questions of representation, the status of different stakeholders, and the status of contested knowledge but also the pedagogical challenge of encountering accounts of genocide in their historical specificity and interdependency with other forms of mass atrocity closer to “home.”

We bring these questions to our particular inquiry into the implications of introducing diverse knowledge forms of Rwandan-Canadian communities within school-based curricular initiatives to study the 1994 Rwandan genocide (see, e.g., FHAO 2010; TDSB 2008, 2009).

Our inquiry is impelled by two central concerns: firstly, genuine inclusion of key stakeholders as partners in developing curriculum that is equitable and accountable to the diverse communities schools serve⁴ and secondly, an interest in how the fields of on the one hand, antiracist, equity, and social justice education, and on the other, genocide education, might mutually refine and critically inform reflexive pedagogical practice.

²Feminist and critical race scholars have developed critical analyses of *which* bodies come to gain institutional acceptance in claiming authority and academic capital. The imperial, classed, and racialized politics mediating the construction of a “global citizen” have, for example, been critiqued by a growing body of postcolonial scholarship. See the discussion below.

³ See, for example, Battiste and Henderson 2000; Dei 2010, 2011; Mignolo 2000; Razack 2010; Thobani 2007.

⁴These concerns are not held by us alone. In proposing its groundbreaking grade 11 history course CHG38 “Genocide and Crimes against Humanity”, the Toronto District School Board states the following: “Many students within the Toronto District School Board and their families have experienced bias, stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination from dominant groups within society due to their perceived difference and inferiority both in their home countries and here in Canada. Our community includes refugee students, as well as the children and grandchildren of people who have experienced genocidal acts and extreme human rights abuses. Given the specific multi-cultural and multi-ethnic diversity within Toronto, we feel it is essential that students born within and outside Canada have the opportunity to explore in depth the causes and consequences of genocide and the lived realities of the aggressors, targets, bystanders, and resisters to these horrific acts of violence. A study of these experiences will help foster a sense of empathy for the targets of these violent acts and hopefully encourage students to understand the connections they have to their fellow human beings” (TDSB 2008, p. 1).

These concerns animate the central question organizing our inquiry: What kinds of power relations inform knowledge construction—and specifically the construction of authority and expertise—within educational initiatives that aim to learn from (Britzman 1998) contested histories and communal memories of mass atrocity within a larger project of human rights civic and global education? Simply put, who speaks for the lessons of the 1994 Rwandan genocide and how does this happen? How are key stakeholders—particularly survivor communities—positioned in this process? How do curricular choices address and position learners, structure particular relationships to the subjects of study, and condition orientations to listening and learning (Simon [forthcoming](#))? More urgently, what resources and exercises might prepare teachers to exercise critical reflexivity and judgment in curriculum selection, development, and pedagogy in ways that center the communities of expertise and multidisciplinary memory of Rwandan Canadians? This latter question broaches the task of learning from diverse “ways of knowing” and practices of commemoration.

Situating Our Project

These questions situate our inquiry at the axis of genocide studies (particularly historiography), genocide education, and social justice curriculum and pedagogy.

Introducing Rwandan-Canadian standpoints and knowledge formations within a critical race framework into the field of genocide studies raises a number of epistemological and historiographical issues. These circle around the question of how different knowledge forms and speakers are positioned within academic hierarchies and taxonomies. Evidentiary traditions of Holocaust and genocide documentation and historiography—particularly under the pressures of contestation and juridical process—have led scholars to advocate for the truth value, insight, and concomitant modes of listening associated with nonacademic aesthetic and testimonial forms of representation (French 2009; Laub 1992; Milton 2007; Sanders 2007). This supports the claims to authority that might be made by Rwandan-Canadian community members, nonprofessional historians, and artists as well as the curricular status of diverse collective forms of historical memory and knowledge including oral history, lived relationships of survival and healing, the arts, media, journalism, and nonacademic documentation. Indeed, the value of these knowledge traditions has been enhanced by developments in historiography and history pedagogy such as “sentimental history” (Phillips 2008).

This critical intervention is also propelled by over a quarter century of postcolonial and anticolonial, antiracist, and feminist critiques of knowledge production within the social sciences and educational institutions. There has been a broad movement to deconstruct and democratize exclusionary traditions of academic knowledge formation through the lenses of standpoint theory (Harding 2004), “epistemic privilege” (Narayan 2000), and counter-hegemonic knowledge traditions (Armstrong 1990; Battiste and Henderson 2000; Dei 2010, 2011; Mignolo 2000; Sandoval 2000; Tuhiwai Smith 1999).

There has as yet been little work examining the racialized and imperial power relations conditioning and constructing hierarchies of knowing and speaking among differently positioned subjects within the fields of Rwandan genocide historiography, commemoration, and cultural representation (including reportage, documentaries, films, novels, theater, and visual art). As educators, we need an analysis of the racialized and ethnicized institutionalized barriers that trained historians, authors, professionals, and academics from survivor communities face within and outside Rwanda disseminating and receiving recognition for their work. Considering the West's ongoing colonial relations with continental African knowledge traditions (Cooper 2001; Dei 2010, 2011; Mbembe 2001), we argue that the ethics of *speaking with* (Alcoff 1996) and *to* (Spivak 1988) survivors demand a careful and critically reflexive analysis of the institutional processes through which expertise and authority are constructed and differentially embodied in contemporary practices of scholarship, education, and commemoration.

These concerns have important implications when considering the epistemic power relations constructed through the curriculum and pedagogy of Rwandan genocide education. While issues of curricular representation and normative address have been extensively debated within the broad field of social justice education (or SJE, including critical, feminist, antiracist, and queer pedagogies) as part of a larger exploration of the implications of difference for progressive educational projects, they have as yet remained outside the conversations in RGE. In support of such a project, a growing body of scholarship that critically examines current global citizenship educational theory and practice through postcolonial and anticolonial critique is instructive. Schueller (2009), for example, traces the ways even explicitly anticolonial theoretical and activist projects share with traditions of colonial knowledge production a Eurocentric universalizing framing of the “global” that reinstates the colonial difference (Mignolo 2000) and reinscribes the “triumph of globality” (Radhakrishnan 2003 in Schueller 2009).⁵ Andreotti and Souza (2008) discern Eurocentric, colonial teleologies of “development” (equating technological and civilizational indicators) in British practices of GCE (one could discern in liberal, uncritical practices of peace education Eurocentric teleologies from Third World conflict to First World global citizenship). Pashby (2008) argues that even critical GCE constructs the subject and object of learning and agency within colonialist imaginaries and ways of knowing. Willinsky (1998, pp. 333, 349) posits an imperialist “educational commodification ... a will to know that is capable of turning the testimony of others into ‘learning experiences’” with curative effects for normalized privileged First World learners: producing, that is, a successful “learning experience” that promises moral sanitization and absolution from the complex, historically implicated locations inhabited by privileged readers. These critiques place

⁵ This echoes one of the most radical and substantive critiques of contemporary globalization theorizing made by the African historian Frederick Cooper (2001, pp. 192–193) who argues that, among the three predominant framings of globalization—the “Banker’s Boast,” the “Social Democrat’s Lament,” and the “Dance of Flows and the Fragments”—a common conceptual lacuna and gesture of renewed mastery is the “totalizing pretensions and their presentist periodization.”

the transformative and in some cases anticolonial agenda of global citizenship education in question, suggesting that the modern/colonial (Mignolo 2000) imaginary to which GCE is an active heir invites students into hierarchical relations of power, authority, and agency with fellow citizens of this planet (Andreotti et al. 2010). Postcolonial scholars argue that global educators have yet to seriously grapple with the ways a Eurocentric colonial imaginary and West-centered global order structure both student desire as well as the terms and limits of “thinkability” (Britzman 1998) when citizens of the North turn their attention to those of the South. Doing so might illuminate the ways in which the call to global citizenship is so easily taken up through persistent colonial tropes of the “desire for development” (Heron 2007), of “white”⁶ innocence, and of *noblesse oblige* and the civilizing mission refashioned as global responsibility (Amireh and Majaj 2000; Mahrouse 2010; Razack 1996, 2004, 2007a, b; Schick and St. Denis 2005).

This critical work in SJE has raised issues of representation and address in curriculum as well as critical reflexivity, self-location, and implication in pedagogy; these are valuable lines of inquiry that promise to productively complicate contemporary practices of genocide education. Critical pedagogy in particular demands teachers’ and students’ development of critical capacities and vigilance vis-à-vis the exclusionary politics of knowledge construction in the social sciences and canon formation in the humanities. It has also foregrounded the power relations between schools and the students, families, and communities they serve. A key premise is that teachers need preparation to develop critically reflexive ways of listening, reading, and learning from institutionally marginalized knowledge forms (Taylor 2007, 2008, forthcoming).

Beyond issues of critical reflexivity in curriculum and pedagogy, critical pedagogy urges an attention to the kinds of relationships that are constructed between schools and the communities about whom they teach, even as these communities are among

⁶ Critical race theory and whiteness studies both examine the ways racism constructs a flexible identity of *whiteness* through images of civilization, purity, honesty, worthiness, entitlement, moral authority, and universal neutrality which naturalize white ethnicity and European knowledge traditions as a neutral vantage point and invisible or “unmarked” norm (Carr and Lund 2007; Fine et al. 1997; Frankenberg 1993; Levine-Rasky 2002; Roediger 1991). “White” is understood not as an absolute identity but a socially constructed, contextually specific position of power and status in relation to other groups.

This understanding is crucial to our use of this term within the context of genocide education addressing the 1994 genocide. The field of genocide studies and education is the legacy of the courageous work that has and continues to be conducted by Jewish scholars, human rights advocates, and the broader Jewish community along with their allies. At the same time, Jewish-Rwandan relationships cannot be considered outside the context of what Mignolo (2000) has termed the “colonial difference” that delineates the racialized and colonial power relations between European-descended First World citizens and Africans.

Reflecting this complex understanding, we will alternately use the terms “white” and “white-identified” in this chapter with the implicit recognition of the ontological, sociopolitical, historical, and epistemic distinctions between Jewish and non-Jewish scholars and educators working in this field.

the student population and stakeholders the schools serve. Our research advocates moving beyond the “community consultation” model positioning Rwandan-Canadian community members as clients, research subjects, and nonexpert purveyors of testimony or storytellers (Razack 1993; Simon [forthcoming](#)) as part of a larger project of challenging and shifting current conceptualizations and practices of community involvement in education in the direction of collaborative, research-based meaning-making (Ippolito [in press](#); Schecter and Ippolito 2008).

Meaningful Rwandan-Canadian community participation in the design of curriculum and pedagogy addressing the Rwandan genocide opens fertile possibilities for one of the core aspirations of genocide education: that is, the creation, through the active opening of the present to the incommensurable accounts and claims of the past, of not only a “community of difference” but a “community of remembrance,” one that fosters covenantal engagements with testimony (Simon [forthcoming](#)). As Simon puts it, the aspiration is to “stage an encounter with history as a force of inhabitation, a sense of dwelling with the past that instigates an altered way of living with and learning from images and stories that engage not only one’s identities and distinctions but as well as one’s sense of their responsibilities and rights” (Simon [forthcoming](#)). In such a “pedagogy of remembrance,” learning to listen to diverse representations of mass systemic violence would launch teachers and students on their own journeys of thinking in new ways about social injustice and implication. This implies confronting the kinds of “difficult knowledge” (Britzman 1998) that threatens one’s attachments to, and defenses of, a coherent, innocent, and unimplicated self-image. We understand accounts of the Rwandan genocide to trigger “difficult knowledge” in Britzman’s (1998, pp. 117–119) sense of knowledge which “references incommensurability, historical trauma, and social breakdowns” in ways that “open teachers and students to their present ethical obligations” (Pitt and Britzman 2003, p. 756).

Britzman’s notion of difficult knowledge demands that students learn *from* rather than *about* the relations of injustice, inequity, and exploitation in which we participate. Contrasting these two orders of learning posited by Freud, Britzman (1998, pp. 117–119) distinguishes “the acquisition of qualities, attributes, and facts” from a detached distance (*learning about*) from the forms of implication and affective investment that characterize a response to difficult knowledge from which insight might emerge. Learning *from* the ethical call of difficult knowledge, according to Ellsworth and Britzman, disrupts, destabilizes, and sets the learning self in motion within an intimate process of becoming: becoming the kind of person able to entertain or understand such thoughts; a process of becoming-in-relation to another immune to our will to know who, in refusing “to become like us or to be erased by our fantasies of who they are, embody the potential for our own self change” (Ellsworth 2005, p. 89).

It is this implicated “becoming-in-relation” that offers the possibility of teachers’ and students’ de- and reconstructing institutional hierarchies of authority and learning to listen reflexively to the institutionally marginalized diverse knowledge forms circulating within Rwandan-Canadian communities in ways that demand ever more equitable and accountable relations.

This chapter had its origins in a community-directed participatory action research (PAR) project currently underway that gathers, systematizes, and analyzes diverse forms of knowledge and collective memory within Rwandan-Canadian communities as the basis of meaningful community intervention and collaboration in institutional processes of knowledge formation and curriculum development about the 1994 Rwandan genocide against the Tutsi.

Below, we bring three distinct voices into conversation, each of us writing from our disciplinary and embodied locations as researchers and educators. Umwali argues that bringing a commitment to equity, inclusion, and antidiscrimination education to the practice of genocide education about the 1994 genocide raises important issues not only for students but also for teachers, in terms of how they acquire and use knowledge and the kinds of reflexivity they practice as they do this. Marie-Jolie explores the highly compromised ways Rwandans and Rwandan-Canadian knowledge forms are positioned in scholarship and commemorative practices regarding the 1994 genocide and traces these to a racialized politics of knowledge production regarding Rwanda and continental Africa as a region. Lisa explores ways in which the fraught politics of knowledge construction in curriculum addressing the Rwandan genocide are complicated by the complex dynamics of resistance, consolation, and re-entrenchment associated with difficult learning (Britzman 1998) and suggests examples of critical questions that this analysis implies for genocide education. Each section is presented here in the writer's own voice, as she contemplates the possibilities of ethical and critically reflexive approaches to curricular practices of remembrance. Together, the three pieces present a multidisciplinary argument for an engaged, implicated collective practice of learning through meaningful stakeholder inclusion in genocide education.

In Conversation: Umwali

My interest in questions of representation, voice, and critical reflexivity in genocide education conducted by schools about the Rwandan genocide is to some degree personal as a member of the Rwandan-Canadian community. While my positionality does not subsume my analysis, it does ground it: As Alcoff (1995) explains, “[a] speaker’s location is *one* of the elements which converge to produce meaning and thus to determine epistemic validity” (emphasis mine). I grew up as a refugee: I experienced first-hand how institutional policies can serve to displace, isolate, and oppress my culture, my family, and myself. My lived experience has enabled me to utilize an anti-oppression lens to engage in analysis of genocide education wherein I draw from my background and identities as Black African woman from an immigrant and refugee background, originating in a country that suffered genocide in 1994. At the same time, I am a university-trained, heterosexual individual with no visible disabilities. These competing identities inform how I live and am perceived in this world, as I struggle with the impacts of power dynamics and hegemonies within our society.

In this article, I will leave the discussion about knowledge production and notions of expertise to my colleagues. I will examine how I am implicated in this issue and elaborate on my own self-reflexive process. This grounds my interest in how schools and community members can work together toward developing an inclusive curriculum that values all stakeholders while attending to how inclusion is mediated in complex ways by power and location (Alcoff 1995).

It is my belief that schools are a microcosm of the society; therefore, my discussion about equity, social justice, and critical reflexivity obliges me to reference other social contexts. But first, I acknowledge that the Ministry of Education and Toronto District School Board recognize inequality within the education system and are making important efforts to work toward an inclusive public education model. This is reflected, for example, in Ontario's (2009) Equity and Inclusive Education Strategy and the TDSB's groundbreaking Equity policy (1999).

Both policy documents discuss at length the importance of an inclusive school climate. But what does "inclusion" mean? George Dei argues that "[i]nclusion is not bringing people into what already exists; it is making a new space, a better space for everyone" (Dei et al. 1997). In this sense, inclusion promotes a sense of belonging and the ability to engage meaningfully in society. If we are to promote global citizenship, our educational systems must be able to include and value all stakeholders as equal members.

The interest we share with these institutions—the interest I'd like to elaborate on here—asks what the implications are when you bring this commitment to equity, inclusion, and antidiscrimination education to the practice of genocide education about the 1994 Rwandan genocide.

I believe this raises important issues not only for students but also for teachers, in terms of how they acquire and use knowledge and the kinds of reflexivity they practice as they do this. Critical reflexivity challenges each of us to examine our relationships and stakes in our practice. Is there such a thing as a neutral relationship to the events or people or issues of genocide? In that case, is it even possible to teach about one form of oppression or atrocity without recognizing other communities that share similar histories? Specifically, can we responsibly teach about international atrocities without teaching about similar atrocities that have happened here in Canada?

The Canadian education system is deeply implicated in colonial history and cultural genocide. According to Harper (1997), the orientation of the Canadian state to the issue of racial/cultural diversity is fundamentally defined by its relationship with the First Nations peoples of Canada. This dates back to the earliest military and cultural conquest: The mission to "civilize" and "save the souls of the savages" was pursued by the state as well as the church and its missionaries. The abduction of over 150,000 children into residential schools that aimed to rob them of their religion, language, and cultural identity was a key element of a longer history of colonization, attempted cultural, political, and physical genocide directed at entire 1st Nations and Metis nations. These policies were justified by a broad Euro-Canadian culture and colonial ideology that persists across Canadian society today. The residential school policy aimed not only at cultural genocide but more importantly

at land conquest and political disenfranchisement, expressed clearly by the then Superintendent of Indian Affairs, Duncan Campbell Scott: “[o]ur objective is to continue until there is not a single Indian in Canada that has not been absorbed into the body politic and there is no Indian question, and no Indian Department” (Legacy of Hope Foundation 2007).

This is not to detract from current initiatives teaching about the history of colonialism and residential schools. Rather, it is a deeper question of how we as educators teach about forms of violence that have fundamentally informed the design and organization of the institutions in which we work.

As I advocate for critical thinking and self-questioning, some of the issues I struggle with include: If I were teaching about the Rwandan genocide, what would I teach and why? How do we teach people to examine and make explicit their relationships with people on the other side of the world? Is this worth doing? To whose benefit? How can students or teachers truly understand his/her story that is not part of their lived reality? How can they recognize where and how they are deeply implicated? Why does it matter *who* it is that tells the stories or presents the expert analysis? The notion of responsibility after learning about tragic event/s is key here: What are our social responsibilities? *For* or *to* whom? Are there parameters or boundaries around this? What kind of response (or response-ability) are we looking for in students? If we are asking them to become global citizens, what is the underlying expectation? Even as a Rwandan, to what extent can I claim authority to speak “for” or “about” my people?

I believe that critical reflexivity demands that we mount a critique of the ways *expertise* and *experience* are positioned as mutually exclusive, such that survivors are positioned as holders of experience that they are implicitly presumed incapable of analyzing or systematizing (because of their proximity, emotional forms of knowing or lack of formal training). This binary is underpinned by a model of knowledge arguing that only distance and the separation of emotion and thought can produce objectivity; impartiality; and, consequently, truth. This model of knowledge and truth has been roundly critiqued by feminist scholars, from Narayan (2000) to Scott (1992) to Harding (2004).

Equally important, can ethical self-reflexivity avoid a framework of competing oppressions? How? As human beings, our greatest gift is our mind; it is also our greatest weakness, for myriad reasons. For instance, we may feel fear that one atrocity may overshadow another or fear that if we equally value all forms of atrocities and oppressions, we may be implicated; in that case, what would be our responsibility? What about unequal power dynamics within various communities (including the Rwandan-Canadian “community”) and corresponding feelings of entitlement? How about altruism? Most importantly, knowledge and interactions are often based on normative or accepted assumptions (e.g., about who is or needs to learn to be peaceful, who should naturally aspire to be a conflict mediator vs. who is biased by experience or identity, who is a global citizen and who is a refugee). What does that imply for overall communication and our experiences of learning since they are laden with subjectivity shaped by our subject positions?

This crisis of representation also informs my professional work as a community activist, a popular educator, and a proponent of community-based education. Critical reflexivity is key in all aspects of interactions and work; it continues to guide my work as I navigate various relationships and power dynamics. These include my social positioning vis-à-vis the service users, funders, and colleagues and my speaking engagements representing my diverse communities. It urges me to ask how we might redefine the concept of leadership in order to recognize and empower community members who may not fit the conventional construction of a *leader*. It informs my interest in how people construct their own expertise and come into relationships of authority vis-à-vis particular bodies of knowledge (e.g., expertise on the Rwandan genocide) within a larger economy and process of accumulation of academic capital. What would a process of members of the Rwandan community taking up positions of expertise look like?

For the past 13 years, I have been actively involved in the planning and hosting of commemoration events that remember the genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda. Testimonials have always been a significant part of the events in to give voice and honor people's experiences as part of the healing process in our community. Through our planning processes, we had recurring dialogues about representation, the politics of visibility and invisibility, authority and recognition, and competing approaches to practices of commemoration. As a consequence of these discussions, we decided 7 years ago to deliberately invite Rwandans to give their expert analysis on the 1994 genocide. This examination was framed by various themes, including the history of Rwanda and colonization, gender roles in the genocide, the role of media, the aftermath, court proceedings, and implicated parties (including the West). We had passionate discussions that recognized our social positioning and looked at the "facts." Since then, I have observed a movement by many members in our community to claim authority as experts on the events surrounding the genocide in 1994. This shift has led me to question the hegemonic distinctions asserted between personal experience and impartiality.

When filming the documentary (Rwigema et al. 2009), we engaged in heated debates about whether change can occur within or outside the system. We asked the following: How do you challenge a problematic pedagogy or institutional practice? How are we located in relation to other Rwandan Canadians, and mainstream Canada? Many voices suggested working outside of powerful institutions while I dissented. Did that mean I am a "sell out" or a realist, or perhaps something else? These dialogues and questions of unpacking my location ground me in an ongoing lived process of critical self-reflexivity, an approach I seek in others and the education system.

The act of self-reflexivity can be likened to peeling an onion, uncovering layers and layers of intertwined complex issues so overwhelming they might leave one in a state of despair. Nevertheless, this exercise is a great opportunity to work toward social change because it holds us responsible for what we articulate and our actions, as well as provoking personal and social responsibility in an unequal world. It cautions against the "harmful repetitions of certain privileged knowledge and practices" that are normalized in our society and institutions (Kumashiro 2002). Even when

individuals act in good faith, our actions can continue to have adverse effect if we do not engage in a continuous and self-reflective process of questioning our individual and professional thoughts, beliefs, and conduct. I believe this is key to making the kind of new space for which Dei argues: a space in which Rwandan Canadians are heard in complex ways as schools undertake to learn from our experiences.

Marie-Jolie

My personal interest in Rwanda and the genocide is grounded in my lived experience as a member of Rwandan communities in Canada. As a community-based antiracism and equity educator, social worker, and documentary filmmaker, my work has been strongly influenced by a commitment to making a positive contribution to these communities.

In the process of conducting research about Rwanda for academic papers and for the production of a documentary, I've come to realize that "expert" Rwandan voices are absent in the mainstream discourse about the genocide. Instead, if and when Rwandan voices appear, they do so as informants and objects of study, not as authors and experts. As someone who has mainly learned about the genocide (and massacres in Rwanda from 1959 onward) from people with first-hand experience of these events, I was disturbed to discover that almost none of their voices can be found through mainstream channels. Instead, after conducting a Google search with the heading "Rwandan genocide experts," what I found was a top ten listing of non-Rwandan academics, journalists, and humanitarian workers. If Google is to be believed, there is not one Rwandan among the "experts" on the genocide. And if you were to believe the writings of the experts thus validated by Google—if you were to consult their references, citations, and footnotes—it would be confirmed that those who "know" (in an authoritative sense) about Rwanda are white Westerners. This is problematic.

In addition to conducting research about the genocide, I've taken every opportunity to attend as many conferences and events about Rwanda as I've had access to over the past 10 years. In doing so, I've observed complex power dynamics and situations play out, depending on who organized what type of event and for what purpose. When events have involved collaborative organization between Rwandans and non-Rwandans, or have been led by non-Rwandans, racialized dynamics have played out. One instance that comes to my mind is a 2009 conference entitled "Remembering Rwanda 15," the only academic conference I've seen organized in Toronto about the genocide. I remember being struck, when opening the brochure for the event, that of the 22 "experts" scheduled to speak at the event—only two listed speakers were Rwandan (one of whom was a "t.b.a" representative from the Rwandan Association of Toronto), and all but three of the speakers at the conference were white. Although Razack is describing the theft of Rwandans' pain through the film "Shake Hands with the Devil"—"we become the Rwandans through the understanding that what has happened in Rwanda is a human thing, devoid of

historical specificity, devoid, in fact, of Rwandans” (Razack 2007b, p. 384)—her statement is equally applicable to the theft of knowledge enacted at the academic conference described above. Apparently, commemorating and educating about the genocide does not require Rwandans (other than on a “to be announced” tokenistic basis). Similarly, at many educational film screenings about the genocide over the years, organized as fundraisers for educational initiatives in Rwanda, I’ve observed that (a) the films (presented as educational resources) are almost always produced and directed by non-Rwandans and (b) the post-screening speakers often reproduce the “white expert”/“Rwandan embodied victim” binary. I’ve also witnessed these dynamics being challenged: Members of Rwandan community have openly and publicly questioned the choices of non-Rwandans who continue to speak with expert voices about Rwanda and/or who unquestioningly claim leadership in organizing efforts. Unfortunately, describing and deconstructing all of those interactions and dynamics—while a worthwhile undertaking—would require more space than I have available to me here.

Nonetheless, I know, and common sense dictates, that there is no shortage of Rwandans who have expertise on the genocide. Their expertise has been gained not only through the lived experience of surviving massacres directed against Tutsi but also through political engagement as activists, community organizers, politicians, academics, and cultural producers. There is no shortage of Rwandans whose lives are permeated by genocide-related intellectual and emotional labor, *labor that is driven not by accidental, incidental, or strategic academic, artistic, and professional interest but by the necessity of dealing with the inescapable circumstances of their own lives*. So, why can’t I find them and their work (as experts) on Google? Or at conferences? Or in academic texts? Or in newspaper articles? Or in movies and documentaries?

And what is the implication when those who were and continue to be the most impacted by the genocide and its aftereffects are the least visible and least audible? What are the implications of the reality that most recognized “Rwanda experts” are not only non-Rwandan but are white? And why is this even the case?

“A conversation of ‘us’ with ‘us’ about ‘them’ is a conversation in which ‘them’ is silenced” (Minh-ha 1989, p. 66). Rwandan community organizer Sharangabo explains the correlation of whiteness with expertise (in the case of Rwanda in particular and African in general) as a “colonial continuity.” He asserts that “there is a long history of whites claiming the right to speak on behalf of Africans that has its roots from the partition of Africa, to recent suggestions at G8 meetings that [Western] NGOs should represent Africa” (Rwigema et al. 2009). When Rwandans are invited to the table to speak, it is more often as “embodied victims” than as authoritative knowledge producers. In a roundtable discussion, Nsabimana, a Rwandan community activist and academic, explains this process: “So you have things that are set up [at conferences and events]: there is a person that comes before the survivors testimony, usually Western and white, and they talk about the historical and political context of the genocide, and as a support for the intellectual political and sociological analysis—there is a survivor’s testimony.” She explains, “[while]

there is a place for testimonies, an important place, the problem is the power dynamics, having to almost entertain people in reproducing stereotypes of the helpless victims standing there and for people to come after and patronize you and then to have the “real” experts come and explain “real” things to people” (Rwigema et al. 2009). Nsabimana rightly identifies that implicit in the setting up of the binary of “white expert” who provides “intellectual analysis” and “black survivor” who provides “personal testimony” binary is the racist assumption that Rwandans “do not have the intellectual capacity to analyze and explain what happened in their country” (Rwigema et al. 2009).

This kind of binary framing—which Minh-ha (1989) describes as “‘them’ is only admitted among us, the discussing subjects, when accompanied or introduced by an ‘us’”—exists not only at the lectures, conferences, and commemorative events where knowledge about the genocide is publicly circulated; it also proliferates in the published academic literature on Rwanda, which is full of (published) white experts who explain and provide analysis based on information from (unpublished and often un-cited) Rwandan informants who substantiate and provide evidence. This process also occurs with films: White experts—drawing from Rwandan informants—end up freely utilizing their creative license to tell whatever stories they deem important, while Rwandan informants end up as the (literal) supporting cast in the stories of their own lives. This binary framing is a racialized hierarchy of knowledge production that positions whites as objective experts with legitimate and authoritative knowledge and Rwandans as subjective evidence with supportive information. And it is through an “objective” “universal standpoint” (Dana Nelson in Razack 2007a, b)—claimed by experts (who do not speak to how they themselves are positioned)—that “white moral authority is produced out of the suffering and silencing of blacks” (Razack 2007a, b). It is this sense of moral authority that then enables self-proclaimed experts to claim the right to act as decision-makers in real life institutions—schools, courts, humanitarian agencies, and media—without consulting and recognizing the value and authority of the knowledge of those most impacted by the genocide.

There is no doubt that Rwandans do produce knowledge about the genocide. It is in the context of global white supremacy—both in terms of what is recognized as authoritative knowledge and in terms of differential access to the means of production and distribution⁷—that Rwandans meet such barriers to their knowledge from being as widely produced, distributed, and accessible as knowledge produced by Westerners. Racialized power and privilege (in international development, cultural production, and academic production) exist, and if it is denied (through silence or outright denial), this will continue to reproduce inequity, avoid accountability, and allow those in privileged positions to benefit from the resources of those who are systemically marginalized.

⁷This point is underlined in the simple fact that this chapter was written between our other jobs, in one author’s case without the benefit of a personal computer.

Lisa

My own history as a white Canadian-born child of an Austrian immigrant mother draws me to this research as I grapple with my many difficult inheritances; at the same time, I'm haunted by a particular series of questions emerging from my own teaching practice.

It seems education has such a potentially influential role to play in shaping the ethics of a society and the forms of injustice it tolerates, benefits from, or confronts: What can education *actually* aim for? Thinking in terms of the stakes of teaching for social change, confronting one's implication in injustice provokes a hosts of defenses that mobilize discourses and worldviews already supportive of the status quo: Eurocentric and patriarchal assumptions of who can know and who can only experience, imperial discourses of the civilizing and rescuing mission, enlightenment Cartesian theories of objectivity and rationality (which preclude emotion) as exclusive routes to impartial truth, etc. Given that there will always be resistance to learning about one's implication in injustice, most schools of equity-seeking pedagogies either implicitly or explicitly follow certain assumptions and modus operandi: for example, it is implicit that there must be "emotional buy-in" to a larger redistributive or inclusive agenda, particularly for privileged students and those who are beneficiaries or oblivious to certain forms of discrimination. This "buy-in" might be a response to the ethical call of what one has learned, it might be a recognition of collective interest despite individual indifference, it might be a desire to think better of oneself (as a "good" or ethical person), and it is often presumed to be a feeling of sympathy, empathy, or being "touched" by the humanity of another person. Simon ([forthcoming](#)) argues that the pedagogical use of testimony implicitly "assumes that, if attended to, such narratives elicit a form of natural empathy and critical historical judgment that can lead, not only to an understanding of the lives of [the community of those testifying] but a restorative project within which widely diverse people work together to fulfill the requirements for a more just future."

We could debate the different merits and risks of each of these, but what worries me most is their consequences: for example, when a Rwandan survivor is invited to testify in order to provoke this emotional buy-in from students, how does this framing and the curricular goals being pursued structure a particular relationship of power between students and those about whom they are learning? How does it condition those students' response or their possibility to diverge from the instrumental, dehumanizing listening practices that circulate in popular culture? How does it support students in examining or resisting the desires (for innocence, paternalistic charity, heroism) fostered within a Eurocentric, imperial popular imaginary?

This positioning of survivors as exhibit A to elicit emotional buy-in while non-Rwandan academics are positioned as impartial experts is, I think, complicated by many factors, including a popular misunderstanding of the ways contemporary theories conceptualize trauma as "the overwhelming experience of sudden or catastrophic events" that exceeds immediate comprehension (Caruth 1996, p. 11). In her contemplation of Freud, Lacan, and literary narrative, Caruth calls this "unclaimed

experience,” that is, experience that can only be understood retrospectively with sufficient distance. She writes, “[t]raumatic experience, beyond the psychological dimension of suffering it involves, suggests a certain paradox: that the most direct seeing of a violent event may occur of an absolute inability to know it; this immediacy, paradoxically, may take the form of belatedness” (Caruth 1996, pp. 91–92). At the same time, Laub (1992) has insisted on the unique truth value of testimonial accounts shaped by experiences of trauma. In the case of the Rwandan genocide, the unique truth status of Rwandan-Canadian testimony must be insisted upon in the light of the particular colonial and racial hierarchies structuring the West’s epistemological conquest of its others and specifically Africa (McClintock 1995; Said 1978; Young 2004; Zegeye and Vambe 2006). There are clear examples of the ways certain witnesses are racialized while others speak from positions of both traumatic memory and authority.

This raises daunting questions regarding curriculum selection that raise the stakes of the broadly accepted policy of “inclusion.” Considering the threat of revisionism, the Eurocentric colonial imaginaries shaping so many educators’ positioning and desires as non-Rwandans in the West, the outright racist representations of African in popular culture and news reporting, and ongoing paternalist and clientelist political and economic relations between the West and Africa; considering the precarious insertion of Rwandan Canadians into marginal spaces in Canadian society and their exclusion from powerful institutions (even from the resources and authority to produce widely circulated accounts of the genocide in film, literature, theater, or nonfiction); and considering the psychic dynamics of resistance to “difficult knowledge” (Britzman 1998) and the compromises that pedagogies of “buy-in” sometimes make, I strongly believe that as educators, we can’t afford the slightest naïveté when teaching about genocide as a means of inspiring a habit of civic vigilance and activism in Canadian youth.

This is not to fall into the absolutes of identity politics, as Alcoff (1995) cautions: “to say that location *bears* on meaning and truth is not the same as saying that location *determines* meaning and truth ... Location and positionality should not be conceived as one-dimensional or static, but as multiple and with varying degrees of mobility” (emphasis original). She does draw our attention, however, to the effects—whether or not intended or recognized—of representing and thus speaking for others in our very act of speaking (or teaching): “As my practices are made possible by events spatially far away from my body so too my own practices make possible or impossible practices of others. The declaration that I “speak only for myself” has the sole effect of allowing me to avoid responsibility and accountability for my effects on others; it cannot literally erase those effects.”

For myself as a white Caucasian Canadian-born, privileged educator, I am convinced that I cannot simply teach accounts and documentation of the 1994 Rwandan genocide and presume that the curriculum, my students, and I are neutral and objective. Here, I find Alcoff’s extended analysis key:

The pursuit of an absolute means to avoid making errors comes perhaps not from a desire to advance collective goals but a desire for personal mastery, to establish a privileged discursive position wherein one cannot be undermined or challenged and thus is master of

the situation. From such a position one's own location and positionality would not require constant interrogation and critical reflection; one would not have to constantly engage in this emotionally troublesome endeavor and would be immune from the interrogation of others. Such a desire for mastery and immunity must be resisted.

A series of critical reflexive practices I integrate in my practice include:

- Looking clear-eyedly at the power relationships and histories in which I am inextricably implicated and participate (and that inform my self-image, access, and intentions)
- With a different focus, asking myself "What active relationships do I have with this issue but more importantly, with the people I'm teaching about?"
- Asking myself what hierarchies of authority and voice I'm reinforcing in my approach to curriculum selection, guest speakers, community collaboration, etc.
- Being curious and candid about my own investments, fears, and hopes in this teaching (e.g., what subject positions or identities do my investments, fears, and hopes seek to construct for myself? How is whiteness being produced as a Euro-Canadian, First World position of "doing good," floating neutrally and unimplicated, claiming impartiality, and taking up a global "responsibility"?)⁸
- Examining the models of learning and activism on which I'm basing my pedagogy
- Asking myself which sources I turn to as a teacher and why
- Paying attention to sources that most deeply disturb or confound me (and asking why)
- Paying attention to sources that most profoundly comfort or resonate with me (and asking why)

Alcoff (1995) advises educators: "[s]peaking should always carry with it an accountability and responsibility for what one says." I firmly believe that I am first and foremost accountable to those about whom I teach, who are among those diverse communities of Canadian whom my teaching serves. Dialogic teaching requires new pedagogies of listening.

Conclusion

We believe that the concerns and questions that emerge from introducing diverse Rwandan-Canadian knowledge forms within a critical race framework into discussions of genocide education addressing the 1994 Rwandan genocide both renew the ethical imperative of a "curriculum of difference" and open genocide education to the dialogic forms of learning and becoming-in-relation to which it aspires.

We have sketched above not only the imperative for meaningful inclusion but for ongoing interrogation of the terms of that inclusion and their consequences.

⁸ "The impetus to speak must be carefully analyzed and, in many cases (certainly for academics!), fought against" (Alcoff 1995).

These discussions have moved our own research interests from teacher development to action research. We now ask the following: How might community-referenced knowledge generation and meaning-making that gathers, systematizes, and draws conclusions from diverse forms of knowledge and collective memory gain traction as research and claim recognition as expertise and authoritative knowledge? Can this form the basis of meaningful community intervention and collaboration in the institutional processes of knowledge formation and curriculum development?

This examination of the particular politics and stakes of knowledge production in genocide education addressing the Rwandan genocide gestures to the crucial implications of difference for critical peace education. In pedagogies attempting to intervene into the legacies of ongoing histories of systemic violence, difference is first and foremost an epistemological question. How and what we know—and what this knowing does to and for us as well as others—are our first questions. Most urgently, we ignore at our own peril the hegemonic normative address of curriculum that seeks to build in our students the critical faculties demanded by systemic local and global violence within which we are so profoundly embedded. We would do well to attend to the fraught terrain tread by pedagogies that challenge us to learn from the emotionally charged knowledge of our implication in an increasingly dystopic world order of empire and war.

“Utazi Ubwenge Ashima Ubwe. This is a traditional Rwandan proverb. Literally, it can be translated as: ‘one who knows no other wisdom always praises her or his own’. On a philosophical level, it emphasizes collective knowledge (and critical collective processes of knowledge formation) as the most trusted path to truth. One is strongly encouraged to consult alternative references and sources: this implies consulting with others through debate and the sharing of wisdom in order to solidify one’s own knowledge claims. Wisdom belongs not to one but to all, and thus is collective in process and patrimony. Practically, this proverb is commonly used when one tries to dismiss other sources without proof other than her or his own certainty or ignorance of other sources” (Sharangabo, 2011, Personal communication).

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Chapter 9

Forging a Constellation, Recovering a Space of Memory Beyond Reconciliation and Consternation

Mario Di Paolantonio

The notorious *Escuela de Mecánica de la Armada* complex (known by its Spanish acronym ESMA) stands on a busy thoroughfare in Buenos Aires. Painted metal silhouettes adorn its fence. Since they first appeared in demonstrations in the early 1980s, such silhouettes have become synonymous with the disappeared—simple but graphic accompaniments to the demand that the bodies of those taken be returned. These are the first signs that this site has a story to tell. ESMA, a complex of 17 ha and 34 buildings, was one of the 600 clandestine detention centres operative during the military’s “dirty war”. An estimated 5,000 people were imprisoned there—of whom only 400 survived. If one building can be said to symbolise the repression in Argentina, it is ESMA.

Anxieties and questions about how to live with the unsettling presence of this site (known to have scattered remains within its site) were indicative of the unease around the amnesty laws sheltering the military from prosecution and from their being compelled to reveal the whereabouts of the disappeared. In 1998, then President Carlos Menem issued a decree to demolish ESMA to remove its haunting presence in the name of “reconciliation” and “national unity” (BBC World Service 1998, *n.pag.*). In a type of public exorcism that sought to quell the momentum to overturn the amnesty laws, Menem proposed to replace ESMA with a monument to “national reconciliation”. A brochure that enticed people to buy newly built apartments across the street promised views onto a beautiful park. Literally, in the overturned burial grounds of the disappeared, the sense of a redeemed “we” sought to its monumentalisation.

But ESMA was well-known; it was entrenched in the public imagination as a type of monumental crypt, attesting to the worst memories of the repression. Menem’s proposal misapprehended the public mood. Opposing the use of the same

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grounds of a past atrocity to justify the terms of the present, an urgent mobilisation unfolded to prevent the state from undertaking the demolition project. Menem's decree was annulled through a lawsuit launched by rights groups, and eventually on the 24th of March 2004, then President Néstor Kirchner declared that ESMA was to officially become the *Espacio para la Memoria* (Space of Memory).

While ESMA's official designation as the Space of Memory stands as a physical refutation of the politics of "reconciliation", of the pardons and amnesty laws that until recently were in place, those vested with ESMA's future found themselves in the grip of a complex and perhaps interminable debate regarding the pedagogical mandate of this site. How to tell the story of ESMA? What narratives, what artefacts, and what relations between objects could ever do justice to the known and unknown stories of violence engraved within this site? What to remember? What to forget? How to draw links that point to the present and to the future? As Estela Schindel (2005) wrote at the time, "How to make use of those cursed buildings?... The proponents, who saw their dream fulfilled when President Kirchner turned the grounds over for the construction of a Museum of Never Again, now face the difficulty of reaching a consensus with what to tell in its interior" (p. 267; see also Schindel 2006). There is broad agreement that ESMA will have an educational function of some kind, "where the issue is about creating", as Horacio González puts it, "an experiential site with a pedagogical and reflective characteristic" (2005, p. 75). However, the proposals seeking to specify and concretize the broad pedagogical desires invested with this site are varied and often at odds with each other (Melendo 2006, pp. 90–91). The *Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo*, spearheaded by Estela Carlotto, proposed the construction of a museum whose contents were to be explicitly dedicated to remembering and honouring the disappeared. Others like the *Movimiento Ecueménico por los Derechos Humanos* and the *Liga Argentina por los Derechos Humanos* put forth that ESMA should be reconstructed exactly as it appeared during the repression when it was functioning as a clandestine torture centre. Hebe de Bonafini, the president of the *Madres de Plaza de Mayo*, rejected rendering ESMA into a "museum" or some fossilised replica and proposed instead that ESMA should become a functioning art school. The school would include, according to Bonafini, a site dedicated to learning about the "ideals of the 1970s" and the accomplishments and aspirations for social justice of the disappeared.

From the various proposals above, we can gather that ESMA is vested with a particular memorial charge, which is fraught with complex and often contesting attempts to give representational content to the past victimisation. The opening of ESMA as a memorial site mobilised a series of affective responses that exposed the contradictions and differences that inherently riddle the work of learning, remembering, and reconciling with a difficult past. It is apparent that this is a normative debate that is about the collective future as much, if perhaps not more than, the criminal past. Deciding what to tell inside and through ESMA inevitably involves, as Lila Pastoriza recognises, an intra- and inter-generational endeavour of facing the past and moving towards a different future (2005, p. 253). The difficulty involves bringing forth the disruptive force of the past in the present so that a political

community can ask after, “who are we” and “who will we become if we pursue this course of action” (Pitkin 1972, p. 205). In this chapter, I return to one of the more disputed issues in the discussion regarding the pedagogical mandate of ESMA. Namely, I engage the debate of whether to include artworks, installations, and an art gallery within ESMA. Working with some of the arguments offered by artists and critics—such as Marcelo Brodsky, Lila Pastoriza, and others—I consider how the placing and arrangement of art within ESMA can forge a particular *pedagogical act of memory*, rendering collective meaning to the difficult and highly charged memories that interrupt the politics of reconciliation.

The ESMA Debate: What Objects, What Relations Between Objects in This Site

One of the central questions in the debate regarding the pedagogical mandate of ESMA is whether art has any role to play here at all. Those concerned with promoting a more straightforward human rights education question the role of art. What role can be entrusted to art when it is primarily intended to deliver an aesthetic experience, an experience valued for its own sake rather than for social utility? Art’s concern with nuance, tensions, and interruption renders it suspect for educating and enlisting succeeding generations in the ethos of a human rights culture or for suitably commemorating past victims. Some others worry about the appropriateness of art in such a place, claiming that ESMA “speaks for itself”, and only minimal descriptive documentary information is appropriate.

One of the expressed concerns is that placing artistic works or a gallery space within the premises would alter and corrupt the actuality and historical authenticity of this site. For instance the *Asociación de Ex Detenidos Desaparecidos* are opposed to any adaptation or introduction of objects into the premises for any purposes other than to reconstruct and attest to how ESMA functioned as a detention, torture, and extermination centre. There are groups who propose preserving the details of only the most notorious places of torture and detention—like the Casino de Oficiales—while allowing other buildings within ESMA to be used and restructured for different purposes. However, the group of *Ex Detenidos Desaparecidos* put forwards that the whole 17 ha of the ESMA complex “should have no other use or function except as a material witness to genocide” (in Brodsky 2005, pp. 215, 216).

Echoing similar sentiments as the *Ex Detenidos Desaparecidos*, there are those who while questioning the role of art or the construction of an art gallery favour reconstructing an exact replica of how the detention centre operated. Groups like the *Movimiento Ecueménico por los Derechos Humanos* and the *Liga Argentina por los Derechos Humanos* put forth a pedagogical agenda that attempts to simultaneously recall the crimes committed within ESMA and promote human rights in the present by staging an exact, mimetic reconstruction of the day-to-day existence of the camp (Melendo 2006, p. 90). Still for others, the concern is with showing the

brute facts and attending the testimonial details that fill this site. According to Alejandro Kaufman (2005), no special emphasis or artefacts are required at ESMA: “Only a strict adherence to the testimonies and the proofs...its mission is not to understand or teach history, nor violence, but to show that and only that which took place here” (p. 249).

However, Pastoriza worries that confronting the testimonies and actual spaces of murder without mediation—through a “pedagogy of consternation”—can turn out to be overwhelming (p. 92). While certainly facing the testimonies and spaces attesting to the atrocities helps convey what happened, a naked encounter with the horror risks stupefying and paralysing visitors to this site. Horror is all that is left for the person facing a mimetic reconstruction of this place. Pastoriza wonders if the authoritarian logic that forecloses engagement and participation is not reproduced in such a limited space of interpretation and consternation. She writes, “Are not authoritarian practices reproduced if the museum limits itself to ‘showing’ what happened without providing opportunities for visitors to participate and engage different discourses?” (p. 92). Her question here echoes Jacques Derrida’s concern with the risks of assuming the past to be wholly given and transparent. According to Derrida (1994), our ability to receive the past is not truly possible without our present ability to work through, interpret, and engage with its multiple and interminable meanings. For “if the readability of a legacy were given, natural, transparent, univocal,” writes Derrida, “if it did not call for and at the same time defy interpretation, we would never have anything to inherit from it” (p. 16).

In another gesture of fidelity to the historical referent, there are those who propose, in a rather enigmatic manner, that ESMA should remain mostly empty, with minimal objects, and very few educational props or artifice, in order to allow the site to “speak for itself” and to so offer its indisputable yet unrepresentable evidence. Eduardo Molinari for his part points out that ESMA “requires nothingness, which should not be confused with oblivion” (in Brodsky 2005, p. 213). Rather than mere forgetfulness, Molinari mobilises an aesthetic of “nothingness” that would evoke the impossible representation of absence, which is an attempt to encircle the notorious and disturbing instances that exceed our understanding. The prevailing concern with the trope of “emptiness” and with clearing the way, as it were, so that ESMA can “speak for itself” is aptly conveyed in a conversation between the Argentine cultural critic Beatriz Sarlo and the German memorial artist Horst Hoheisel, in the magazine *Punto de Vista*. Speaking about how to appropriately place and integrate historical information within sites of trauma, Hoheisel tells of his disappointing visit to ESMA, where according to him there was already too much interference from the provisional objects and props conveying testimonies and information associated with this site. Hoheisel tells us that

These spaces where torture and murder took place are symbolically loaded and sufficiently evocative. The historical explanations need to be almost invisible... Likewise there is no need for sculptures or art objects here. While someone like Marcelo Brodsky... wants to add art in these spaces, my sense is that these spaces are sufficient in themselves. As one visits the Casino one senses the limits of what art could possibly add to this space. (2005, p. 22)

Between *Filling* and *Emptying* ESMA: The Potential of Art

The Argentine artist-photographer Marcelo Brodsky, whose own brother Fernando was at ESMA and remains one of the disappeared, notes that it is appropriate, as many have done, to ask whether art fits in this space marked by its bloody history (2005). The debates that surrounded the limits of representation in relation to the Holocaust, the “historian’s debate”, in Germany resound here too. Emptiness has a certain quality that provokes a form of attentiveness to this traumatic site that is personal and meditative. As Pastoriza admits, “Emptiness can invite one to imagine and to ponder spurring curiosity, engagement, and interpretation” (2005, p. 90). Emptiness can also help to foster a type of *negative witnessing* that may account for both the unrepresentable gaps that remain in people’s lives and, importantly, point to our own epistemological gaps. Such gaps are significant to acknowledge lest we too easily settle the disruptive force of this site.

However, Brodsky makes the point that in the precarious institutional environment of Argentina, “emptiness is not project enough” (p. 207), for it leaves the building vulnerable to future unknowns—to changes of mind and alternative social agendas that might be imposed on what are still politically volatile commitments. Noga Tarnopolsky captures the fragility and uncertainty that accompanies the ESMA project when she writes,

Nothing here is quite what it seems. This is a country of anti-memory, a country that consumes its own archivists. So despite what clearly appears to be the best of intentions, it remains entirely unclear what exactly a museum at ESMA will provide for Argentineans. What will be held there? (in Williams 2007, p. 70)

The possibility of putting the memorial task aside and severing this difficult engagement with past and future is ever more threatening, since the election of Mauricio Macri (on 24th June 2007) as head of the government of the city of Buenos Aires. Presently, there is a worry that Macri may come to stall or eventually fore-close ongoing memorial projects such as those taking place in and around ESMA.

Clearly, buildings do not “speak for themselves” or maintain their own political-cultural relevance; they require artifice and purposely placed objects to bring humans together to draw significance and forge a commitment to a desired future. For Brodsky, visual art does have a role to play in the pedagogical project that ESMA should be. Visual art, in a particular non-didactic form, has the ability to offer objects and open an interpretative space where evocative interminable questions around representation and relations to the past can emerge, rather than merely *presenting* the horrors that happened there. Such an approach is needed, Brodsky and others propose, because it guards the significance of ESMA and gives it a better chance for a future: “No one will want to repeatedly return to hell” (2005, p. 207).

In an email correspondence between various artists grappling with the potential role of art in ESMA, published in the Argentine art journal *Ramona* (2004), Nicolás Guagnini relates his difficult visit to a Nazi concentration camp in Mauthausen, Austria (pp. 57–58). He expressed that the visit was necessary but extremely arduous and that he did not want to ever again visit Mauthausen or other Nazi camps since the overwhelming horror encountered there was sufficiently exemplary. Guagnini

notes that the memorial space being proposed for ESMA has a chance to undertake a different pedagogical trajectory than the one employed at Mauthausen (2004, p. 57). According to Guagnini, certain parts of the premises—like the Casino de Oficiales (where torture was mainly carried out)—should be preserved through a museum-like treatment of the space. However, the Casino should not be the only or main way of bringing people to or through ESMA, since the information of death and torture here would overwhelm everything and eventually exhaust our interest to return. The possibility of thoughtfully arranging art objects, study, and cultural exhibitions, according to Guagnini, will mark this place with a trans-generational passageway and possibility—hence guarding ESMA’s future (p. 58). This gestures us “neither towards a traditional model of the museum nor towards the morbid reconstruction of extermination camps” but towards *arranging* a multifaceted site for ongoing interpretation and communication (Brodsky 2005, p. 44).

The point is that humans need sites that can invite and support complex mediation: objects, things, interpretative networks, and intricate structures that allow people to come together to appreciate the *work of inheritance* and the *still unsettled claims for justice*. Otherwise, without thoughtful arrangement and mediation—through a literal replica or statistical abstraction of the horror—we risk draining the world of significance and collapsing into a gnawing indifference. Rather than merely presenting the factual horrors of the past (which risks exhausting our interest), the very nuance of art, which necessarily asks us to take our time, opens a different sense of temporality, a different consideration of our time that has the ability to sustain a future relation with these issues.

So, certainly, the concern by varying rights groups to recover and preserve ESMA from the “politics of reconciliation” (a politics, recall, that threatens to demolish the specificity of this site) is an important undertaking. But there is also the worry, as expressed by those noting the significance of art within ESMA, that amid this recovery operation, we might threaten the very futurity of this site when we assume that the building “can simply speak for itself”. Similarly, when we render ESMA primarily as a site for conveying raw testimonial and historical information—supposedly without artifice—we risk obviating the troubling complexity of the past event into the swamp of horrible facts or, as Pastoriza puts it, into a paralysing “moral didactics” (p. 91). By privileging a pedagogical strategy that either *empties* the building or *fills* the building with supposedly *transparent horrible facts*, we make ESMA susceptible to either the *future whims of politics* (since emptiness is not project enough) or to a *numbing disinterest* with the event (since no one wants to return repeatedly to hell).

The pressing peril facing ESMA resides then in the way in which the pedagogical proposal to *empty* or *fill* ESMA, respectively, forecloses the present *public memorial potential* afforded by this site. To prioritise either a site of emptiness or a site filled with transparent facts disregards how the placing and relating of objects and the use of artifice within ESMA can forge collective scenes of orientation towards the past and future. What is at issue then is to recognise how ESMA potentially offers a site where publics can gather around the traces and objects of a forlorn past through *memorial artistic arrangements* that may allow individuals and publics to be powerfully affected and so apprehend how the past faces and still calls out to the present.

While Brodsky and others who fall on this side of the debate are loath to specifically prescribe what type of art should go into ESMA, the suggestion is that there is something about the very nuanced associations and interruptive potential evoked by art that opens us to the work of sustaining *interpretation*, which is so necessary for allowing the past to teach us and face us *as* the past—as something *different* than the present. Since visual art is opposed, in Brodsky’s opinion, to a straightforward encounter with information, the arrangement of artworks within ESMA can evoke a mode of attentiveness and memorial interpretative practice substantially different from the presentation of historic facts. Through the passage that art opens, the hope is that ESMA can become a complex and living space for reflection, learning, and dialogue that is not easily exhausted or rendered obsolete by passing political trends. The hope is also that this site can foster a *constellation* between the past and present, preserving and animating the particular relevance of the past across time, signalling an *unfinished legacy*. This would be a place for reshowing and reinserting the past into an elsewhere, allowing new configurations to emerge so that we may see *a unique event* instead of a continuous flow of equivalent events that disappear into the wreckage of yet another historical catastrophe.

It is not surprising that those who make a case for the potential of art within ESMA are often fond of citing Walter Benjamin (see Pastoriza 2004, 2005, p. 87). Within the proposals for art, there is thus an implicit appreciation for Benjamin’s theses on history (1969), which aim to cultivate the capacity of transmitting the past as a necessary concern for us in the present (see also Simon 2005). Against the reduction of the past into positivist historicism, which pretends “to grasp the past as it really was” (p. 255), Benjamin puts forwards an art of historical attentiveness that endeavours to rescue from oblivion that which threatens to disappear. The work of “rescuing” the past, or breathing political life back into it, does not proceed by grasping for some “pure” or “transparent” reconstruction of what actually was, rather the historical attentiveness that Benjamin speaks of appropriates the past as a “flash” or as an “image”—which emerges through a constellation—in order to blast open the continuum of history: to interrupt the continuum of unsettled injustices (pp. 261–262, 263).

For Benjamin, as well as for Brodsky, Pastoriza, and Guagnini, there is a dire concern to forge a complex living relation—a constellation, not consternation—with the remnants of an oppressed past that is decaying, leaving, and revealing itself in the traces and ruins of its passing. Rather than mimetically presenting the past or depositing raw, direct accounts of the horror (supposedly without arrangement) within a site like ESMA, the art of forging a constellation involves the historical work of decomposing the sequence of the past and recomposing it into a living interpretative relation with the present. Thus, it is through the art of arrangement (and not through the direct presentation or complete unrepresentability of the horror) that a constellation takes shape, illuminating a dialectical relationship between the past and present where different *tenses* confront rather than overwhelm each other. The proposal—in a Benjaminian tone—aspires to draw and arrange artistic works and objects within ESMA in order to reframe and expand what can be perceived in the present, evoking a “flash” or “image” that makes a different and ongoing relation to the past and future thinkable and imaginable.

We see here that commemoration need not solely revert to a didactic pedagogy: The arrangement of art can memorialise beyond merely illustrating the historical referent (and ceasing to be “art”) or falling into mere aesthetic pleasure (and ceasing to deliver a political-ethical thrust). The traces of a difficult past buried amid the ruin of time can be recovered and reconfigured through a space and arrangement that frames, focuses, and stimulates an affective concern for a common world. This practice forges a constellation between past and present, inventing a scene where that which risks falling into a purely private incommunicable horror (and thus forgotten) may become visible and sensible beyond the logic of consternation. It is the very affect of its public reinsertion and circulation that renders the numerous sufferings endured at ESMA into something more than a purely privative, isolated portrait of pain, into a composition that can bring together fragments that call out for justice beyond reconciliation.

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Chapter 10

Dialogical Hospitality as a Habitat for Peace

François Mifsud

The concept of hospitality as a welcoming act of a community or individual towards strangers takes different forms and styles according to different traditions, beliefs and cultures. What remains central in every act of hospitality is the catalyst dialogical activity that transforms an encounter between strangers into a host and guest relation. The dialogical relationality of hospitality is intrinsic to the ethical and political commitment between a host and a guest, which transcends all sorts of norms, ideologies and beliefs. The concept of hospitality in history has been subject to different interpretations and practices but always maintains the essential dialogical characteristic. In recent history, hospitality is experiencing not only an alteration in the practice but also in its meaning, which has given rise to a paradigm shift in hospitality. In this chapter, I will be attributing this paradigm shift to liberal and neoliberal thought where hospitality assumes a utilitarian instrumental role for the benefit of individuals' ideals and capital – thus jeopardising the essential dialogical character of hospitality. The purpose of this chapter is to rediscover the role of hospitality as a dialogical space of encounter between strangers, where my objective is to explore the motivation that animates and originates a dialogical hospitality and how dialogical hospitality can become a habitat for peace. I will be using the term dialogical hospitality to distinguish dialogical hospitality from other notions of hospitality and to emphasise the dialogical role that this notion of hospitality has.

The motivation force behind a dialogical hospitality in this chapter will be attributed to a more organic ontological perception of humanity on which every dialogical activity is founded. The ontological conception that I opted for is Paulo Freire's notion of *unfinishedness* which, in my view, explains better the motivation and thus the existence of a dialogical hospitality. To explore dialogical hospitality and its *unfinishedness* as ontological foundation, I will first explore the two opposing paradigms: the neoliberal paradigm of hospitality, which is that of tourist and entertaining

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industry, and the liberal paradigm of hospitality, which I will define as the charity model. The neoliberal and liberal paradigm conception of hospitality overemphasises individual autonomy at the expense of dialogical relationality and thus endangers the possibility of a habitat for peace. This lack of dialogical relationality in liberal and neoliberal conception of hospitality will lead me to reevaluate an older conception of hospitality whose final objective is a dialogical engagement with the other. Thus, a fundamental objective in this chapter is to show how a dialogical hospitality through the welcoming of strangers (as strangers) generates a dialogical epistemology. As a conclusion, I will focus on the necessity of non-essentialist ontology that makes possible a dialogical hospitality as habitat for peace. It is important to emphasise that dialogical hospitality does not offer conceptual and practical solutions for peace, but it offers a space where different notions of peace can be exchanged and communicated.

Hospitality in a Liberal and Neoliberal Paradigm Shift

The dominance of the neoliberal and globalised market discourse in Western society has contaminated the distinction between hospitality and entertaining by merging the two concepts into one. As a result, the notion of hospitality has become a subject of a paradigm shift that transformed hospitality into a synonym for tourist and entertaining industry. The discourse of hospitality is no longer self-defined by a voluntary and altruistic welcome of the other by individuals or community; indeed, it now has been transformed into a consumerist meaning of tourism and entertaining industry. Thus, hospitality in a neoliberal and globalised market loses its heterogenic space of encounter with the other and becomes a homogenising tool for the benefit of a neoliberal and globalised market.

The neoliberal and globalised market reinterpretation of hospitality is rooted in a human ontological perception generated by the liberal philosophical tradition. Thus, the paradigm shift in hospitality is just a tip of the iceberg that manifests a deeper and stronger liberal philosophical tradition that focuses on the individuality of human person, subjecting the social and relational dimension to the autonomy of the individual choices and decisions. The liberal thinking focuses almost exclusively on autonomous action (freedom) of every human individual, where the individual autonomy relies on a private/public and individual/social dichotomy. Consequently, individual morality, faith and ideology – labelled as private – are excluded from the political and the social realms which are to be considered public. ‘Individual morality is for liberals a private question and each one must be able to organize his life as he intends.’ The main role of the public and governmental structures is to protect and to enhance the autonomy of the individual. Thus, in liberal thought, the guaranty and protector of individual autonomy is the government, whilst in a neoliberal ideology the guaranty and protection of individual autonomy is shifted to the market economy; consequently, both market economy and social and governmental structures become subject to the individual’s autonomy.

This liberal dichotomy between individual and society originates in the Cartesian epistemological question, where Descartes (through his epistemological questions) shifts the epistemological authority from the social institutions (both secular and religious) to the individual person, establishing a new (modern) philosophical approach. Thus, epistemology in modern philosophy becomes more an individual person's pursuit and less an organic relational and dialectic activity. The Cartesian epistemological dilemma echoed itself as a paradigm for all the other disciplines and discourses. Chantal Mouffe, whilst commenting on Norberto Bobbio's works, explains that the individual/social epistemological dichotomy breaks into the political discourse with the notion of 'social contract'. Rousseau's notion of 'social contract' in line with the Cartesian social/individual epistemological dichotomy initiates a transfer of political authority from the society to the individual. 'The modern idea of social contract represents... a Copernican revolution in the relationship between individual and society because it indicates the end of an organicist and holistic conception of society and the birth of individualism.' The liberal philosophical tradition holds on to this social/individual dichotomy by identifying the individual as the object and subject of political activity.

The liberal tradition does not exclude activities like hospitality, but every human activity was reinterpreted as a focus on individual autonomy, thus bring about a weakening in the social relationality. This less organic and relational ontological model of human person became a springboard for a latter neoliberal ideal. The object and animating force of every human activity in a liberal and a neoliberal ideal are always the individual autonomy; the key difference between the two ideologies is the means through which individual autonomy is expressed: For the liberals, it is through ethical and political practice – carried out through the public/private dichotomy – whilst for the neoliberals, it is through the free market ideal.

Thus, hospitality in a liberal and neoliberal context had to be reinterpreted to accommodate these ideals. In a liberal context, hospitality adapted an individual charity model, where the starting point of hospitality practice becomes the individual private ethical and political ideal, thus abandoning the reciprocal dialogical character. We can see this shift with the foundations of institutions of hospitality privately run and focusing more on the *aid* and *services* ideal and less on the dialogical relational between the guest and the host. As mentioned earlier, the neoliberal context animated by the free market ideal has reinterpreted hospitality as a tourist and entertaining industry. As a result, when neoliberal ideals have merged into the notion of hospitality, it has jeopardised the dialogical and relational element of hospitality, transforming hospitality into an arena of individual consumption. Hence, the reciprocal relation of guest and host in a neoliberal hospitality becomes mediated by capital consumption, transforming the host into client. Both the liberal and neoliberal hospitality paradigm shifts have become the dominant models of hospitality in today's Western culture, alienating but not eliminating a dialogical model of hospitality.

A Dialogical Hospitality

The practice of hospitality as tourism and entertaining industry subsists on the notion of entertaining that assumes an acquaintance (or epistemological preconception) of the guest. The entertaining objective is in *pleasing* the guest, where *pleasing* can be performed only through a preceding epistemology/acquaintance of the guest. Since hospitality as entertaining subsists in this preconception or epistemology of the guests, hosting as entertaining becomes an occasional activity that demands an occasional planned set-up. Contrary to the entertaining notion of hospitality, a dialogical hospitality entails a willing acceptance of an unexpected arrival of a guest who is a stranger. The different objective held by dialogical hospitality and entertaining hospitality leads to differences in practice. A dialogical hospitality is based on a sharing of the *mundane* life of the host, whilst an entertaining hospitality is centred on an occasional set-up that screens the host's *mundane* from the guests.

...entertainment involves 'putting on something for people,' creating the impression of 'perfect people in a perfect house.' Hospitality...puts the focus elsewhere, asking 'How can I extend myself for you without having all my things put up together first?'... It's being willing to say, 'Come in – as we live.'

The liberal charity model hospitality is based on a 'mission statement' (object) which just like the entertaining hospitality supposes a preconception and an epistemology of the guest. Though in the charity model hospitality the guest might be unknown as individual by the host, the guest is not a stranger because her/his needs are already defined and presented to the host. Moreover, although the charity model hospitality and the tourist and entertaining industry hospitality model claim that the guest is the objective of the practice of hospitality, the non-dialogical relation with the guests and the host's power to interpret and determine the needs or wants of the guest position the host as the object and as the subject of hospitality.

The liberal and neoliberal hospitality paradigm shift, though invasive, has not obscured the more traditional dialogical practice of hospitality. The tradition of hospitality is defined by many different cultures and traditions as a welcoming act of a community or individual to strangers. This welcoming act of hospitality has challenged for centuries the demarcation of cultures, traditions, faiths and ideologies by offering an asylum to strangers. Though hospitality is expressed in many cultures and traditions as a mundane activity disguised under many small acts of encounter and welcoming of the other, in many historical instances, hospitality exerted its privileged 'extraterritorial' status through the giving of sanctuary, through which laws and traditions were surpassed by an ethical or moral ideal that has initiated a dialogical encounter with the other. Thus, the practice of hospitality through its sanctuary faculties has managed to create a dialogical *oasis*, even in situations of conflicts and animosity. Where the privilege of sanctuary offered by hospitality has not been recognised by the political powers, a dialogical hospitality has transgressed and contested these powers through subversion; a recent historical example is the hospitality to Jews in Nazi Germany and Nazi-occupied territories by many non-conformist people.

Whilst traversing all sorts of frontiers and borders, dialogical hospitality has offered a dialogical space of encounter with the other. This encounter with the other in a dialogical hospitality goes beyond the entertaining or the attending of the other. The ethical and political commitment of an individual or a community to welcome the other involves and affects the whole way of life, both of the hosts and of the guest. Thus, the ethical and political commitment for the other in a dialogical hospitality cannot be justified through an epistemological (or a preconceived) understanding of the other, because a dialogical hospitality precedes the preconception of the other. Though in some practices of hospitality there might be an acquaintance of the guest, such an acquaintance or knowledge is not assumed. That is, the notion of dialogical hospitality does not prejudge the nature and qualities of the other. The understanding of the other is not an a priori one; it arises from and through the encounter with the other. Thus, the practice of a dialogical hospitality consists of an encounter between strangers and a welcome to a stranger as stranger. Therefore, a dialogical hospitality is motivated by the unexpected and thus subjective encounter with the stranger, through which hospitality becomes the catalyst of a new and fresh dialogical relation. Derrida explains that this encounter with the unknown other (stranger) is an intrinsic aspect of unconditional or absolute hospitality. Accordingly, Derrida authenticates hospitality through the absence of knowledge where at the end, in a dialogical hospitality, both the guest and the host are strangers to each other.

...absolute hospitality requires that I open up my home and that I give not only to the foreigner (provided with a family name, with the social status of being a foreigner, etc.) but to the absolute, unknown, anonymous other, and that I *give place* to them, that I let them come, that I let them arrive, and take place in the place I offer them, without asking of them either reciprocity (entering into a pact) or even their names.

Every encounter with the other in dialogical hospitality brings an epistemological newness that cannot be justified with an a priori or a posteriori epistemology. Both a priori and a posteriori epistemologies situate their epistemology in an *expectation*: An a priori epistemological *expectation* is in a pre-experiential, whilst for an a posteriori, the epistemology *expectation* is related to the experience. Since dialogical hospitality subsists in the *surprising* encounter with the other, the only expectation to be expected is the ethical and political commitment for the (unknown) other to be welcomed. Unlike hospitality in the tourism and entertaining industry and the charity model, the object in dialogical hospitality is not the host who prescribes the practice of hospitality but the subjective dialogical encounter with the other. Thus, the philosophical justification (explanation) of the ethical and political commitment for the other in the context of dialogical hospitality transcends the Cartesian epistemological centrality of the self and opts for a more organic relational and ontological justification.

***Unfinishedness* as the Ontological Basis for Dialogical Hospitality**

Freire's notion of *unfinishedness* offers the ideal ontological setting or foundation that explains the impetus of a dialogical hospitality. Freire defines the notion of *unfinishedness* as 'natural' which means that it is identifiable with all living things.

For Freire, human beings participate in this 'natural' notion of *unfinishedness* in virtue of 'life' that humanity shares with the rest of creation. 'It is natural because unfinishedness is integral to the phenomenon of life itself, which besides women and men includes the cherry trees in my garden and the birds that sing in their branches.' The notion of *unfinishedness* as human ontology implies that all human actions subsist in it. *Unfinishedness* as ontological subsistence for human life and actions does not predestine humanity in a fatalistic formula. Freire observes that *unfinishedness* in humanity is expressed in a distinctive way from the rest of living beings, for in the human person, there is an awareness of her/his *unfinishedness*. The process that brings about the human person into an awareness of her/his *unfinishedness* is described by Freire as conscientization or consciousness: '...conscientization is natural to unfinished humanity that is aware of its unfinishedness.' Thus, conscientization transforms *unfinishedness* into a creative force that emancipates.

For Freire, the human person can only come to a conscientization of her/his *unfinishedness* in relation to the other's *unfinishedness*. Thus, conscientization of *unfinishedness* is generated through a dialogical relation between human beings. This process of conscientization of the *unfinishedness* is achieved through the mutual and relational activity of learning and teaching. Education for Freire becomes a dialogical expression founded on the *unfinishedness* of human nature. Consequently, every dialogical activity (hospitality included) becomes an educational occasion that engages every participant in both roles of teaching and learning. Accordingly, human *unfinishedness* expressed in consciousness becomes a dialogical motivation that generates a relational reaching out, through the welcoming of the other in hospitality.

The best starting point...is the unfinishedness of our human condition. It is in this consciousness that the very possibility of learning, of being educated, resides. It is our immersion in this consciousness that gives rise to a permanent movement of searching, of curiosity interrogation that leads us not only to an awareness of the world but also to a thorough, scientific knowledge of it. This permanent movement of searching creates a capacity for learning not only in order to adapt to the world but especially to intervene, to re-create, and to transform it.

The notion of *unfinishedness* situates human life in a constant state of relational dependence, where *unfinishedness* reinterprets the definition of individual autonomy no longer as self-sufficient but as a relational consciousness. It is through this relational consciousness that the individual person engages in a dialogical activity, animated by ethical and political ideals. *Unfinishedness* contests the liberal dualistic conception of 'private/public' as a guarantee of individual autonomy. The dialogical action that is motivated by *unfinishedness* rests on a dynamic ongoing process of inclusivity that cannot be held in any form of boundaries (which includes the private/public boundaries). Though *unfinishedness* does not exclude an 'us/them' dichotomy, the 'us/them' dichotomy boundaries are always resilient to the dialogical force of *unfinishedness*.

The dialogical contribution of Freire's *unfinishedness* does not only affect the present human relationality but it creates a space within the present for future possibility. *Unfinishedness* generates a continuous *unsatisfying* disposition that instigates a constant desire in human beings to go beyond the present. As a consequence, the *unsatisfying* effect of *unfinishedness* becomes a source of critical and creative activity that makes change possible for a future possibility. *Unfinishedness* for Freire

is what makes the human being go beyond the *status quo* and dares to go for *more*, *beyond* of the present situation.

I like being human because I live between the possibility of changing and the difficulty of changing. It is living the dialectic of being able to and not being able to that satisfies my presence of surpassing the condition of object and reaching the condition of subject, maker of the world....

Dialogical hospitality manifests and confirms *unfinishedness* as its ontological foundation. Thus, dialogic hospitality reveals the human ontological dimension of *unfinishedness* in its dual dimensions of relational dependence and as a future possibility. The future possibility element in dialogical hospitality is manifested through hospitality's subversive character. The capacity of 'sanctuary' in hospitality transgresses present norms and conditioning powers for a future possibility. Thus, dialogical hospitality through its 'extraterritorial influence' transgresses the present constrains generated by exclusive ideals and beliefs and offers an inclusive space for the excluded stranger. The dialogical engagement with the excluded stranger in dialogical hospitality becomes a denial of the present situation for a future possibility. Thus, dialogical hospitality's welcoming of stranger is always expressed as a trespassing action on the present situation by the future possibility. The *unsatisfying* disposition generated by *unfinishedness* is what motivates in dialogical hospitality the transcendence from the present. The guest who seeks a better situation in hospitality (because *unsatisfied*) from her/his present situation and the host who is willing to subvert present norms to welcome the guest generate a dialogical occasion of encounter that transcends the present for a future possibility.

Relational dependence as expressed by dialogical hospitality rests on the ontological character of *unfinishedness*. The relational dependence in dialogical hospitality is not limited to a prescribed community as for instance proper family, tribe, village or nation state, but it is open to strangers that do not form part of the community. Thus, the concept of relational dependence in a dialogical hospitality transcends the community and transforms the *us/them* borders into a means for a relationship. Jacques Derrida observes that the relational dependence between the *us* (proper community) is constituted on the relation with the *them/other*. He explains the relational dependence using the metaphor of the house, where a house (*us*) is not a house without the door and the windows, a sign and symbol of openness to the external other.

...in order to constitute the space of a habitable house and a home, you also need an opening, a door and windows, you have to give up a passage to the outside world [*l'étranger*]. There is no house or interior without a door or windows. The monad of a home has to be hospitable in order to be *ipse*, itself at home, habitable at-home in the relation of the self to itself.

Non-essentialist Ontology

Arguing for Freire's notion of *unfinishedness* as an ontological foundation of dialogical hospitality creates a hermeneutic challenge: How to conceive *unfinishedness* as ontological basis without falling into essentialism, which would contradict the

dialogical aspect of hospitality. Given that essentialism, by definition, demands an imposition of an ideal classified as true and the exclusion of others defined as false or less true, essentialism does not permit a sincere dialogical activity. Concurrently negating any form of ontology can lead to what Chantal Mouffe defines as ‘fragmentation’ essentialism, a universalistic relativistic discourse that is aware of plurality but cannot perceive a relational activity within plurality; thus, dialogue is reduced into a *gallery* of diversity without a dialogical engagement. Combining the notions ‘fragmentation’ and ‘essentialism’, Mouffe demonstrates the contradictory character of relativism, where the non-dialogical engagement of relativistic (fragmentary) thought perpetuates an essentialist discourse disguised as plural.

...pluralism must also be distinguished from the postmodern conception of the fragmentation of the social, which refuses to grant the fragments any kind of relational identity. The perspective I maintain consistently rejects any kind of essentialism – either of the totality or of the elements – and affirms that neither the totality nor the fragments possess any kind of fixed identity, prior to the contingent and pragmatic form of their articulation.

Freire’s concept of *unfinishedness* provides an ideal ontology for dialogical hospitality because it recognises and professes a truth that is not finite, which denotes a process for *more*. Accordingly, the primary truth of *unfinishedness* as ontology is that of *lack*; that is, the truth on which one’s epistemology is founded is not sufficient in itself, and thus, it is in need of the *more* that subsists in the relating with the other. Now, even though epistemology, in *unfinishedness*, subsists in the relation of the self with the other, this does not make the relation with the other a utilitarian one (that is, one in which one relates with the other only for the purpose of benefiting or profit): since the epistemology of *unfinishedness* is ontologically grounded in the relation, the subject is neither the self nor the other but the dialogical relation between the self and the other.

Dialogue is thus an existential necessity. And since dialogue is the encounter in which the united reflection and action of the dialoguers are addressed to the world which is to be transformed and humanized, this dialogue cannot be reduced to the act of one person’s ‘depositing’ ideal in another, nor can it become a simple exchange of ideas to be ‘consumed’ by the discussants. Nor yet is it a hostile, polemical argument between those who are committed neither to the naming of the world, nor to the search for truth, but rather to the imposition of their own truth. Because dialogue is an encounter among women and men who name the world, it must not be a situation where some name on behalf of others. It is an act of creation; it must not serve as a crafty instrument for the domination of one person by another.

The merging of the *lack* with truth and the relationality between the self and the other as epistemological subject is what makes *unfinishedness* a non-essentialist ontology on which dialogical hospitality is founded. Hospitality as ‘tourism and entertaining’ industry and as ‘charity model’ is motivated through an epistemology of the other (guest) by the subject, that is, the host, whereas in a dialogical hospitality, the epistemological subject and object are not fixed but in a constant movement of alternation. The epistemological alternation movement of subject and object in dialogical hospitality arises from the ontology of *unfinishedness*, where both the guest and the host lack an epistemology of the other and are in a constant process of an epistemological initiation.

The epistemological alternation of *unfinishedness* offers to the other (guest) in a dialogical hospitality a more protagonist role because the other is free to act according to her/his otherness and is not assimilated in the self of host. The first instance perspective of the tourist and entertaining industry and the charity model hospitality is to accommodate the guest, but the guest is always accommodated according to the criterion that conditions the guest to the host, whereas in a dialogical hospitality, a criterion of hospitality is negotiated between the guest and the host. Thus, in dialogical hospitality, the conditions and criteria of hospitality are subject to the uniqueness and subjective encounter between strangers that are both the host and the guest. The ontology of *unfinishedness* motivates in hospitality the dialogical role between strangers by transforming dialogical hospitality into space for a relational and an epistemological encounter with the other, thus creating the possibility for peace.

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Chapter 11

The Road to Inclusion: Citizenship and Participatory Action Research as a Means of Redressing “Otherness” Among Homeless Youth

David Alan Goldberg

Mainstream social, political, economic, and cultural systems set up a class of others—people who are marginalized according to certain criteria, usually deviance from “accepted” norms. In practical terms, others are excluded or limited from participating in many social structures and practices. For instance, homeless youth, the subject of this chapter, are excluded from many educational opportunities, employment appropriate to their abilities, stable housing, and consistent resources to help them transition off the streets. In many instances, their struggle with poverty and the rupture with home and the life they knew affect peaceful relations with the community. To survive the streets, some resort to drugs, gangs, violence, and sex-trade work—either as victims or perpetrators—thereby reinforcing their othered status.

Any democratic and socially just peace education program in schools must necessarily reach out to homeless youth. New ideas about participation are needed that include the youths’ voices and perspectives. Incorporating a philosophy of citizenship that welcomes *all* citizens to participate in decisions affecting their community would require us to rethink both our assumptions about homeless youth and about the relationship between homeless youth and citizenship. This chapter argues that participatory research methods that foster involvement, voice, and participation are integral to educational practices, especially those pertaining to marginalized groups. In such a process, homeless youth will benefit from vital opportunities to redefine themselves as citizens.

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The Scale of the Problem

Because of their nomadic nature, varied living spaces and places, and differing definitions of “homelessness,” it is difficult to estimate the size of the homeless youth population precisely (Kidd 2003; Glasser and Bridgman 1999). High-end estimates put the number at about two million in the United States (Rew 2003) and about 150,000 in Canada (Public Health Agency of Canada 2006). Although many homeless youth on the street may appear “normal” to a casual observer, more detailed observation suggests otherwise. Indeed, their status as outsiders—as “other”—derives from lack of contact with parent(s) or guardian(s), formal education, and apprenticeship or career. Many are also “othered” by feelings of displacement and unrelenting anxiety (Kidd 2004; Haley and Roy 1999) about their immediate and long-term futures. Compounding matters, many of these youth have psychological, emotional, and health issues particular to their circumstances.

Dashed Hopes

Youth rarely become homeless on a whim. More often than not, they try to remain with their family, even under difficult circumstances. Their hopes that things will improve can be dashed by parent(s) and or guardian(s) who are unable to support them emotionally or who may neglect or outright abuse them. Since family is a fundamental unit of social attachment, many youths are loathe to abandon it—the more so since many have negligible resources and limited experience surviving on dangerous and unpredictable streets (Bender et al. 2007). As a result, they may first try to couch-surf with friends (Kurtz et al. 2000) or squat in some type of semipermanent shelter. Invariably, though, the impositions and impracticalities of couch-surfing make it a short-term proposition at best. As well, abandoned buildings and public spaces are patrolled to evict trespassers.

Running from Home to the Streets?

Do disaffected youth choose the streets? It may indeed appear that some are homeless by choice, thereby ignoring, rejecting, and repudiating the mainstream practices of family life. But based on my personal experience running an educational program for homeless youth in a shelter as well as from scholarly research, the overwhelming majority of homeless youth flee *from* a home rather than *to* the streets (Kurtz et al. 2000; Earls and Carlson 1999). Such youth run from family chaos, parental neglect, or physical and psychological abuse. Extreme poverty, unresolved substance addictions among parent(s) or guardian(s) or unmanageable substance addictions (Haley and Roy 1999) of the youths themselves, maladjustment to divorce, and new family arrangements can also lead to the streets. Other factors may include parental inability to cope with mental-health issues of a child (Haley and Roy 1999). Unyielding

parental opposition to a child's peer group, sexual orientation (Finley 2003), or dropping out of school are other factors that may drive youth away from their homes.

Surviving on the Streets

Homeless youths face numerous challenges pertaining to their physical and emotional well-being (Karabanow 2004/08). Their mortality rate (Roy et al. 1998) is 12–40 times greater than that of the general population. Suicide-attempt rates are reportedly 20–40% higher (Yoder 1999, cited in Kidd 2003). Because belongings can be easily lost, stolen, or misplaced, identification documents are often unavailable (Rew and Horner 2003; Panter-Brick 2002). Since a nomadic lifestyle can interfere with medical appointments, homeless youths are susceptible to infections and dental hygiene problems that can compromise their health. Erratic and insufficient nutrition (Kidd 2007) elevates the risk of a compromised immune system. Lack of a fixed address can preclude a youth from meaningful employment. And schools are often ill prepared to deal with young people who may be overwhelmed by the chaos, uncertainty, and emotional challenges of dealing with a dysfunctional and stressful situation at home. Under such pressures, many youths can become disruptive and act out in a variety of contexts, including in school, or disengage and shut down entirely (Kidd 2007; Karabanow 2004/08). Under the unrelenting demands of standardized testing and publicized test scores, youths may withdraw from school altogether, and the schools themselves may be relieved to be rid of students with disruptive and difficult-to-resolve problems.

Homeless youth's physical, emotional, and psychological challenges require assistance on many levels. Coming to terms with the trauma of a rupture with the family is an ongoing issue. Often, the shame of being rejected at home is so substantial that youths may depart from their communities as well. Hearing of friends who still live at home and are proceeding with their lives and goals, strengthened by some degree of parental nurture, only intensifies their feelings of abandonment. On the streets, the otherness of homeless youth is evident to them when they observe young people in some type of supportive relationship with parental figures. Without a plan, money, emotional support, and available counsel from a well-intended adult, many of these youths struggle (Haley and Roy 1999). In a context of limited educational, career, and housing options for homeless youth, stereotypes project them as deficient, vagrant, lazy, unintelligent, illiterate, and dishonest (Bender et al. 2007; Finley 2003; Panter-Brick 2002).

Participatory Research: Using Youth's Lived Experiences as a Means of Empowerment

At issue is how to support homeless youth with something that does more than address their anxiety and struggle of surviving another day. Participatory research may be one answer. In a participatory context, all individuals can use their lived

experience, intelligence, and creativity to address their marginalization, thereby addressing issues of otherness. Participatory research is inclusive because it values what everyone knows—their lived experiences—as fundamental to its methodology. Denzin (2004) asserts how research method in general involves exploration of self in relationship to life issues: “Life and method are inextricably intertwined. One learns about method by thinking about how one makes sense of one’s life” (p. 449). By making personal experience foundational, barriers are reduced for marginalized groups that want to research their lived experiences and explore possible avenues to social change from that research. Freire (1970/1998) calls this process of inquiry and reflection, “invite[ing] the people to grasp with their minds the truth of their reality” (p. 514). With a participatory approach, a self-perpetuating community can evolve—participation invites community, community invites participation.

Homeless Youth and Citizenship

The concept of citizenship underpinning participatory research is based on the rights to participate in meaningful decisions and practices that citizens enjoy in a political democracy. Hart (1992) proposes that youth participation involves “shared decisions which affect young people’s lives and the life of the community in which they live” (cited in de Winter and Noom 2003, p. 326). To be able to address the circumstances of their lives is a fundamental right of citizenship for marginalized groups. That right is also essential for them to analyze the sources of their oppression as a means to understanding themselves (and perhaps then helping others to do the same). The deficit model of homeless youth as lazy, criminal, deviant, and having diminished abilities overlooks the fact that they have rights as citizens and that they are capable of identifying and acting in their own self-interest, drawing on the resilience, intelligence, and creativity they display to overcome their numerous physical, emotional, and health challenges (Bender et al. 2007; Hyde 2005; Finley 2003; Rew and Horner 2003).

Citizenship theory aside, Giroux (2003) argues that children have nominal rights in a neoliberal framework:

Increasingly, children seem to have no standing in the public sphere as citizens and as such are denied a fair sense of entitlement and agency. Children have fewer rights than almost any other group and fewer institutions protecting these rights. Consequently, their voices and needs are almost completely absent from the debates, policies, and legislative practices that are constructed in terms of their needs... In public life, however, children seem absent from any discourse about the future and the responsibilities this implies for adult society. Rather, children appear as objects defined through the debasing language of advertising and consumerism. (p. 554)

Giroux’s argument about the precariousness of children’s citizenship rights is analogous to the situation of homeless youth, whose voices and perspectives are also largely absent from mainstream power structures. Besides objectifying children in a context of “advertising and consumerism,” academic research can also objectify

subjects by denying, curtailing, or minimizing their role as co-participants in research that attempts a critical analysis of their lives and circumstances. The unequal relationships between researchers and disenfranchised communities can materially reinforce power dynamics that subordinate marginalized groups and perpetuate social inequalities and injustices (Finley 2003; Gaventa and Cornwall 2001). Oppressive circumstances can remain unchallenged in research because “academic researchers have acquired a penchant for positioning themselves at a safe distance from the brunt of bitter reality” (Earls and Carlson 1999, p. 71). Lilla Watson, an Australian aboriginal educator, speaks trenchantly to the necessity of researcher and researched community uniting to avoid the limitations of traditional approaches, “If you’ve come to help me, you’re wasting your time. But if you’ve come because your liberation is bound up with mine, then let us work together” (cited in Wadsworth 2001, p. 430).

Without substantially challenging unequal power relations between researcher and marginalized community, knowledge that purports to be objective science can be diverted for purposes of social control (Clough 1992, p. 134, cited in Denzin 2004, p. 465). In his 2009 article, “Deconstructing research: paradigms lost,” Trifonas asserts: “... what has been at stake with respect to the purpose of all research is a mode of knowledge control” (p. 302). Reflecting on her own control of research subjects in her early academic career, Wadsworth (2001) describes how she shifted her focus from an “all-knowing ‘we’” to a more facilitating position:

My discomfort grew, during the early years of my career, with the mantle of the scientific ‘We’ and the presumptive and ultimately unscientific ventriloquism that it authorized: of speaking for the lives and realities of ‘our’ subjects without them being actively present in that process. The discomfort propelled many of us to shift from being the deemers and certifiers of Truth, to being the facilitators of inquiry processes for others to come to their own truths-for-the-purposes. (p. 420)

A citizenship model, on the other hand, recognizes youth agency, creativity, and intelligence—in short, the ability of young people to analyze and define their own realities. Indeed, there is a political model of children as citizens who can, with resources, act in their own interests:

According to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, children are citizens (Limber and Flekkoy 1995). The idea that they are simply immature creatures whose needs must be met by parents or other charitably inclined adults is becoming obsolete. As citizens, children have rights that entitle them to the resources to protect and promote their development. (Earls and Carlson 1999, p. 72)

The idea of “children as citizens” has significant implications in terms of their participation in research. If young people are viewed as capable individuals with a “right to resources” instead of as victims and dependents, they can contribute in meaningful ways to research that concerns their own lives. Consistent with Denzin’s (2004) notion of a research method to make sense of one’s life, in a participatory action research (PAR) process, youth could shape subsequent action by disseminating their findings through such means as photovoice, theater, narrative, social media, and performance. In a participatory action research project, young people themselves

guide the search for explanation and understanding and through these establish conditions for social change.

In Kidd's (2003) research, homeless youth identified "capable people" as those who have "agency and options" (p. 31). Such qualities would foster the hope and sense of self-efficacy that are instrumental for homeless youth to pursue other options beyond living on the street. Moreover, participation in a group process would be especially significant to homeless young people, who, after a traumatic rupture with family and disrupted ties to a community, may have difficulty trusting and making connections with others (de Winter and Noom 2003; Kidd 2003; Rew and Horner 2003; Whitmore and McKee 2001). Of import for educational endeavors, working with peers in a participatory environment could serve as a model to counter the abusive and disrespectful experiences homeless youth may have had with family members and other adults (Kidd 2007; Ensign 2003). In participatory action research, marginalized groups name their realities, contexts, fears, and dreams without having to respond to a researcher's predetermined agenda. Such an environment of critical analysis invokes Freire's concept of literacy and empowerment: "reading the word to read the world."

Participatory Action Research as an Instrument for Social Change

While analysis and articulation may be helpful to come to terms with experience, experience in and of itself has limited power to effect social change. In reference to the limitations of experience in a broader context of social change, Myles Horton (1990) asserts, "There's a time when people's experience runs out" (Horton and Freire 1990, p. 128). The dichotomy between experience and action is a catalyst for participatory action research (PAR). Homeless youth may have difficult traumatic experiences to process and resolve, but clearly their experiences can change nothing without wider societal understandings and policy shifts regarding their access to education, housing, and community. For social change to occur, it is never sufficient for an aggrieved population simply to understand its own structural or ideological problems and barriers; a wider, collective approach is necessary for strategic action (Kroeker 1996, cited in Kidd and Kral 2005, p. 189).

Methodologically, PAR engages a specific community, discovers and explores issues of interest, and acts upon them (Kidd and Kral 2005). A useful definition of action is "the process of change in a particular situation" (Noffke 1997, p. 309). One example of experience and action working together is found in Wang et al.'s (2000) photovoice project with a homeless population. In this project, participants used photovoice, "a process by which people can identify, represent, and enhance their community through a specific photographic technique" to convey their lived experience (Wang and Burris 1997, cited in Wang et al. 2000, p. 82). To challenge the public's assumptions and biases, Wang's et al. (2000) group acted by contacting the media and art galleries to disseminate their own photographs, which depicted their daily realities as homeless people. In this case, the resulting action

and the corresponding receptivity shown to them changed the lives of the participants, empowering them in the process. As well, some of the audience at the gallery questioned their own perceptions of homeless people, emerging with a more nuanced understanding of these people's skills and abilities to cope with their daily struggles.

The action component leads PAR in a different direction than much academic research that focuses on answering a researcher's preselected questions for the purpose of gathering and disseminating knowledge. Richardson (2000) asserts that traditional research is usually read by a few and is intended to benefit the researcher herself (p. 924). Commenting on academic theorizing for building an "intellectual class hierarchy," hooks (1994) writes: "It is evident that one of the many uses of theory in academic locations is in the production of an intellectual class hierarchy where the only work deemed truly theoretical is work that is highly abstract, jargonistic, difficult to read, and containing obscure references" (p. 64). As a result, groups can remain marginalized because of their inability to participate in an "abstract, ... difficult to read and obscure" discourse, particularly regarding matters of import to their communities (Maguire 1987).

Issues of Participation in a PAR Project

Traditional academic research requires research subjects to partake in an agenda and process they did not shape and one whose goals and objectives they cannot *significantly* alter. Such research is often a "one-off," time-limited inquiry that can have limited value regarding the longer-term needs of research, reflection, and social change (Wadsworth 2001). Elaborating on a "one-off" approach, McIntyre (2008) describes this research as "an intrusion; ... just another researcher engaged in a 'drive-by' research project that benefits the researcher and leaves the participants with nothing" (p. 13). Without any significant input in the research design, the research subjects effectively become *objects* of the research. This process of objectification mirrors and reinforces the dysfunctional relationships between marginalized groups and empowered ones (Maguire 1987). Ennew observes that a patronizing attitude toward street youth is inimical to a participatory process: "... street and working children are not objects of concern, but people. They are vulnerable but not incapable. They need respect, not pity" (1994, p. 35, cited in Panter-Brick 2002, p. 156). Objectification of subjects has profound consequences on research by impeding voice or directing voice to other purposes besides empowering the subjects. On this issue, hooks (1989) cites Audre Lorde: "Only as subjects can we speak. As objects, we remain voiceless—our beings defined and interpreted by others" (p. 12).

Those who are merely objects are denied meaningful ownership of the project's aims (McIntyre 2008). Regarding the distinction between involvement and participation, McTaggart (1997) writes: "People often are involved in research, but rarely are they participants with real ownership of research theory and practice" (p. 29). The PAR model, on the other hand, undermines the tendencies of traditional research

to involve subjects in actualizing the plans of others (Maguire 1987). It also foregrounds the political nature of all research methodologies, particularly with regard to issues of power and advantage between the researcher and the researched (McTaggart 1997). Analyzing power relationships in the context of PAR and peace education could create new understandings and approaches to groups that are traditionally regarded as the other.

In the case of homeless youth, ownership of research means, as Freire says, “they learn to do by doing it” (cited in McTaggart 1997, p. 5). The youth’s decisions on how they conduct the process, and what they learn from it, may lead them to act for changes that can alter their circumstances. Such research-based action would transform these youth from passive objects filtered through the perspective of researchers into capable subjects acting in their own interests (Maguire 1987).

Having witnessed youths’ passion and intelligence in programs addressing issues of importance to them, it is evident that homeless youth participation is less problematic when they codesign a study and feel a sense of ownership in it. Dispelling the myth of disinterest in this sector, Ensign (2003) writes: “Most of the homeless young people I have worked with are... highly creative, articulate and eager to contribute their ideas” (p. 46). Defying the notion of a lazy, disinterested, and disengaged homeless population, none of the homeless participants dropped out of Wang et al.’s (2000) photovoice project. A participatory researcher needs the confidence that *all* groups can reflect on and contribute to social change. McIntyre (2008) cites Freire (1971): “To be a good [participatory researcher] means above all to have faith in people; to believe in the possibility that they can create and change things” (p. 69).

Fostering Voice in PAR

As a result of marginalization and disenfranchisement, homeless youth may not readily have their interests represented and their voices heard (McIntyre 2008). Through PAR, marginalized groups can “breathe their stories into life” (McIntyre 2008, p. xvii). On the subject of breathing one’s stories into life as a means of coming to terms with them, a research subject in a Belfast study commented:

If you are going to have any deep healing you have to get some expression of truth even if it is only my truth. It doesn’t have to be your truth. It doesn’t have to be a shared truth. But before I can actually be healed I have to feel that somebody’s heard my story and if they haven’t heard my story then I’m not open to letting it go. (Lundy and McGovern 2006, p. 83, cited in McIntyre 2008, p. 69)

Wang et al.’s (2000) project reinforces the point that photovoice has the power to heal by helping subjects define themselves through their experience and to have it acknowledged by fellow participants and the broader public. One homeless participant in Wang et al.’s (2000) project observed that: “...photovoice gave her the opportunity to define her life as she, not outsiders, understood it” (p. 86). By opening up spaces for voice, reflection, and action, participatory research overcomes the “lack of

respect for the knowledge of stigmatized peoples” (Fals-Borda 1991, cited in Kidd and Kral 2005, p. 187). When researchers, facilitators, and the participants themselves affirm the lived experiences of homeless young people, these youth’s self-respect and confidence may grow (de Winter and Noom 2003).

PAR and “Thick” Data

In the intensive and close interaction between researchers/facilitators and subjects, a PAR researcher becomes quite connected to the population being worked with. As part of this involvement, a researcher “must be prepared to care deeply and personally, be confused and frustrated, and be quiet when necessary” (Maguire 1993). With such a relationship between researcher and study subjects—and the “lived experiences” that result—a participatory researcher has a “thick” or detailed look at a population and its problems. Indeed, a PAR researcher is afforded an inside perspective to contexts, people, and knowledge that conventional approaches would otherwise preclude. In short, a PAR project affords access to the expertise of a population regarding its daily struggles. As Angela, a 19-year-old homeless subject observed in one study:

So many people don’t get that we know what is going on, and coming from the outside, you can’t really know what is happening. You might have ideas, but the only people who know what is really going to work, and how to get at what is really going on, is us. (Kidd and Kral 2005, p. 187)

The expertise inherent to the subjects’ understanding and analysis of their world is aptly captured in the title of Wang et al.’s (2000) article: “Who Knows the Streets as Well as the Homeless?”

The problems facing homeless youth are multifaceted, complex, and entrenched. In a context in which knowledge is power (and in which knowledge is often controlled, reproduced, and restricted to specific groups, particularly the academy), the discussion needs to be broadened. Indeed, the voices, ideas, and perspectives of those facing the problems—homeless youth themselves—need to be embraced as a starting point for new ideas and possible solutions (Wilmsen 2008). Actively including homeless youth in such practices as PAR and peace education can teach us much about how they, as well as others on the margins of society, can access and use their citizenship rights. The willingness of the youth to participate belies the perception that they are unworthy of citizenship and cannot meaningfully reflect upon their life experiences and structural challenges or devise possible solutions to address them.

This chapter argues for a PAR process that helps homeless youth define and articulate their worldviews and so helps researchers and themselves better understand the terms of their societal estrangement. The youth’s awareness of their own power to make choices is fundamental to this approach. Through this awareness and any subsequent action resulting from it, they may become less estranged as others and more engaged as citizens. Most important, such awareness and action may empower them to find their own means and methods of transitioning off the streets.

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